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Preface 
ECOWAS was established in May, 1975 as a regional institutional framework for the 
coordination and promotion of economic cooperation and sustainable development in 
West Africa. The challenges of economic development in an underdeveloped and highly 
unstable environment such as West Africa appear to be enormous and so leave one to 
ponder on the possibility of success or otherwise in realizing such an ideal.  
This therefore, sparked off my enthusiasm and desire to undertake this research project 
to examine and uncover the overwhelming processes involved in the interplay and 
interrelationships among those factors that promote or inhibit regional economic growth 
and development in West Africa. 
The research project consists of six chapters. Chapter one surveys the current state of 
ECOWAS and its region and traces the processes of decolonization in West Africa and 
earlier hopeful beginnings after independence, and then the period of decline and decay 
orchestrating the failure of ECOWAS in accomplishing meaningful regional economic 
integration and sustainable development, against the background of enormous 
expectations. 
Chapter two, deals with the background history of West Africa and its states in order to 
provide a better understanding of the course of events in West Africa. 
Chapter three provides a descriptive examination of the history and structure of 
ECOWAS and selected chronology of major events within the organization. 
Chapter four deals with the core analytical examination of ECOWAS and its 
shortcomings and seeks to uncover the factors precipitating the failure of the organization 
to accomplish its mission of attaining economic stability and sustainable growth and 
development throughout the region so far. 
Chapter five looks at regional integration theories in order to, find out their usefulness 
or otherwise in explaining ECOWAS and its short comings. 
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Chapter six provides useful deductions and conclusions from chapters four and five 
and throws deeper insight into the prospects for enhanced economic cooperation and 
development in West Africa under the overall institutional framework of ECOWAS. 
    Different persons provided enabling support to me at different stages throughout this 
process to which I express my profound gratitude. First of all, thanks goes to my family 
for their understanding, support and constant encouragement. 
Special thanks and appreciation go to the officials of the ECOWAS headquarters at 
Abuja, Nigeria for the time they spent answering my numerous questions and inquiries, 
and sourcing of needed ECOWAS documents. Specifically, I thank Dr Oluremi Aribisala, 
deputy executive secretary integration programmes, T.O. Lijadu-Oyemade, former 
Director of Administration, H.A. Warkali, Principal programme officer, Library and 
Documentations, Mazi Kingsley Enwere, Secretary of the Division of library and 
Documentations and Henry Nwagboso, library Assistant who painstakingly sourced any 
available documents I asked for. 
Particular thanks also goes to Mr Yahaya, former Director-General, Nigerian Ministry 
of Integration and Cooperation, Abuja, Mr Umoesen Emobong of the same ministry, For 
reasons of anonymity some officers of the Nigerian Customs Service [Import and Export 
Section, Headquarters Abuja], Nigerian Immigration Service Headquarters, Abuja, Tukur 
A., Deputy Controller Nigerian Customs [Seme Border Post], Frank Annan, Assistant 
Superintendent Ghana Immigration Service [Headquarters] Accra, Evans Klutse, Chief 
Controller, C.E.P.S. Accra Ghana, Kennedy Mitchel, Commissairie, Benin Republic 
[Hila Conji Border Post], and other immigration and customs officers of Togolese 
Republic who chose to remain anonymous. Dr. Osita Agbu , Research Fellow Nigerian 
Institute of International Affairs, Lagos and his Assistants, for their time and openness. 
Deep gratitude and appreciation goes to the Swiss Commission for Research 
Partnerships with Developing Countries [CASS], Berne, the Novartis Foundation, Basel, 
for their sustained systematic financial contributions, and the University of Zurich [often 
anchored by Sabina Stocker] for off -setting some of my bills during my field work 
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between, January, 2002 and March 2003, Mr Mikic of Caritas Zurich and Odile 
Rosenkranz for their kindness and sustained assistance. 
Further, with deepest sense of appreciation and gratitude, I acknowledge the 
overwhelming support and advice of Professor Dieter Ruloff, [Thesis Adviser and Head, 
Institute for Political Science], whose initial acceptance to supervise me paved the way 
for me to move to Zurich. His wealth of experience and open mindedness in tackling 
issues regarding my dissertation even in the face of certain odds, heavily strengthened 
and empowered me to surge ahead. His constant expression of his conviction and 
confidence in my ability to accomplish this research work gave me the moral boost to get 
this work to its final stage.  
I am especially grateful to Max Mader [Secretary, Institute for Political Science] for his 
sustained assistance, special concern and care for my personal problems throughout the 
period of my study. In fact, his administrative wisdom and expertise really made things a 
lot easier for me in Zurich. 
 I also thank Dr Asisi Asobie of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka and Dr Cordelia 
Anadi, of the Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria for their comments on earlier 
drafts of the dissertation and Markus Stierli for his assistance in my computer operations. 
 
 Sunday Anadi, Zurich, April 2005 
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1 Introduction 
Over the past two and half decades, West African States have been enmeshed in the 
struggle to attain sustainable economic development and self reliance through regional 
economic integration. ECOWAS was established in May 28, 1975, by the sixteen 
member states of West Africa [now remaining fifteen as Mauritania withdrew], as a 
practical approach in tackling the economic dilemma of the sub-region that is 
devastatingly entangled in excruciating poverty, underdevelopment and foreign 
dependency.  
In addition, ECOWAS had strongly recognized the development and expansion of the 
regional market as the corner piece of its comprehensive development strategy. As clearly 
demonstrated in the preamble of chapter 2 Article 3 of its Revised Treaty, ECOWAS 
sought to achieve economic integration through liberalization of trade between its 
member states, removal of all impediments to free mobility of factors of production, as 
well as harmonization of national economic and fiscal policies of member states1. 
First, ECOWAS set out to form a free trade area by undertaking a progressive removal 
of all custom duties and other charges of similar effect, on imports and exports between 
member states, as well as all quota and quantitative restrictions and other administrative 
impediments on trade between the member states within the sub-region, as epitomized by 
Article 41 of its Revised Treaty2. 
Second, ECOWAS envisaged to gradually roll over to a customs union that will 
eventually metamorphose into a common market, with the eventual elimination of all 
obstacles to free mobility of factors of production between them, while at the same time, 
maintaining common external tariff structure in their trade with countries outside the 
union3. 
                                                 
1 For details of ECOWAS objectives, see Chapter 2, Article 3 of ECOWAS Revised Treaty, ECOWAS 
Secretariat, Abuja, Nigeria. 
2 On Quota and Quantitative Restrictions, see Chapter 8 Art. 41. 
3 For details of ECOWAS envisaged Customs Union; see Chapter 9, Article 54. 
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Finally, in the preamble of chapter 9, Article 54 of ECOWAS Revised Treaty, the 
organization sought to cap its efforts by attaining a complete economic union through the 
harmonization of agricultural, industrial, transport and communication, energy and 
infrastructural development as well as common economic and monetary policies between 
member states4. 
The newly independent states of West Africa had squarely hoped that the success of 
ECOWAS will significantly ameliorate their seeming intractable socio-economic and 
even political problems of underdevelopment, poverty and external dependency. Yet, 
more than twenty-five years after its formation ECOWAS has essentially remained 
somewhat a “lame duck”, with hardly any meaningful impact apart from providing 
employment for a number of civil servants and the elaborate ceremonies of its summits. 
This introductory chapter outlines the emerging role of ECOWAS, at the core of the 
search for sustainable development strategy in West Africa. The rationale of analysis 
used in this work can be better understood when ECOWAS and its performance is 
viewed in relation to the overwhelming underlying challenges before and after its 
formation. Thus, chapter 1 sets out the internal and external dimensions of the emerging 
ECOWAS role and consequently its failure in the search for sustainable development and 
self reliance through regional economic integration. 
I focused on several interrelated factors in order to view ECOWAS and its supposed 
rallying role and indeed failure in West Africa, from both internal and external 
perspectives, while preparing the ground for the theoretical arguments presented in this 
work. The internal dimension examines the evolving process of decolonization and 
hopeful beginnings in West Africa, the period of decline and decay and the emerging 
regional power structure with its attendant implications. The external dimension 
examines the conditions outside the regional context that significantly impact on the 
emerging ECOWAS role and contribute in shaping the character of regional integration 
in West Africa. 
                                                 
4 For details of ECOWAS envisaged complete Economic Union, see chapter 9, Art.55 of ECOWAS 
Revised Treaty. 
 13
1.1 Internal Dimension 
1.1.1 Decolonization and Hopeful Beginnings 
Colonial governance in West Africa with its legitimate trade in one or more cash crops 
to serve the industrial needs of Europe created the basis for the development of a highly 
dis-articulated colonial economy in West Africa, which survived till date. This resulted 
from the non diversification in the production system of the colonial economy 
orchestrated by wide income disparities and remarkable underdevelopment. Several 
decades before the attainment of political independence, West Africa was effectively 
bisected into two main diametrically opposed political and economic systems, directly 
cultivated and nurtured by the colonial powers; The British colonial system of indirect 
rule and free commercial enterprise on the one side, and the French colonial 
administrative policy of assimilation hinged on trade ‘protectionism’ on the other. 
Colonial development policy on both sides of the divide did not include any 
meaningful plan for a balanced economic and political development of the colonies; 
rather, they were structured and nurtured to suit the conveniences of the colonial powers. 
Also, colonial infrastructural developments were horizontally arranged, running from the 
coast to the hinterland for easy evacuation of cash crops. More so, throughout the 
colonial period, the devastating effects of the structural imbalances in the colonial 
economic development strategy and the resultant effects on the colonial economy’s 
balance of payments, were only marginally felt as they were really cushioned and 
sustained by the use of the colonial metropolitan currencies i.e. ‘British pound and French 
Franc’ in their international trade. 
However, the aftermath of the Second World War ushered in an era of fundamental 
changes in socio-economic and political spheres in both the British and French colonies 
in West Africa. The evolving era soon created unavoidable necessity for the reappraisal 
and modification of the traditional colonial policy of preserving the colonies against 
“radical changes”, quite contrary to the colonial authority’s decades of preference for 
gradual changes in the colonies. 
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First, The economic basis of the colonies enmeshed in devastating structural 
imbalances were on the verge of “collapse” which were mainly precipitated by the 
pressures of urbanization and uncontrolled population growth, increased scarcity of land, 
propensity for expansion of primary products production as well as worsening soil 
degradation. Therefore, there were quite unavoidable necessities for the reorganization 
and subsequent introduction of new methods of land use and land tenure and immediate 
expansion in socio-economic infrastructure in several areas of West Africa, if any 
remaining elements of colonial legitimacy were to be maintained. 
Second, the period after the war also witnessed acute shortages of primary products in 
the World market compared to the pre-existing World commodity market saturation that 
characterized the period before the war. Thus, this created the necessity for expansion in 
cash crop production not only for the domestic market but also for the international 
market, to meet up with the high international demand for agricultural commodities as 
well as the attraction from the accompanying increases in prices occasioned by the 
shortages. 
Third, soon after the war, there emerged some kind of domestic public opinion in both 
the colonial metropolitan centres and indeed the international community that began to 
weigh heavily against colonial rule, thus, demanding coordinated and sustainable actions 
for increased advancement in the living conditions of the colonies. 
Finally, of importance too is the fact that the existing colonial administrative 
institutional structures were becoming increasingly ‘inefficient’ to shoulder the burden of 
expansion in socio-economic and infrastructural development throughout the colonies. 
Both the British ‘indirect rule’ system through the native authority and the French 
‘assimilation policy’ based on the Chef de Cantons or Chef de village were widely 
resented throughout West Africa, as both colonial institutional structures were essentially 
designed for tax collection, recruitment of forced labour, conscription and general 
maintenance of law and order. Thus, the growing need for new institutions for effective 
governance, lead to several constitutional reforms in both the British and the French areas 
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in West Africa to ameliorate existing administrative impediments and apparent 
inadequacies throughout the colonies.5  
“Thus, a ‘change of emphasis’ in administrative policy was dictated by immediate 
necessities; - improvement of native authority efficiency in dealing with expanded social 
services and an ambitious program of agricultural rehabilitation and economic 
development, and the political representation of non-traditional elements of the African 
population to secure their cooperation in central and local government [Robinson, R.E. 
[1947] in Hyam, R. [eds.], [1992]: 153-157]”. 
In addition, there were as it may seem uncomfortable immense pressures and general 
restiveness on the part of the World War 11 colonial returnee soldiers, who soon after the 
war began to demand for extensive reforms and a more rewarding relationship from the 
colonial authorities. This arose out of the fact that both the British and the French actually 
“enlisted” a sizable percentage of colonial peoples into their combined forces during the 
Second World War in their effort to confront the overbearing challenges of the war.  
This experience and exposure of course, substantially enhanced the amount of public 
attention and notice they could garner within the colonies as well as advancements in 
political education and awareness of the colonial peoples. Thus, the resultant 
enhancement in public awareness of the inequity of colonial governance, and the 
attendant protests, riots and general unrests against colonial rule, added more pressures 
on the colonial administrations to embark on meaningful reforms throughout West 
Africa. Apparently, the experience of the British colonial officials in tackling the 
difficulties of economic and social development in West Africa in the face of enormous 
pressures from the ‘dependent peoples’ was summarized as thus; 
“We must expect trouble some period ahead. We cannot pursue development schemes 
fast enough to absorb all the rising generation in useful wage-employment. …They can 
not on their present economies enjoy all the services which they begin to demand. They 
                                                 
5 For details of efforts at decolonization in British West African territories, see Hyam, R.[eds.], British 
Documents on the End of Empire, Series A Volume 2, “The labour Government and the End of Empire 
1945-51”: Part 1 [HMSO], [1992]. 
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clamour for the benefits of civilization without the economic basis to sustain them [Jones, 
C. [1948], in Hyam [eds.], 1992: 162: 168]”. 
These conditions necessitated drastic changes and adjustments in colonial 
administrative policies, and consequently created an enabling environment for the 
emergence and growth of nationalist movements throughout West Africa. In addition, 
improvements in education and political advancement, increased negative international 
opinion against continued sustenance of colonialism and the colonial peoples concerted 
struggles to free themselves from the shackles of colonial rule, effectively combined to 
trigger off a chain of events that eventually metamorphosed into the political 
independence of the West African states. The West African peoples’ struggles against 
colonial rule were succinctly articulated in Nkrumah’s political philosophy of “Positive 
Action” i.e. “legitimate political action, Newspapers and educational campaigns, and as a 
last resort, the constitutional application of strikes, boycotts and non-cooperation 
principle of absolute non-violence...” through which Ghana eventually became the first 
independent West African state. 
  
“In our present vigorous struggle for self-government, nothing strikes so much terror in 
the hearts of the imperialists and their agents than the term positive Action. This is 
especially so because of their fear of the masses responding to the call to apply this form 
of resistance in the case the British government fails to grant us our freedom…[Nkrumah, 
K. [1949], in Metcalfe, G.E. 1964:168-169].” 
Around the French West Africa, following the devastating effects of the economic 
depression of the 1930’s, the French adopted a more systematic exploitation of the 
colonies which extensively exacerbated the already boiling colonial people’s discontents 
with colonial rule. Consequently, the French African Empire soon began to show signs of 
visible crack as nationalist demands and activities heightened throughout the French 
colonies. Even as early as 1936, the emergence of the Popular Front to power in France 
with its liberal doctrines had created the enabling environment for the “upsurge of trade 
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union activities demanding equal political and economic rights as French citizens”, with 
the Senegalese Lamine Gueye’s socialist party of the popular front as the rallying point 6. 
However, by the 1960’s when most of the West African states gained their 
independence, the realities of the enormous distortions inherent in the colonial economy 
came to the fore. First, they were utterly left with highly fragile and structurally truncated 
economies based on the export of one or two agricultural commodities with inherent price 
distortions in the international commodity market. Also, the fact that none of these states’ 
national currencies were convertible further worsened the already destabilizing balance of 
payments problems in both their trade within the region and in their trade with other 
regions of the world.  
Therefore, the 1960’s witnessed a period of concerted efforts on the part of the newly 
independent states to restructure the inherited colonial economic mode of production in 
West Africa, in which the state was bound to play a leading role in economic 
development, through the building of social and economic infrastructure and the 
provision of social services to the citizens. Interestingly most of the newly independent 
states of West Africa emerged from independence with high hopes of rapid and 
sustainable socio-economic and political development throughout the region.  
Thus, while basking in the euphoria of self-governance, many of these states embarked 
on several ambitious but poorly coordinated and implemented national development 
plans that yielded only marginal benefits as the economies were too weak to sustain the 
large industrial projects needed for balanced and sustainable economic development. 
Also, the rapid industrialization strategy of import substitution industrialization adopted 
by these states could not yield the much desired diversification in their economies, but 
only practically resulted in the reproduction of foreign dependency. Apparently, due to 
the inexperience of the local negotiators, these import substitution industries were not 
designed to use local inputs in their production processes, but merely required semi-
processed goods as raw materials from the developed nations, thus, worsening the already 
balance of payments problems. 
                                                 
6 For details of decolonization process in French West Africa, see Chafer T. [2002], “The End of Empire in 
French West Africa”: France’s Successful Decolonization? Oxford. New York: p 29-30. . 
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1.1.2 Period of decline and decay 
Towards the end of the first decades of political independence and as the euphoria of 
self rule gradually disappeared, the newly independent West African nations were soon 
preoccupied with the problem of redressing the harsh economic realities of their new 
states. In addition, the devastating effects of the fragile nature of their economies 
characterized by single crop export dependence became increasing manifest, which were 
severely worsened by the non-convertibility of their national currencies in their local and 
international trade. Worse still, the value of their export commodities was constantly 
battered by incessant price fluctuations in the international market, of which they had no 
control. 
Consequently, the following decade of the 1970’s witnessed an era of devastating 
socio-political and economic decline in West Africa, leading to severe drop in the 
provision of social services and dehumanizing decline in average living conditions of the 
people, in contrast to the positive improvements attained in the 1960’s. As a result, the 
West African sub-region gradually plunged into a ‘lost era’ bedevilled by decades of civil 
wars and social unrests that greatly devastated the already suffocating economies of these 
states. 
In real terms, the newly independent states of West Africa were not really “negotiated” 
states [i.e. without the consent of the nationalities], but merely imposed by the colonial 
authorities, remained substantially structurally weak and generally propelled by force. 
Thus, the coercive nature of these new states which had its roots from the colonial order, 
could not sufficiently harness the advantages of ‘political plurality and ethnic diversity’ 
in nation building, and therefore, severely impeded the development of sustainable socio-
economic and political institutions throughout West Africa. Thus, the new states of West 
Africa could not build on the same solid nationalist sentiments that propelled and 
sustained nationalist struggles for independence for decades to establish a unified state, 
rather, most of the new states soon “slipped back into ethnic, religious and linguistic 
divisions that constantly threaten the very existence of these states”. 
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As a result, shortly after independence “personal rule” became the preferred form of 
government in West Africa “where rulers have no constitutional, charismatic-
revolutionary or traditional legitimacy”. More complicating is the fact that “the strongest 
loyalties of most Africans remained those to their extended family, ethnic group and 
region rather than to the nation-state that was still coming into being”.7
The West African states could not generate effective political institutions to regulate 
social relationships based on economic and political order, and therefore were not able to 
replace their traditional social forces with “occupational, class and skill groupings” in 
their process of modernization. Public institutional structures remained highly fragile and 
utterly disorganized in the face of enormous pressures from varied and fast expanding 
social forces. The inability of West African States’ national political development to 
accommodate great qualities of “consensus, legitimacy, effective organization and 
stability” created grave deficiencies in enthroning effective and stable government 
throughout the sub-region. This in-turn created conditions for widespread “mistrust 
among their citizens, in national and public loyalties, in organization, skills and capacity 
building”8. 
In addition, economic decline and decay seem to be the major catalyst for social 
change in West Africa - characterized by socio-economic and political turmoil enmeshed 
in increased poverty, chronic food shortages, expanded indebtedness, worsening balance 
of payments and internecine wars etc, whereas, in other places, social changes are often  
propelled by positive and meaningful changes. The consequence is that the post-
independence lofty aspirations and dreams of these states of improving the welfare of 
their citizens could not materialize.  
More-so, several economic and political reform measures in the 1980’s and 1990’s 
characterized by different and poorly designed structural adjustment programs supported 
                                                 
7 See R. Sandbrook, [1982]. in J.F. Clark and D.E. Gardner [eds.], “Political Reform in Francophone 
Africa”, West View Press, Boulder, Colorado: [1997]; and D.E. Gardner’s Extracts, for detailed 
descriptions of the forms and decadence of governments that emerged in Africa after Independence. 
 
8 For detailed explanations on the relationship of social forces and political institutions in nation building, 
see, Samuel P. Huntington “Political Order in Changing Societies” [Henry L. Stimson Lectures], New 
Heaven and London: Yale University Press, [1968]:1-28. 
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by the World Bank and IMF, could neither redress the structural imbalances inherent in 
their economies nor ensure the much needed sustainable forms of development 
throughout the sub-region. Also, the fact that most of these structural adjustment 
programs were designed outside the sub-region, without taking proper cognizance of the 
conditions in West Africa, aggravated by poor implementation and commitment on the 
part of the states, only resulted in increased poverty, intractable inflation, increased 
unemployment and widening disparities in income throughout West Africa.  
Also, the fact that the institutional mechanisms for governance in these states 
originated from the colonial administrations, meant that these new states inherited 
administrative systems and institutions which were fashioned basically for raising 
revenue for the colonial government and remained to a large extent, inherently coercive. 
Thus, the result is that in West Africa till date, most governments are so distant from the 
people and in most cases authoritarian in nature, with very low credibility and poor 
recognition of the efficacy of public opinion in good governance. Indeed, the present 
socio-political and economic state of West African nations confirmed the age long fears 
of colonial officials often articulated in their decades of speeches and circulars thus; 
“Since the 1940, much progress has been made in the granting of increased 
responsibility to Africans in the central political and administrative machinery of 
government….for the most part these positions of responsibility are necessarily being 
filled by men from the educated minority, and in present circumstances, almost all the 
leaders of African society must be drawn from this class. But this very situation, 
inevitable as it is, carries with it one danger for the future, in that it may result in the 
creation of a class of professional African politicians absorbed in the activities of the 
centre and out of direct touch with the people themselves [Jones, C. [1947], in Hyam, R. 
[eds.], [1992]: 119-122]”. 
Therefore, the cumulative consequence of the seeming general failure at state 
formation and nation building in West Africa, is that, most states in West Africa have 
gradually but steadily and gravely degenerated into a somewhat highly “predatory” 
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institutional system and an unholy and organized and coordinated structure for 
“tormenting” the civil society throughout the sub-region9
Thus, as the West African states search for new strategies for the attainment of 
sustainable all round development, they had increasingly looked up at regional 
integration and the supra-national role ECOWAS could play in the reinvigoration and 
redirection of the process of development in the sub-region as articulated in the preamble 
of chapter 2, Art.2 of ECOWAS Revised Treaty.10
1.1.3 Regional Power Structure 
To further broaden the chances of better understanding of the operational environment 
of ECOWAS and the seeming insurmountable overlapping challenges there in, it is 
pertinent to examine the emerging regional power structure in West Africa after political 
independence that negatively or positively impact on the ability of ECOWAS to carry out 
its sub-regional mandate of championing the course of sustainable development and self 
reliance in West Africa. 
The regional power structure after independence and till date is essentially made up of 
two major blocs reminiscent of the colonial divides, which are constantly competing for 
regional leadership. On the one side, are the English speaking member states lead by 
Nigeria with Ghana as “lieutenant”, while on the other side are the French speaking 
member states lead by Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal. The leaders of these blocs are the 
region’s “super powers” because of their military superiority, fairly large population, 
compared to the others, somewhat diverse economic resources and to some extent, 
established central government.  
These vantage positions are further enhanced by the size of their territories. Ghana and 
Senegal and to a lesser extent Togo, play the role of “lieutenants”. They are not in the real 
                                                 
9 For a classic explanation of the Concept of the Predatory State, see, Falton, R. [1992], “Predatory Rule: 
State and Civil Society in Africa”, [Boulder: Lynne Rienner]. 
 
10 For details of ECOWAS envisaged role in the sub-region’s integration process, see Chapter 2, Article 2 
of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty, ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja, Nigeria. 
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sense of it, first rate powers, but are stronger than the other smaller members. Rivalries 
between these two blocs over regional leadership are constant features that characterize 
their relationship and significantly shape the sub-regional political and even economic 
environment. 
Often times, Nigeria has consistently projected itself as the ‘guardian of the sub-
region’s status quo’ in their often public ‘declarations and actions’ that Africa is the 
centre piece of its foreign policy, which were usually viewed with grave ‘suspicion and 
sometimes hostility’ by the other bloc. On the other hand, Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal 
expend greater effort and resources extending their own influence throughout the French 
West Africa while consistently seeking to curtail the ever growing influence and power of 
Nigeria in the sub-region. 
Nigeria has an estimated population of well over 126million and a land area of 
approximately 923,768 square kilometres, while Ghana has an population of about 
17million and a land area of 234,460 square kilometres. On the other hand, Cote d’Ivoire 
has a population of about 14million and approx. 332,463 square kilometres, while 
Senegal is about 9million in population and has a size of about 196,192 square 
kilometres.  
All the other member states on both sides of the divide are ‘relatively small and 
vulnerable powers’ which are substantially financially dependent countries of the sub-
region, in relation to their poor resources, small size and population. Even though Mali 
and Niger Republic are quite larger in size than any of the competing power blocs, more 
than half of these countries are predominantly arid zones, and therefore, lacked the 
necessary economic and human resources to make any remarkable impact in decisions 
affecting the sub-region. 
1.2 External Dimension 
Apart from the fact that ECOWAS represents an expression of Pan-Africanism, there is 
no doubt that West African leaders were influenced by the evolving events in world 
politics at the time. This was at a time when regional trading blocs were becoming 
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increasingly fashionable in the world political arena, as a developmental strategy for 
enhanced economic development and self reliance. As a result, there emerged several 
regional trading blocs or groups in several regions of the world, often as bargaining blocs 
in their trade with the rest of the world. Thus, the success of the European Economic 
Community and later European Union in reinvigorating Europe’s battered economies 
after the Second World War, effectively projected regional economic cooperation as a 
practical self reliant strategy in economic development. 
It is quite possible too that the West African leaders were also influenced directly by 
the overwhelming catalogue of economic gains which liberal economic theories 
propounded could accrue from regional economic cooperation- expansion in market size, 
enhanced economic gains from economies of scale and greater advantages in joint 
management of scarce resources for the well being of all. 
Also, the gradual disappearance of the cold war era and the diversion of substantial Aid 
funds towards the former soviet bloc, invariably created the necessity for African states 
particularly West Africa to reappraise and refocus their developmental strategies toward 
self reliant development, that will ultimately lead to the political and economic 
empowerment of the grass root peoples through regional economic cooperation.  
Therefore, ECOWAS could be viewed in one way, as a reaction to the growing body of 
regional economic groups in world politics and a kind of sub-regional alternative to the 
increasing paucity of developmental aid from the developed countries. The emergence of 
the sub-regional body also offered West African states a veritable instrument for 
negotiations at the international arena–a kind of ‘congenial platform’ for joint and 
coordinated decisions/actions from the sub-region in international issues. 
Finally, a seeming strong pressure and institutional support for an all embracing 
economic grouping in West Africa came also from the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa. As early as 1965, the Commission in its 7th session had through 
Resolution 142 [VII] called for the establishment of a sub-regional intergovernmental 
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structure in West Africa to harmonize and coordinate economic and social development 
in the sub-region11.  
1.3 Regional Integration Processes  
The attempt here is to undertake a short summary of different forms and processes of 
regional integration in order to have a clearer picture of ECOWAS performance in 
relation to its stated objectives. The process of regional integration involves joining 
together different economies into large economic areas for the purpose of free trade while 
at the same time removing all discriminatory barriers between them. This in turn creates 
the necessity for some degree of cooperation and coordination of policies between them. 
In addition, a short overview of different regional schemes will be undertaken while 
striving to ascertain the real motives behind their formation. The commonly cited forms 
of integration include: 
 
1. Free Trade Area – This occurs when nations jointly remove all trade restrictions 
amongst them, while retaining their freedom to pursue individual policies, e.g. 
early EEC or NAFTA. 
2. Customs Unions – This represents an upgrade of free trade area but member 
countries must undertake joint external trade relations with non-member states i.e. 
common external tariffs on goods from non member states. 
3. Common/Single Markets – This occurs when customs unions upgrade their 
relationship further to allow free movement of factors of production i.e. the so 
called ‘4 Freedoms’ between them e.g. the EU. 
                                                 
11 For details of the United Nations ECA contributions in the formation of ECOWAS, see the 7th Session 
Resolution 142 [VII], [1965]. 
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Table 1.1: Schematic Representation of Regional Integration Schemes 
Scheme free intra 
scheme 
trade 
common trade 
policy  
free factor 
mobility 
common 
monetary & 
fiscal policy  
one government 
Free trade 
area 
yes no no no no 
Customs 
Union 
yes yes no no no 
Common 
Market 
yes yes yes no no 
Economic 
Union 
yes yes yes yes no 
Political 
Union 
yes yes yes yes yes 
Source: Ali M. El-Agara, Regional Integration: Experience, Theory and Measurement 
[1999]. 
 
4. Complete Economic/Financial Union – This involves a situation when countries 
that formed a common market completely unify and harmonize their monetary 
and fiscal policies. 
5. Complete Political Union – occurs when two or more member states unite to 
form a sovereign nation under one federal or centralized institutional structure e.g. 
the now defunct Mali federation or the unification of the East and West 
Germanys. 
 
Regional integration generally involves a somewhat complex web of cooperation 
between countries within a given geographical area. It demands harmonization of policies 
in such sectors as trade, investment, infrastructural development, as well as monetary and 
fiscal policies of member states. The overall objective is essentially to ensure stability 
and sustainable economic growth and development within the integrating area.  
The success of any integration scheme be it free trade area, customs unions, 
common/single markets, monetary union or even political union, enhances competition 
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and efficiency within the integrated area, through increased specialization, and generally 
ensures better allocation of scarce resources into the most productive areas. 
In terms of trade, based on the assumptions of perfect competition in markets, the 
classical economic theories insist that the disappearance of tariffs and non tariff barriers 
i.e. complicated customs procedures or somewhat difficult standards etc., between 
member states ensures increased smooth flow of trade within the integrating area, thereby 
increasing the gains in overall national welfare.  
Also, it assumes that as better allocation of resources is attained, product prices 
decrease in favour of consumers. Thus, the welfare benefits occur if the aggregate gains 
by consumers far outweigh the losses encountered by both the producers in relation to 
marginal cost and benefits and the government in terms of loss of revenue. 
 In addition, a meaningful integration process also leads to ‘trade creation’ within the 
integrating area, as member states redirect their trade and increasingly trade more 
between themselves than with non members e.g. when one member state’s exports 
replace goods of inefficient producers within another member country. On the other hand, 
it is widely acknowledged that integration could also lead to ‘trade diversion’ or adverse 
trade effects, if consumers are forced to buy goods manufactured within the integrating 
area at higher prices, as against cheaper similar goods from outside the union12. 
Greater gains from integration could also come in the form of increased investment as 
more prudent application of factors are attained, thus increasing the overall welfare gains. 
However, this can only be assured with the enthronement of effective enforcement 
mechanisms in relation to commitments under regional integration. Economic blocs could 
also gain useful leverage from integration particularly in tariff reduction Agreements 
negotiation with trading partners. However, this is possible only if the integrating area is 
economically large in size in relation to the trading partners with which it negotiates. This 
of-course is not entirely the case in West Africa, as the combined regional market 
                                                 
12 For in depth explanations of the “Trade Creation” and “Trade Diversion” effects of regional economic 
integration, see, Viner, Jacob. [1950] “The Customs Union Issues” [New York: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace]. 
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remains relatively small in economic size which diminishes their bargaining power. 
Therefore, integration is only meaningful if the good aspects of it are greater than the bad 
effects. 
In reality, integration process which ever of the above forms it takes is usually a long 
and tortuous process. The key to its success, joint harmonization and coordination of 
policies between member states requires time and are usually difficult and complicated, 
and generally demands on the part of member states undiluted dedication and 
commitment whether in the form of surrendering some measure of authority to the 
coordinating common institutional structure or in the judicious implementation of the 
assignments required of each member state for the success of the integration process. 
1.4 Short overview of different regional integration schemes 
Regional economic groupings emerged and continued to be relevant in World Politics 
as far back as 1948, when the Benelux countries formed the first ever customs union. 
Subsequently, the European Coal and steel Community was founded in 1951 and 
followed by the EEC common market in 1957, with the main aim of ‘preventing war 
between France and Germany’. This later metamorphosed into the now successful 
European Union. 
 In 1960, the Latin American Free Trade Area [LAFTA] was formed under the treaty 
of Montevideo, to promote industrialization through the expansion of the regional market. 
This was later succeeded by the Latin American Integration Agreement [LAIA] in 1980 
which seeks to expand cooperation through bilateral trade agreements between member 
states according to the level of their economic development. Its goal of complete removal 
of barriers to trade over a 12 year period remains largely unattained, due to wide 
disparities in economic development between member states. 
The organization of Latin American States founded the Central American Common 
Market [CACM] in 1960 as a free trade Area to be attained within five years, and aspires 
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to transform into a customs union, embodied in chapter 1, Articles 1&2 of its treaty13. So 
far, integration remains difficult due to long years of social unrest and political instability 
in most of the member states. In 1967, Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela etc, 
founded the ANDEAN PACT, with the original goal of a customs union as epitomized in 
their Cartagena Agreement of 196914. It hoped to attain a common market based on 
import-substitution, and centralized coordination of industries, as well as harmonization 
of foreign investments and repayments regulations. However, due to frequent 
disagreements between it member states, the association is yet to attain its stated 
objectives.  
The Anglo Caribbean States formed the Caribbean Common market [CARICOM] in 
1973 under the revised treaty of Chagraramas, to coordinate economic activities within 
the region while embracing import-substitution. However, it is still far from attaining its 
stated objectives, as the member states’ economies continue to record persistent declining 
rates of growth since the 1990’s15. Others include, the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] 
founded in 1981 for political and military cooperation, and later strives to attain a 
customs union while at the same time, coordinating protection among it member states 
against foreign interference in the gulf. 
Further, Argentina and Brazil founded the MERCOSUR in 1985, and were later joined 
by Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay in 1990, which matured into a ‘highly 
integrated’ common market in 200116. It provided the institutional framework for settling 
disputes within the region, and serves as a ‘bulwark’ to the economies of member states. 
Currently, the organization is debating proposals for new political and institutional 
reforms, particularly the possibility of an all embracing South American Community and 
a common regional Parliament. In 1967, the Association of South East Asian Nations 
                                                 
13 For details of the CACM Objectives, see Articles 1 & 2 of the General Treaty, 13 December, [1960]. 
 
14 For details of the ANDEAN PACT activities, see the CARTAGENA AGREEMENT, [1960]. 
 
15 For details of the CARICOM Integration Objectives, see Article 6, of the Revised Treaty of 
Changraramas, [1973]. 
 
16 See the “Treaty of Asuncion”, Chapter 1, Articles 1-8 for full details of the Mercosur integration 
Programme. 
 29
[ASEAN] was founded under the framework of the Bangkok Declaration17, which 
became a preference area in 1977 and metamorphosed into a free trade area in 1992 
[AFTA].  
The association provided the much needed framework for guarding against external 
aggression and for curtailing the threatening expansion of communism into the region. At 
present, the organization is seeking new innovations for social development and adapting 
cost-sharing techniques in priority regional projects. However, the expected target of 
2008 is continually extended and aspires to attain a single production base while seeking 
international standards. Also, recently, they have jointly agreed to fast track their 
integration process under the ‘Agreement for the Integration of Priority Sectors’, and 
hope to attain an all inclusive ASEAN Economic Community [AEC] by 2020. 
The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC] was established in 1989 first as a 
dialogue forum but later transformed into a free trade area with a ‘free trade Agreement’ 
that is more or less nonbinding on member states. Currently, it seeks support for 
enhancing member states economies through a ‘three stage process’ for promoting the 
APEC initiative. Under the framework of its most recent Santiago Declaration of 21st 
November, 2004, the organization seeks to enhance interdependence and economic 
advancement of member states through expanded trade, investment, security and good 
governance throughout the region18. 
In Africa, the South African Customs Union [SACU] formed as far back as 1910, 
represents the oldest of such groupings in the region. Apart from the fact that it was first 
muted by the colonialists, after independence, member states willingly rejoined the 
group. This was followed by the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference [SADCC] in 1980, but later renamed in the 1992 ‘Lusaka Declaration’ as the 
Southern Africa Development cooperation [SADC], when South Africa became a 
member.  
                                                 
 
17 See the BANGKOK DECLARATION [1967], for details of ASEAN envisaged Integration program. 
 
18 For details of current APEC Integration Initiatives, see the SANTIAGO DECLARATION, 21 November, 
[2004], APEC Secretariat.  
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The original objective was to protect member states against the destabilizing tendencies 
of the apartheid regime in South Africa, while guaranteeing infrastructural assistance and 
policy coordination. In 1996, it gradually matured into a free trade area, under an 
institutional structure in 2001 as articulated in Article 5 of the 1992 SADC Treaty19. 
The Communàute Economiquè de L’ouèst [CEAO] was founded in 1972, and strives to 
attain a free trade area with a compensation fund for loss of revenue for member states. In 
1973, the Union Donniere ET Economiquè de L’Afriquè Centralè [UDEAC] was formed 
but though it aspires to become a customs union, it has so far remained redundant. There 
is also the now defunct East African Community [[1967], the Mano River Union [MRU]. 
Ofcourse, there is the Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS] founded 
in 1975, to promote sustainable development and self reliance throughout the sub-region. 
Generally speaking, in all these regions, considerations of security remain paramount 
as the access to trade. For instance, the EU could be viewed as a practical effort to reduce 
conflicts and tensions between countries in Europe. In the case of the ANDEAN PACT, 
the framework successfully curtailed frequent rivalries among its member states, and help 
checkmate the threatening expansion of internal crisis of one country across national 
boundaries of the others. 
                                                 
 
19 For details of current SADC Integration initiatives and increased efforts at greater cooperation between 
member states, see Art.5, SADC Treaty, [1992]. 
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Table 1.2: Selected African Regional Integration Groups 
ORGANISATION DATE 
ESTABLISHED 
STATUS 
Southern African Co-operation Union  1910 Replaced 
Mali Federation 1959 Defunct 
Organisation Commune Africàine ET Malgachè 1961 Defunct 
Union Douanière et Economiquè de l’Afriquè 
Centrale 
1964 Operational 
East African Community 1967 Defunct 
Communàute Economiquè de l’Afriquè de l’Quèst 1967 Operational 
Mano-River Union 1970 Operational 
Economic Community of West African States 1975 Operational 
Southern African Development Co-ordination 
Conference 
1975 Replaced 
Preferential Trade Area for East and Southern Africa. 1981 Operational 
Communaute Economique des Estats de l’Afrique 
Centrale. 
1981 Operational 
Southern African Development Co-operation 1992 Operational 
Source: Own Construction 
 
In Southern Africa, the SADCC made no secret of its intention to provide material and 
military support to member states against the moribund apartheid regime of South Africa. 
Even the West African Economic Community has quite remarkable security undertone. 
The founding architects of the community particularly Nigeria, viewed the success of the 
community in the ‘context of providing the much needed protection against external 
aggression’. Even the community now intervenes in internal conflicts within member 
states considered sufficiently threatening to the sub-region, to guard against cross-border 
spill over. El-Agara summarizes the debate concerning the motive forces propelling the 
initiation of these regional groups as thus: 
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“The frequent citing of investment gains even if there are no potential gains, which can 
only come if there is a confidence effect, independent of economics, all supports the idea 
that these regional groups have primarily non-economic motivations …Therefore, in 
counting the motives for different groups, the avalanche of recent military conflicts are 
counted as positive, because preventing future military conflicts is among the most 
commonly present motives or pre-existing conditions for the regions, along with political 
cohesion, trade access and pre-existing economic integration…where basic national 
interests like political cohesion and security are important, it is more likely that the 
prospects for successful economic integration will be strengthened  [El-Agara, 1999]”. 
It is also note worthy, that most of these economic groupings are confronted with 
similar difficulties as in ECOWAS, particularly in the areas of harmonization of policies 
to facilitate trade, and often remaining unions between and among unequal partners. 
However, some of the existing regional economic groupings have been more successful 
than others in their quest for sustainable economic development and self reliance through 
regional economic integration. 
1.5 The central research interest and research questions 
This work takes a closer look at the regional integration efforts of the Economic 
Community of West African States [ECOWAS], and its role and aggregate performance 
in the sub-region’s search for alternative strategies for sustainable socio-economic 
development and self reliance through regional economic integration.  
The choice of regional integration in West Africa is not for its own sake, as it has 
become increasingly important in the developmental efforts of the sub-region. The 
ultimate transition to sustainable socio-economic and political development in West 
Africa seems to be a long and tortuous process, and basically involves the harmonization 
of economic, social and even political objectives. 
Added to this is the fact that any meaningful developmental strategy must also take 
into account the aims and aspirations of today while transferring to generations yet 
unborn, sustainable socio-economic and political systems. So far, the West African States 
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have failed woefully not only in ensuring socio-economic and political stability but also 
sustainable development throughout the sub-region. 
The research interest stirring this work is threefold: first, it attempts to present to the 
reader the dynamics and challenges of West African integration through the focal point 
presented in the first part of this chapter. This is largely done through field study of the 
implementation of key ECOWAS Protocols in selected ECOWAS states- Benin 
Republic, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo, informal interviews and analysis of ECOWAS 
documents and statistics. 
Second, the work applied the research tools of the cognitive framing model of analysis 
in analyzing the interrelated and overlapping challenges precipitating the failure of 
ECOWAS in its regional integration programme. The approach’s analytical tools provide 
a better outlook on how to view policy makers in West Africa and indeed ECOWAS, 
while assuming the primacy of subjective factors in arriving at decisions, which assumes 
that decision makers’ thought processes are largely conditioned by the demands of the 
immediate domestic environment and roles of policy makers.  
The approach generally assumes that, due to the devastating socio-economic and 
political circumstances in West Africa, it will be politically suicidal for policy makers to 
pursue the long term benefits of regional economic cooperation in preference to the short 
term national needs of their states that demand urgent attention. This underscores the 
realist assumption that “…no single rational choice exists for the policy question 
[McKeown, [1993]: 204]”. Therefore, the cognitive framework is “…dominated by 
immediate elite or national needs; a rational choice in terms of conjoint utilities provided 
by regional cooperation may lack rationality within the cognitive framework of political 
elite seeking to maximize individual political goals [Brown, [1994]: 14]”. 
When a number of countries agree to unite together under a formal institutional 
structure, they are fully aware that the success of the scheme will depend to a large extent 
on their level of commitment and cooperation within the institutional agendas. Often, 
such a scheme creates a necessity for policy harmonization and coordination. However, 
because member states’ interests and preferences are not always the same, they are 
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constantly confronted with the problem of policy choice as each policy decision arises 
within the common institutional structure. In most cases, the way and manner member 
states’ policy makers make these decisions, are largely influenced more by ‘subjective 
factors’ than any structural or behavioural trait peculiar to the policy makers. This in-turn 
determines whether they will cooperate or not with the particular policy in contention 
within the regional agenda. 
On the contrary, both the realist and liberal theories insist that in making these 
decisions, states are largely influenced by the “anarchical” nature of the international 
order. In doing this, they undertake “rational” classification of objectives as well as assess 
the benefits of other available policy alternatives in order to achieve intended policy 
outcomes at reasonable cost.  
The realists maintained that states streamline their “national interests”, and quantify 
costs and benefits of different policy alternatives to achieve intended outcomes, under an 
ambiguous environment due to ‘limited resources, time and information’. They 
concluded that, this condition of-course does not allow policy makers greater 
opportunities to consider other avenues of arriving at decisions, and therefore, viewed 
state behaviour as a consequence of bounded rationality [Keohane, 1989: 62; Simon, 
1955, 1957 and 1958].  
In general terms, the Cognitive Framework of analysis views the disparities in the 
levels of analysis and assessment of utilities between national and regional policy makers 
as well as the aggregate influence of time on utility assessment as prime determinants of 
the degree of cooperation between member states in a regional integration scheme.20
                                                 
20 For detailed explanation of the assumptions of the cognitive Framework, see Brown, M.L. “Developing 
Countries and Regional Economic Cooperation”, Praeger, CT: [1994]: 21-31. 
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Table 1.3: Schematic Presentation of Member States’ Elite Cognitive Framework of 
Utilities V/S Regional Initiatives 
 
ISSUE CONCEPTUALISATION 
 
NATIONAL 
  
 REGIONAL 
  
 LEVEL OF ASSESSMENT  
 
 IMMEDIATE NATIONAL 
WELFARE 
 
REGIONAL WELFARE 
 
GAIN / LOSS 
IMMADIATE NATIONAL GAIN /
LOSS AVERSION 
LONG-TERM REGIONALLY 
DISTRIBUTED GAIN / LOSS 
 
PROBABILITY / RISK 
 
RISK AVERSION 
 
HIGH / LOW RISK 
 
IDEOLOGY/FOREIGN 
INFLUENCE 
 
NATIONAL COLONIAL 
CLEAVEGES 
 
 REGIONAL IDEOLOGICAL 
DISPARITIES 
 
TIME - HORIZON 
 
SHORT-TERM PAY-OFFS 
 
LONG-TERM PAY-OFFS 
Source: Reconstructed from Brown, 1994: p.38 
 
This work insists that this position does not fully take into account those aspects of 
decision making that are largely determined by such ‘subjective factors’ as policy 
makers’ attitudinal disposition toward “probability and risk”, “gain and loss”, “time 
frame and indeed world view”, which significantly affect policy outcomes.  
For this, I argue that the realist and liberal interpretations will not effectively capture 
the attitudinal disposition of policy makers in West Africa, in relation to their cooperation 
with regional integration policies, which largely accounts for the failure or order wise of 
ECOWAS integration initiative. It seems quite obvious in West Africa, that in most 
cases, long-term regional policies are often ‘incongruent’ with the preferred national 
policies of member states in relation to the immediate national needs of these states. 
Third, the shortcomings not explained by traditional theories of integration in 
explaining the dynamics of West African integration programme are highlighted. 
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1.5.1 The research questions 
The questions raised in this work attempt to tackle the several aspects of the challenges 
confronting ECOWAS in its integration programme, with the goal of providing a clearer 
picture of the numerous overlapping factors that precipitated the failure of ECOWAS in 
general. The questions are both descriptive and analytical and strive for causal 
explanations. 
 Why has regional integration process been very difficult in West Africa: What went 
wrong and why? 
 Is regional integration only for the developed countries? 
 Which theoretical framework best accounts for policy outcomes in ECOWAS? 
1.6 Methodology: Field Study, Informal Interviews and Analysis of ECOWAS 
Documents and Statistics 
In the following, I consulted and analyzed available literature, and official ECOWAS 
documents and statistics at the ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja, Nigeria. This made it 
possible to have a clear identification of the data gap, which in-turn propelled the 
collection of the primary data. 
In view of this, a field study was undertaken based on case selection of the operations 
of ECOWAS policies in four designated countries – Benin Republic, Ghana, Nigeria and 
Togo. 
Whilst there, observational tools and informal interviews were used to capture the 
views of Scholars, Customs and immigration officers and business peoples and travellers. 
The focus of the informal interviews hinged on the perception of the goals, benefits and 
problems of regional integration in West Africa, member states attitudes toward regional 
programmes, as well as political and strategic issues hindering the ECOWAS integration 
process.  
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A variety of integration theories have attempted to explain different phenomena in 
regional integration generally, but they are not sufficient in providing a broader picture of 
ECOWAS in relation to its failure to achieve meaningful regional integration in West 
Africa so far. I argue that cognitive framing approach best explains ECOWAS failure 
more accurately than its counterparts in relation to the socio-political and economic 
circumstances in West Africa. 
Agreed that regional economic integration in general offer greater opportunities for the 
attainment of common good, particularly in terms of ensuring stability and economic 
growth through better allocation of scarce resources, enhanced competition and positive 
trade if properly channelled, of which states may find extremely difficult to tackle alone, 
the economic circumstances of West Africa at present renders regional schemes 
practically ineffective, and often running in opposite directions with immediate national 
aspirations of member states. While the maturation of regional schemes are usually long 
term, the national needs of states in West Africa demand serious urgent solutions which 
regional schemes are not designed to provide in the immediate. Therefore, policy makers 
in West Africa are constantly engulfed in their failed bid to balance the demands of 
urgent national concerns with the long term regional initiatives. 
1.7 The Itinerary 
Following the introductory chapter, the historical background of the development of 
West Africa was reviewed in chapter 2. Basically, in order to understand clearly the 
course of events in West African integration, a selected chronology of member states of 
ECOWAS is presented as well an examination of their internal socio-political and 
economic profiles thus providing a ‘tour d’ horizon’ of the sub-region and its states. 
Chapter 3 is essentially descriptive; it first examines the chronology of ECOWAS and 
its organizational structure. It examines various ECOWAS integration policies in relation 
to actual degree of implementation, drawing useful inferences from experience of the 
field study and interviews undertaken as well as ECOWAS documents and statistics. 
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Chapter 4 is the core empirical part of the work and essentially analytic. It underscores 
the failure of ECOWAS in its search for sustainable development and self reliance and 
the overlapping factors that precipitated that failure, and strives to answer the research 
question: Why is regional integration seemingly very difficult in West Africa: What went 
wrong and why? 
Chapter 5 examines various regional integration theories in order to find out if they are 
useful in explaining ECOWAS and its shortcomings. It strives to ascertain if the core 
preconditions for the successful application and/or adaptation of these theories exist in 
West Africa. The summary of this chapter attempts to answer the question: Is regional 
integration only for the developed countries? 
In addition, a candid summary of the usefulness of other regional integration theories 
in explaining ECOWAS and its failure, would have thrown more light on the efficacy and 
preference in using the research tools of the cognitive framework model in accounting for 
the failure of ECOWAS in this work. While acknowledging the contributions of other 
theories in explaining this failure, the cognitive framing model better clarifies these short 
comings in relation to the existing political and economic circumstances of the sub-
region. 
Finally, chapter 6 summarizes the main findings, discusses the probable limits of the 
cognitive framing approach applied in this work as well as suggestions about future 
avenues of research. 
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2 West Africa and ECOWAS - Historical Background 
This Chapter looks at the origin and development of West Africa and its states in order 
to better understand the course of events in West African economic integration process. 
Basically, it briefly examines traditional West Africa and undertakes selected chronology 
of events and internal socio-political and economic profiles of its member states, thus 
providing a tour d’horizon of the sub-region and its states. 
West Africa is that part of Africa that is bounded in the West and South by the Atlantic 
Ocean, the Sahara desert on the North, and on the East by the eastern boundaries of 
present day Nigeria. Practically, it is that area of Africa that is “encircled in the North by 
a line running from the Senegal River to Lake Chad, in the East by a line running from 
Lake Chad to the Cameroon Mountains, and in the south and west, by the Atlantic Ocean 
coastline”21  
However, even though the ‘southern and western borders remain clearly cut out by the 
sea, the eastern and western boundaries are largely unclear due to the near absence of 
natural geographical barriers demarcating it from the rest of Africa’. 
                                                 
21 For details of geographical location of West Africa and history, see Onwubiko, K.B.C. [1973]. History of 
West Africa: AD 1800 – Present Day [Book Two]. Aba: Africana Educational Publishers Co [Nig.]  
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Figure 2.1: Map of West Africa Depicting ECOWAS Member Countries. 
 
Source: Adapted from ECOWAS Official Website [online]. 
 
Traditionally, West African peoples have earned their living from the land and that is 
why agriculture remains the bedrock of all other indigenous economic activity in West 
Africa. Other occupations such as trade and craft manufacture were rather undertaken on 
a part time basis, while additional types of productive enterprises were often made 
possible by the financial surplus from agriculture. 
However, the nature of economic activities in West Africa was drastically changed 
with the arrival of the Europeans on the west coast of Africa between the 17th and 18th 
centuries, and the subsequent transformation of the hitherto local servitude into a largely 
‘profitable trans-national commercial enterprise’ which for centuries gravely retarded 
socio-economic development throughout west Africa. 
Also, the resultant partitioning and subsequent introduction of European colonial 
governance in West Africa with its colonial policy of legitimate trade in one or two cash 
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crops to serve the industrial needs of Europe further worsened the resultant erosion of 
indigenous industrial skills and the basis for the development of sustainable interactive 
economic activities throughout West Africa.  
In consequence therefore, by the time most of the new nation states of West Africa 
gained their independence in the 1960’s, they were left with structurally fragile and 
highly disarticulated economies with inherent acute and devastating price distortions in 
the international commodity market.  
2.1 Genesis and Formation of ECOWAS 
Earlier efforts to co-ordinate economic cooperation on a sub-regional level in West 
Africa dates back to 1963, with a conference on industrial harmonization in the sub-
region in Lagos, Nigeria and the Niamey conference on economic cooperation in 1966. 
Similarly, in 1967, another conference was held in Accra, Ghana where a tentative 
agreement on the Articles of Association of a proposed economic community in West 
Africa was signed.  
An interim Council of ministers mandated to prepare a Draft Treaty for the proposed 
community recommended that the inaugural meeting of the proposed community be held 
on the level of heads of states and government. Though the Heads of States and 
Government actually met in Monrovia in 1968 and signed the protocol for a regional 
group, neither the Draft Treaty nor the Protocol on customs union submitted by the 
interim council was adopted. 
In 1972, the process was revived by the Heads of State of Nigeria and Togo by 
mandating their officials to streamline a framework for community cooperation based on 
the following guiding principles: 
a) That, the envisaged economic community should cut across linguistic and 
cultural differences. 
b) Should pursue limited realizable objectives. 
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c) Approach adopted should be flexible and practical. 
d) Necessary institutions are to be adopted allowing all countries to become 
members at their convenience. 
The proposals of a joint Nigeria-Togolese delegation embodied in a Draft Treaty was 
reconsidered in yet another ministerial meeting in January 1975, and finally signed on 
28th May, 1975, by the Heads of State and Government / Representatives of the fifteen 
member countries of West Africa, thus, marking the end of over a decade of unfruitful 
strenuous effort to institutionalize a framework for coordinating sustainable development 
and collective self-reliance in West Africa. 
ECOWAS was therefore established in 1975 to coordinate and promote trade, 
cooperation and sustainable development throughout West Africa. The signing of the 
ECOWAS Treaty of Lagos in May 28, 1975, was indeed a kind of radical response to the 
plague of poverty and underdevelopment bedevilling West Africa, and as a result, 
practically provided the much desired framework for the realization of rapid and 
sustainable socio-political and economic development throughout the sub-region, and has 
till date the following member states: Republic of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone and the Republic of Togo.  
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Table 2.1: Schematic Representation of ECOWAS Countries 
 
Countries 
 
Land 
Area 
 
Capital 
City 
 
Estimated 
Population 
[Millions] 
Major 
Language/ 
Languages 
Income 
Per 
Capita 
[USD] 
 
Economic 
Resources 
Average
Annual 
GDP 
[USD 
billions] 
 
Benin  
Republic 
 
113,000 
km2
 
Cotonou 
 
6,000,000 
 
French, 
Fon,Yoruba, 
Bariba 
 
886 
Cotton, 
Oil, 
Mining, 
Lime stone 
etc. 
 
2.35 
Burkina 
Faso 
274,122km2 Ouagadougou 11,000,000 French, 
Moore, 
Dioula, Peul 
 
898 
Cotton, 
Peanuts, 
Sheanuts, 
Gold 
 
2.6 
Cape 
Verde 
4,033km2 Praia 430,000 Portuguese, 
Crioulo 
 
---- 
 
Services 
 
---- 
 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
 
322,462km2
 
Yamoussoukro
 
15,000,000 
French, & 
other 60 
native 
languages 
 
1,546 
Oil, Gas, 
Coffee, 
Cocoa 
beans, 
&Palm Oil 
 
10.46 
Gambia 11,295km2 Banjul 1,000,000 English, 
Wolof, 
Fulani, 
Mandinka 
etc 
 
---- 
 
Tourism, 
Services 
etc. 
 
---- 
Ghana 239,460km2 Accra 19,000,000 English & 
over 100 
native 
Languages. 
 
1,793 
Gold, 
Diamonds, 
etc 
 
7.4 
Guinea 245,857km2 Conakry 7,000,000 French & 
other native 
Languages. 
 
1,761 
Coffee, 
Cotton, 
Fruits, Oil, 
Nuts etc. 
 
3.7 
Guinea 
Bissau 
36,125km2 Bissau 1,100,000 Portuguese, 
Crioulo 
 
---- 
Rice, 
Maize, 
Plantains, 
Beans, 
Millet, etc 
 
---- 
Liberia 111,369km2 Monrovia 3,000,000 English & 
other native 
languages. 
 
---- 
Iron Ore, 
Timber, 
Diamonds 
etc. 
 
---- 
Mali 1,249,192km2 Bamako 11,000,000 French, 
Bambara 
 
693 
Gold, 
Phosphate 
 
2.6 
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etc. etc 
Niger 1,267,000km2 Niamey 10,000,000 French & 
other local 
languages 
 
727 
Uranium, 
Cotton etc. 
 
2.0 
Nigeria 923,768km2 Abuja 126,635,000 English, 
Hausa, Ibo, 
Yoruba & 
over 200 
other Native 
Languages 
 
744 
Oil, Gas, 
Lime 
stone, 
Coal, & 
others 
 
37.9 
Senegal 196.192km2 Dakar 9,000,000 French, 
Wolof & 
other native 
languages 
 
1,341 
Oil, 
Cotton, 
Peanuts, 
Rice, Live 
Stock etc. 
4.7 
Sierra 
Leone 
71,740km2 Freetown 5,000,000 English, 
Krio etc. 
 
414 
Diamonds, 
Fishing, 
Agriculture 
etc. 
 
0.7 
Togo 56,785km2 Lome 5,000,000 French, 
Yoruba & 
other native 
languages 
1,346 Cotton, 
Coffee, 
Cocoa, 
Phosphate 
etc. 
1.5 
Source: World Development Report: Attacking Poverty, 2000/2001, p.274. 
 
All these countries differ considerably in their colonial history, natural resource 
endowments and institutional and administrative systems. At the one end of the scale is 
Nigeria, rich in human and natural resources, and at the other end is Burkina Faso with 
poor human and natural resources. These remarkable differences significantly and 
constantly shape their regional relations and their ability to participate meaningfully in 
regional economic integration programmes.  
The ECOWAS Treaty provided for a gradual establishment of a customs union, 
common external tariff and harmonization of economic and financial policies of member 
states within a period of 15years. It also made provision for compensation for losses 
encountered by member states in the course of the implementation of the provisions of 
the treaty. 
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The original treaty was revised in 1993, to broaden economic integration and increase 
political participation and cooperation throughout the sub-region. The revised treaty 
sought to attain an integrated common market and a single monetary union with an 
institutionalized Parliament for stronger political cooperation and participation within the 
sub-region. 
2.2 ECOWAS Rationale for Integration 
There is no doubt that the architects of ECOWAS were influenced by the 
overwhelming assumptions of traditional integration theories, of numerous economic 
benefits that could accrue to member states as a result of their participation in regional 
economic integration programme. 
One alluring assumption is the fact that integration positively affects the gross national 
products of member countries;22 as the resultant enlargement of the size of the market 
increases efficiency and greater advantages of economies of scale within the integrating 
area. Thus, as competition increases, better specialization is ensured as producers 
concentrate on areas in which they have the greatest advantage, thus better positioned to 
exploit large scale economies while at the same time, restructuring the regional economy 
to enhance the production base of the region23. 
Another contention lies in the argument that the enlarged market offered by integration 
will sufficiently sustain heavy industries and better ensure the least unit cost of 
production which will in-turn stimulate demand and consumption as well as increased 
investment and economic growth. 
 Similarly, as better allocation of resources is attained, prices go down in favour of 
consumers in a way that is not detrimental to producers, thus, befitting both the producers 
and consumers. 
                                                 
22 For greater details of benefits of economic integration in the light of traditional theories, see Jaber, T.A. 
[1979]. A Review Article: “The relevance of traditional integration theories to LDC’S” Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol. 9, No.3, p.254. 
 
23 See also Harvey, C. [1977] for more details on why economic rationale has placed the creation of trading 
blocs at the centre of intra-African Cooperation. 
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Added to the theoretical benefit is the argument that the enlarged market size from 
integration will ultimately lead to increased trade within the region. As tariffs are 
eliminated, free flow of trade between member states increases, leading to trade creation 
as member states trade more with each other. 
In West Africa, economic integration is also viewed as an ‘illustration of Pan-
Africanism’ and indeed, a practical step toward the economic liberation of the African 
continent. Some of the states such as Nigeria viewed integration as a veritable instrument 
for ensuring not only regional peace and security but also ‘national security’24. 
In general terms, it is hoped that economic integration in West Africa will not only 
usher in sustainable socio-economic and political development, but will to a large extend, 
provide a solid platform for a united front in negotiations involving the region and other 
regions of the world. Their aim is to support and enhance socio-economic development of 
member states and the welfare of their citizens by promoting and coordinating trade, 
increased cooperation and self-reliance among them; and this they hope to achieve by 
ensuring a common policy regime geared toward economic and financial stability through 
the institutional framework of ECOWAS. 
                                                 
24 For details of Nigeria’s outlook toward regional economic integration in West Africa and its efforts 
therein, see Gambari, I.A. [1991]. Political and Comparative Dimensions of Regional Integration: The Case 
of ECOWAS. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International Inc. 
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2.3 Selected Chronology of Key Events in ECOWAS Member States since 
Independence 
Table 2.2: Republic of Benin. Key Events since Independence 
1960 Gained Independence from France. With Hubert Maga as its first President. 
1963 President Hubert Maga ousted from power in a military Coup d’etat.  
1972 Another military coup that brought Gen. Mathew Kereku to power. 
1974 Kereku’s government adopted Marxism and nationalized major companies. 
1975 Changed its name from Dahomey to Republic of Benin. 
1977 Constitutional Reforms that entrenched Marxism. 
1979 Constitutional Reforms following a series of national strikes against the 
government. 
1988 Collapse of Beninese Banking sector as a result of wide spread corruption. 
1989 Sustained rebellion by the Civil Society against Kereku’s government. 
 All inclusive National Conference. I.e. Conference Nationale des forces Vives 
[NFV]. 
1990 NFV declared itself sovereign with Arch Bishop Isidore de Souza as chairman. 
 Ratification of a new Constitution following a national referendum creating 
multi-party democracy. 
1991 Legislative and presidential elections that brought President Sole to power. 
 General strikes and demonstrations by University students. 
 Promulgation of Press Censorship laws. 
1993 Combined general strikes and demonstration against the government by student 
and civil servants. 
1995 Another round of National Elections. 
1996 Constitutional Court declared Mathew Kereku winner in the Presidential 
election.25
                                                 
25 For more information on the Republic of Benin Profile see, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/i/hi/world/africa/country_profiles/1064527.stm  
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Benin Republic is bordered to the west by Nigeria, to the north by Burkina Faso and 
Niger, and to the east by Togo. The country has Port Novo as its administrative 
headquarters with Cotonou as its commercial capital. Located on a land area of 112, 
622sq kilometres with a population of about Six million, four hundred and Sixty 
Thousand [6,400,000] by mid 2000. The major ethnic groups include the Fon 42 per cent, 
the Yoruba 12.1 per cent and the Bariba 8.6 per cent26. 
The national economy is propelled by subsistence agriculture based on cotton 
production with more than 80% of the population engaged in agricultural production. The 
country’s industrial sector remains relatively underdeveloped and hinged on light import-
substitution industries and agricultural processing. The mining industry is increasingly 
becoming important and based on the extraction of lime stone, gold and iron ore and 
phosphate. Due to inefficient and largely corrupt bureaucracy, the country has constant 
chronic international trade deficit.27
                                                 
26 See the “Encyclopedia Britannica”. [1990] 15th edition, Vol. 9, USA: The University of Chicago Press, 
for expanded details of politics and economy in Benin Republic. 
 
27 See also the IMF: International Financial Statistics Yearbook for more details of Benin Republic 
economic performance. 
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Table 2.3: Republic of Benin. Trade [in billions of CFA Francs]. 
Year                     Exports                   Imports
1975                      .032                        .188 
1980                      .063                        .331 
1985                      .150                        .331 
1990                      .122                        .265 
1995                      .414                        .692 
   2000                      .132.9                     .314.8 
   2001                      153.2                      .340.1 
   2002                      136.4                      .354.0 
   2003                      136.4                      .379.5 
 2004                      N/D                         N/D 
Source: IMF: International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 2004 
*N/D: Indicates No Data.. 
    The government expends over 50 percent of its revenue on social services including the 
burden of a highly politicized army that has seized power through military coups on 
several occasions. 
Table 2.4: Republic of Burkina Faso. Key Events since Independence 
1960 Gained independence from France with Maurice Yameogo as its first President. 
1965 Re-election of President Maurice Yameogo. 
1966 Overthrow of President Maurice Yameogo and Gen. assumed the Presidency. 
1970 A botched attempt at return to civil rule. 
1977 Another failed attempt at return to civil rule. 
1980 Overthrow of Gen. Lamisana in a bloodless coup by Col. Saye Zerbo but 
replaced as President by Major Jean-Baptist Quedraogo. 
1983 The Populist revolution led by Capt. Thomas Sankara who became President. 
1987 Overthrow of President Thomas Sankara in a violent coup by Capt. Blasé 
Campore who declared himself President. 
 Creation of the first ever opposition Party- Herman Yameogo’s Movement of 
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Progressive Democrats [Movement des Democrates Progressistes, MDP]. 
1989 Failed attempt at ousting President Campaore. 
 Introduction of a new Constitution seeking full separation of powers between the 
three arms of government.  
1991 Further Constitutional reforms and the creation of multi-party democracy. 
 Introduction of Structural Adjustment Programme. 
1992 Formation of a National Forum between government and the opposition. 
 National Legislative elections 
1993 General strike and demonstration by university students over grants. 
1994 Emergence of a new opposition Party [Convention of forces of Progress, CFP]. 
 Resignation of Prime Minister Youssouf Quedraogo. 
 Devaluation of the CFA currency. 
 Solidarity visit by the French Minister of Cooperation, Bernard Debre against 
World Bank conditionality.  
1995 Municipal elections. 
 President Campaore participated in Bastille Day celebrations in France. 
1998 Presidential election in which Compaore overwhelmingly won. 
1999 Outbreak of general strike and demonstration protesting increasing hard 
economic realities amidst charges of violence. 
2002 UN and the government jointly monitor weapons import to curtail arms 
smuggling. 
2003 Campaore’s government alleges a failed attempt to overthrow his regime and 
makes several arrests. 
2004 Military Tribunal begins trial of over 13 suspects implicated in the alleged 
botched coup against the government of President Campaore. 
 Capt. Ouali bags ten years jail term for his role in the alleged coup plot. 
 
Colonized by France as early as 1895 and formerly named Upper Volta in 1919 but 
gained its independence in 1960 with its capital in Ouagadougou. In the 1930’s it was 
divided to form two separate countries but reunited as one nation in 1947. Burkina Faso 
has a population of about Twelve million Three hundred thousand [2001], with a land 
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area of approximately 274,122 square kilometres. The major ethnic group is the Mossi 
which makes up almost half of the population. Others include, the Gurunsi in the south, 
the Bwa, Bobo, Lobi, Senufo, Marka and the Samo in the west as well as the Fulani in the 
north. The official language is French while other local languages such as Moore, Dioula 
and Peul are widely spoken. The country is a member of the CFA-Franc zone. 
The country remains one of the poorest countries in the world and over 90% of the 
population is employed in subsistence agriculture- growing peanuts, shear nuts, cotton, 
millet, sorghum and exports gold etc. A sizeable percentage of the population largely 
work as migrant workers in neighbouring countries of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire on 
seasonable basis. 
The main industries consist of cotton lint, beverages, textile and agricultural processing 
with suffocating balance payments problem in their international trade. 
Table 2.5: Republic of Benin. Trade [in billions of CFA francs]. 
Year                     Exports                   Imports 
1975                    .044                           .151 
1980                    .090                           .356 
1990                    .071                           .332 
1995                     .152                          .536 
                                     2000                      146.4                       .374.2 
                                     2001                      163.8                       .373.3 
                                     2002                      164.2                        381.7 
                                     2003                       N/D                          N/D 
                                     2004                       N/D                          N/D
Source: IMF: International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 2004. 
Generally speaking, the country is a very low income nation and perhaps more than 
60% of the population is impoverished relying heavily on subsistence family holdings 
and livestock for their livelihood. 
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 Table 2.6: Republic of Cape Verde. Key Events since Independence 
1975 Gained independence from Portugal and became a one-party state. 
 Aristide Pereira becomes its first President under the banner of the African Party 
for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. 
1980 Re-election of President Aristide Pereira. 
 Unilaterally cancels earlier plans for political unification with Guinea-Bissau 
following a coup in that country. 
1981 The countries arm of the PAIGC was changed to the African Party for the 
Independence of Cape Verde. 
1991 Introduction of multi-party elections in a one party state. 
 Election of Antonio Monteiro as President under the Movement for Democracy. 
1992 Ratification of a new constitution ushering in a multi-party system. 
1996 Re-election of President Antonio Monteiro. 
2001 The African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde bounces back to Power 
sweeping Parliamentary elections. 
 Election of Pedro Pires of the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde 
as President28. 
 
Cape Verde is made up of ten Islands and five Islets and colonized by Portugal but 
became independent in 1975 with Aristide Pereira as its first President. The country lies 
on a land area of approximately 4,033 square kilometres, with a population of about four 
hundred and thirty thousand [1995]. The official language is Portuguese but Cruilo is 
widely spoken. 
Cape Verde lacks any reasonable natural resources as the economy heavily depends on 
commerce, transport and indeed services. The greater per cent of the population reside in 
the rural areas depending heavily on imported food and foreign aid. Agricultural 
production is severely hindered by poor arable land and persistent drought. The country 
                                                 
28 For more details of Cape Verde’s Profile see: 
http://news.co.uk/i/hi/world/africa/county_profiles/1021451.stm
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runs persistent balance of payments problems arising from its heavy dependence on 
imports. 
Table 2.7: Republic of Cape Verde. Trade [in millions of US Dollar]. 
Year                              Exports                      Imports 
1975                              .002                           .040 
1980                               .004                           .068 
1985                               .006                           .084 
1990                               .006                           .136 
1995                               .009                           .256 
                                2000                                N/D                          N/D 
                                2001                                N/D                          N/D 
                                2002                                N/D                          N/D 
                                2003                                N/D                          N/D 
                                2004                                N/D                          N/D
Source: IMF: International Financial Statistics Year Book, 2004. 
* N/A: Indicates No Data. 
The industrial sector remains underdeveloped and mainly based on light manufacture 
and its capacity for expansion is severely limited by the share size of its population, 
geographical location and indeed near absence of natural resources apart from tiny 
deposits of salt. Cape Verde by its share size and poor resources could not make any 
meaningful contribution to the efforts at attaining self-reliance through regional 
integration in West Africa. 
 
Table 2.8: Republic of Cote d’Ivoire. Key Events since Independence 
1960 Became independent with Houphouet Boigny as its first elected President. 
1965 Re-election of President Boigny under the Parti Democratiquè de la Cote 
d’Ivoire, [PDCI]. 
1970 Re-election of President Boigny. 
1977 Dismissal of three Cabinet Ministers for poor economic performance. 
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1980 Re-election of President Boigny. 
 Creation of the office of the Vice President. 
 National Legislative elections  
1985 Abolition of the post of the Vice President. 
 Another National Legislative election. 
1987 General strike and demonstrations by students and civil servants over economic 
austerity measures. 
1988 Return from exile of opposition leader Laurent Gbagbo and his Party, Front 
Populaire Ivorien, [FPI]. 
1990 Re-election of President Boigny. 
 Boycott of national legislative elections by the opposition. 
1992 Opposition leader, Laurent Gbagbo and 11 other imprisoned for precipitation 
violent demonstrations. 
1993 Death of President Houphout Boigny and emergence of Henri Konan Bedie as 
president. 
1994 Bedie assumed also the presidency of the party [PDCI], thus, increasing his 
powers as Boigny. 
 Splinter group of PDCI formed the Raissemblement des Republicans, [RDR]. 
1995 Re-election of President Bedie as opposition leaders i.e. Quattara of the RDR and 
Gbagbo of the FPI boycotted the election. 
1999 First ever army mutiny over unpaid allowances. 
 Overthrow of the government of President Bedie by Gen. Robert Guei. 
2000 Inauguration of a new transitional government. 
 Sub-committee of the Consultative commission present conditions for eligibility 
for election as President, i.e. Candidates father and mother must be Ivorien. 
 Another mutiny against Guei’s government by soldiers demanding settlement for 
participating in the coup that brought him to power. 
 National referendum on the eligibility conditions voted “Yes” to the new 
constitution which was subsequently promulgated. 
 Declaration of a state of emergency by the government. 
 Presidential elections in which Gbagbo was leading suspended and Guei declared 
himself President. 
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 Widespread violence and protest that claimed over thirty lives. 
2001 Legislative elections in which the FPI won majority votes. 
 Former President Konan Bedie returns from exile in France. 
 Termination of the National Reconciliation Forum for easing political tensions. 
 Reconciliation meeting between Bedie, Gbagbo, Quatara and Guei in 
Yamoussoukro. 
 Attempted coup in Abidjan and the subsequent death of Gen. Guei. Mutineers 
took over the rural towns of Bouake and Korhogo epitomized by the Mouvement 
Patriotique de Cote d’Ivoire [MPCI]. 
 Quatarra seeks refuge in the French embassy amid protests and demonstrations to 
hand him over. 
 French troops evacuate foreigners from Bouake as ECOWAS sent in a failed 
mediation group. 
 Rebels reach a cease fire agreement with the government. ECOWAS designates 
President Eyadema of Togo to mediate in talks between the MPCI and 
government. 
  Emergence of two more rebel groups, the Mouvement Populaire Ivorien du 
Grand Ouest [MPIGO] and the Mouvement pour la justice et la paix [MJP]. 
2002 A failed attempt by mutineers to overthrow President Gbagbo. 
2003 Introduction of a new power-sharing coalition and Gbagbo appointed Seydou 
Diarra as Prime minister. 
 Rebels withdrew from the coalition but later rejoined again. 
 Cessation of hostilities between rebels and the government leaving the country 
divided between the rebels held north and the government controlled south. 
2004 UN 6,000 strong peacekeeping mission arrive Abidjan. 
 Peace talks in Ghana sets out timetable for rebel disarmament and political 
reform. 
 Rebels halted disarmament program as government failed to meet deadline for 
political reforms. 
 Resumption of hostilities as government war planes bombarded Bouake, Seguela 
and Bonguera in attempt to free the north from the rebels. 
 Government attacks on Bouake killed eight French troops. 
 French warplanes retaliate by bombarding Ivorien Airbase, completely 
destroying Ivorien airpower. 
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 Attacks and riots against foreigners particularly the French. Thousands of 
foreigners leave Cote d’Ivoire. 
 UN Security Council slams Arms Sanctions against Cote d’Ivoire following 
France’s appeals29
 
Cote d’Ivoire lies in the gulf of Guinea area of the sub region and gained independence 
from France in 1960 with Houphouet Boigny as its life time President. The country has 
Yamoussoukro as its political capital and Abidjan as commercial capital. The population 
is about 15,900,000 [mid 2001] and occupies a land area of approximately 322,462 
square kilometres with diverse ethnic groups including the Kru, Akan, Mande, Volta and 
Malinke. 
The country has until recently enjoyed unchallenged political and economic stability 
since independence, but currently facing heightened pressure from separatist rebels. 
Formerly, prided as the most stable country in west Africa but the power vacuum created 
by Boigny’s death seems to have been quite difficult to fill as the country continues to 
march toward disintegration.  
The country’s economy is traditionally based on agriculture- export of cocoa and 
coffee and sufficiently endowed with abundant rainfall and fertile land. Indeed decades of 
political and economic stability in Cote d’Ivoire ushered in rapid economic growth with 
consistent balance of payments surplus. 
                                                 
29 For in depth profile of Cote d’Ivoire see, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minuci/chron.html
 See also http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L0417434.html
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Table 2.9: Republic of Cote d’Ivoire. Trade [in millions of US dollars] 
Year                       Exports                      Imports
1975                       1.181                          1.127 
1980                       3.135                          2.967 
1985                       3.198                          1.749 
1990                       3.072                          2.098 
1995                       3.645                          2.945 
                                  2000                       1.450                          2.317 
                                  2001                       1.451                          2.271 
                                  2002                       3.084                          2.610 
                                  2003                        N/D                            N/D 
                                  2004                        N/D                            N/D 
           Source: IMF: International Financial Statistics Year book, 2005. 
*N/D: Indicates no data. 
However, the gains of decades of political and economic stability are threatening to 
disappear as the sectional conflicts continue unabated throwing the once buoyant and 
prosperous economy into ruins.  
 
Table 2.10: Republic of Ghana. Key Events since Independence 
1957 Gained independence from Britain and thus became the first independent state in 
west Africa. 
1960 Became a republic through a plebiscite with Kwameh Nkrumah as President. 
1966 Overthrow of Nkrumah’s government through a military coup and replaced by 
the National Liberation Council. 
1972 Another military coup led by Col. Acheampong replaced the national liberation 
council with the National Redemption Council. 
1978 Overthrow of Col. Acheampong in another coup. 
1979 Violent military coup led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings and the election of 
President Hilla Liman. 
1981 Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings stages a second coup and becomes the Chairman of 
Provisional National Defence Council. 
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1985 Inauguration of the National Commission for Democracy. 
1988 Local Assembly elections. 
1990 Public pressure for the introduction of multi-party democracy mounts. 
1992 A new draft democratic constitution accepted through a national referendum. 
  Presidential election boycotted by main opposition groups and the emergence of 
Jerry Rawlings as President. 
1993 Inauguration of Ghana’s fourth Republic. 
1994 Out break violent ethnic clashes in the north of Ghana between the Konkomba 
and Nanumba that claimed hundreds of lives. 
1995 Ghana hosts Liberian peace talks. 
  Renewed ethnic clashes in the northern part of the country led to imposition of 
curfew in the region. 
2000 Presidential and parliamentary elections in which Kufuor became president. 
2001 Swearing in of President Kufuor30
 
 Ghana is situated in the gulf of Guinea with Accra as its capital. The nation has a 
population of about 17,350,000 [1995] and a land area of approximately 239,460 square 
kilometres with diverse ethnic groups. The major groups include the Moshi-Dgomba, the 
Ewe, Akan and Adangba.  
The country’s once booming economy has been severely weakened by decades of 
instability and mismanagement. Its economy is based on subsistence agriculture and a 
booming mining industry in gold and diamonds. Like most member states of ECOWAS 
the country runs persistent balance payments problem. 
                                                 
30 See more of Ghana profile on, http:// www.ghanaweb.com 
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Table 2.11: Republic of Ghana. Trade [in Millions of US Dollars]. 
Year                      Exports                    Imports
1975                       .809                           .802 
1985                      1.257                         1.129 
1985                       .617                            .731 
1990                        N|D                            N|D 
                                   1995                      1.724                          1.907 
                                   2000                      1.936.0                       2758.6 
                                   2001                      1.857.2                       2.831.2 
                                   2002                      2.0645                        2714.1 
                                   2003                       N/D                            N/D 
                                   2004                       N/D                            N/D 
Source: IMF: International Financial Statistics Year book, 2005. 
*N/D indicates no data. 
Ghana like most of the member states suffers from internal political and economic 
pressures of nation building and development which severely limits its ability to attain 
sustainable development and greater participation in regional economic integration 
initiatives.  
 
Table 2.12: Republic of the Gambia. Key Events since Independence 
1965 Gained independence from Britain with Sir Dawda Jawara as Prime Minister 
under his People’s Progressive Party. 
1970 Declared a republic following a national referendum and Jawara became the 
President. 
1981 A failed coup attempt left several hundreds of people dead. 
1982 Formation of a loose confederation named Sene-gambia between Senegal and 
Gambia. 
1989 The newly formed confederation of Sene-gambia collapses. 
1991 Attempt at closer ties with Senegal as they jointly sign the Treaty of friendship. 
1994 Jawara’s government sacked from power in a successful coup led by Lieutenant 
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Yahya Jammeh. 
1996 Introduction of a new constitution for multi-party democracy and Jammeh 
became President to the exclusion of major opposition groups. 
2000 Wide spread student demonstrations and strikes leaving over fifteen people dead 
in its aftermath. 
  Unsubstantiated charges of attempts to overthrow the government against 
opposition. 
2001 The government lifts ban on political parties and activities. 
  Sentencing of Lieutenant Sanneh to sixteen years imprisonment by a military 
court for conspiracy to overthrow Jammeh. 
 
Gambia is a relatively small nation that consist of a narrow strip of land and almost 
encircled by Senegal .The population is about one million [1995] with a land area of 
approximately11, 295 square kilometres. Also, ethnically diverse which include the 
mandinka, Fula, Wolof, Jola etc. 
Its economy is heavily dependent on few agricultural exports as well as re-exports to 
neighbouring countries. Services remain the engine of the economy as it contributes over 
64% of the GDP. Its foreign trade depends simply on the export of groundnuts and cotton 
though a small scale and faces perennial balance of payments problem. 
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Table 2.13: Republic of the Gambia. Trade [in Millions of US Dollars]. 
Year                  Exports              Imports
1975                   .044                      .060 
1980                   .031                      .165 
1985                   .043                      .093 
1990                   .040                      .199 
1995                   .016                      .140 
                                        2000                   126.6                     189.9 
                                        2001                   101.6                     144.7 
                                        2002                   111.0                     160.1 
                                        2003                   102.0                     153.8 
                                        2004                    N/D                         N/D 
Source: IMF: International Financial Statistics Year book, 2004. 
*N/D Indicates no data. 
Gambia’s strength in the area lies in its control of the Gambia River but severely 
hampered economically by its small size, poor natural resources and a decaying 
infrastructure, and as a result can not make any meaningful impact in the effort to achieve 
sustainable development and self-reliance in the sub-region through the framework of 
ECOWAS. 
  
Table 2.14: Republic of Guinea. Key Events since Independence 
 1958 Gains independence from France with Ahmed Sekou Toure as it first President 
under the banner of the Democratic Party of Guinea [PDG]. 
  President Toure severs of links with France and embraced Marxism. 
  Toure’s 26year rule marked by economic mismanagement and draconian 
repression. 
1977 Outbreak of general strikes and demonstrations against the government following 
economic mismanagement and repression. 
1984 President Sekou Toure dies and subsequent seizure of power by Col. Lansana 
Conte. 
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  President Conte discards socialism and embraced free market economy. 
1992 Conte embarks on constitutional reforms for democratic system. 
1993 Presidential elections won by President Conte. 
1995 Parliamentary elections and the appointment of Cellon Dalein Diallo as Prime 
Minister by President Conte. 
2000  Following the wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia, thousands of refugees settled in 
Guinea. 
2001 National Referendum repudiates the earlier two-term limit of the Post of the 
President. 
2003 President Conte wins a third-term in Office against serious allegations of 
opposition repression. 
  Government arrests several members of the army for alleged coup plotting. 
2004 Government detains for Prime Minister and Opposition leader, Sidya Toure on 
charges of coup plotting. 
  Conte’s government alleges plot by opposition Union of Republic Forces Party 
[UFR] to overthrow his government. 
  International Federation of Humans Right League [FIDH] describes the 
government in Guinea as a “Sham Democracy. 
  President Conte appoints Lounsery Fall as Prime Minister who after few months 
resigned. 
2005 Unknown assassins fires at President Conte’s convoy in an attempt to kill him.31
 
Guinea is located on the bulge of Africa and bordered in the south by Sierra Leone and 
Liberia, to the north by Guinea-Bissau and Senegal and to the east by Mali and Cote 
D’Ivoire with its capital in Conakry. The population is about six million five hundred 
thousand [2001] and comprises three main indigenous ethnic groups, the Peuhl, the 
Malinke and the Soussou and occupies a land area of approximately 245, 857 square 
kilometres. 
                                                 
31 For Guinean more profiles see http:news:bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/Africa/36739997.stm 
  
See also http:news.bbs.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/from_our_own_corespondent/2808251.stm 
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Guinea is blessed with abundant mineral resources which include Chrome, Cobalt, 
Zinc, Uranium etc and generally stable compared to other member states. However, the 
economy remains largely dependent on subsistence agriculture and engaged more than 
80% of the population. 
Table 2.15: Republic of Guinea. Trade [in Millions of US Dollars]. 
Year                    Exports                     Imports
1999                     635.7                        -555.4 
2000                     666.6                       - 583.3 
2001                      722.8                       - 561.9 
2002                      708.5                        -596.2 
2003                      724.5                        -578.1 
2004                       N/D                            N/D 
Source: IMF: International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 2004. 
 
The country’s international trade balance fluctuates and dependent on the outset of the 
mining sector and the international market. In general terms, decades of Marxism and 
despotic leadership has left the economy grossly underdeveloped and drastically slowed 
down economic development. At present, Guinea is battling with structural inefficiencies 
of the economy and deeply engulfed in domestic economic restructuring and 
diversification to have sufficient energy left to make any major impact on issues affecting 
ECOWAS economic integration programme. 
   Table 2.16: Republic of Guinea Bissau. Key Events since Independence 
 1973 Unilaterally declares itself independent from Portugal. 
  Assassination of Amilcar Cabral. 
1974 Officially granted independence by Portugal and Luis Cabral emerged as 
President. 
1980 Overthrow of Luis Cabral through a coup and Joao Vieira became President. 
  Abandoned plans of Political merger with Cape Verde. 
1990 Introduction of multi-party system and the PAIGC arm of the country cease to be 
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the only party. 
1994 Joao Vieira democratically elected as President. 
1998 President Vieira sacked the commander-in-Chief of the army General 
Ansumane Mane. 
  Some soldiers mutinied against the government following the sacking of the 
army chief. 
1999 Overthrow of President Vieira by General Ansumane Mane and his supporters. 
  The Army installed Malam Bacai Sahna as interim President. 
2000 Amidst domestic tensions, Kumba Yala elected President. 
  Killing of General Mane following coup Plotting. 
2001 Guinea-Bissau Resistant Party [RGB] withdraws participation from government. 
  IMF AND World Bank suspends Aid to Guinea-Bissau amidst disappearance of 
development funds. 
  President Yala sacks his Prime Minister, Antonieta Gomes and appointment of 
Fustino Imbali as his successor. 
  Prime Minister Fustino Imbali himself is also sacked by President Yala. 
2002 President Yala attempted to dissolve Parliament amidst persistent disagreement 
with his Prime Minister. 
2003 Overthrow of President Yala through a military coup. 
  Appointment of Henrique Rosa as interim President and Antonio Rosa as interim 
Prime Minister. 
2004 The PAIGC bounces back to power, winning the general elections. 
  Commander of the Army killed by renegade soldiers. 
  
Guinea-Bissau lies in the west coast of Africa and bordered to the north by Senegal and 
Guinea to the east and west. The country has a population of about one million three 
Hundred thousand [2001], with a land area of approximately 36,125 square kilometres. It 
is made up of diverse ethnic groups, including the Balanta, Manjaca, and Mandinga.32
Guinea-Bissau remains one of the poorest countries in the world with over 80% of the 
population engaged in subsistence agriculture, with a marginal industrial sector. The 
                                                 
32For more details of key events in Cape Verde, see http://news.bbc.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1043376.stm  
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country runs persistent deficit in its international trade amidst little domestic investment 
and poor infrastructure. 
Table 2.9: Republic of Guinea Bissau. Trade [in Millions of US dollars] 
Year                Exports                Imports
1975                 .007                     .038 
1980                 .011                     .055 
1985                 .012                      N|A 
1990                 .019                     .068 
1995                 .044                     .133 
                                          2000                 62.1                      71.0 
                                          2001                 50.0                      78.5 
                                          2002                 53.6                      70.5 
                                          2003                 62.6                      70.8 
                                         2004                   N/D                      N/D 
Source: IMF: International Financial Statistics Year book, 2004. 
Generally, Guinea-Bissau’s development was greatly retarded by long years of internal 
political disruptions while the economy is too weak to shoulder the burden of potential 
economic expansion in mineral exploration and exploitation. As a result, the country 
could not make any meaningful impact within the ECOWAS framework in the search for 
sustainable development. 
Table 2.17: Republic of Liberia. Key Events since Independence 
1820 Independent resettlement for freed slaves. 
1847 Declared a republic operation US-type political system. 
1980 Overthrow of President William Tolbert in a bloody coup by Sgt. Samuel Doe 
who became head of state. 
1983 General Quiwonkpo, Charles Taylor and Prince Johnson flee Liberia. 
1985 President Doe rigged the general elections in which he declared himself 
President. 
  A foiled coup against Doe’s regime as Quiwonkpo is killed. 
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1986 Sgt. Doe’s government inaugurated. 
1989 Beginnings of revolt against Doe’s government by Charles Taylor’s Patriotic 
Front of Liberia [NPFL]. 
1990 Bloody conflict worsens amidst the Interfaith Mediation Committee Peace 
initiatives and talks in Sierra Leone. 
  ECOWAS peacekeeping forces arrive in Monrovia. 
  Splinter group of the NPFL, the INPFL enters Monrovia. 
  President Doe abducted and killed. 
 Signing of the Bamako Peace Agreement and the installation of the Interim 
government of National Unity led by Dr Amos Sawyer following the Banjul 
Agreement between the AFL, INPFL and NPFL. 
 Taylor’s NPFL forms a parallel government in Gbarnga demanding Doe’s 
resignation as condition for peace. 
 Signing of the LOME Agreement for Implementation of cease fire. 
 Formation of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia [ULIMO] by Kran and 
Mandingo ethnic supporters of late Doe. 
 Reconciliation Agreement for disarmament between Sawyer and Taylor in 
Yamoussoukro, Cote d’Ivoire. 
 NPFL launches assault on ECOMOG forces code named “Operation Octopus”. 
 UN imposes Arms embargo on all factions. 
 ECOWAS imposes sanctions against NPFL. 
 Over 600 civilians massacred in firestone plantation near Harbel. 
 Signing of the Cotonou Accord for disarmament.  
 Liberia National Government replaces the Interim National Government. 
 Formation of the Liberia Peace Council. 
 Signing of the Akosombo Peace Agreement, in Ghana to mediate cease fire. 
 Accra Peace Pact establishes buffer Zones by all factions. 
 ECOWAS heads of state mini-summit mediating the formation of Liberia’s 
Council of State. 
 Abuja Peace Agreement to enforce ceasefire, Disarmament and organize 
elections. 
 Fighting breaks out in Monrovia between the factions. 
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 Signing of the Abuja supplementary Accord. 
 ECOWAS Peace Forces embarks on disarmament. 
 General elections in Liberia and Charles Taylor inaugurated as President. 
  ECOMOG leaves Liberia amidst disagreement with President Taylor. 
  Unknown rebel group, Justice Coalition of Liberia attack Liberian towns. 
  Formation of the Liberia United for Reconciliation and Democracy [LURD] by 
an amalgam of former dissidents. 
 British Government seeks Aid embargo on Liberia. 
 Abducted UN Aid workers freed. 
 Passing of the UN Resolution 1315 establishing “Special Court” to try worst 
human rights violations. 
 UN imposes Sanctions against the government of Charles Taylor through 
Resolution1343. 
  A State of Emergency declared in Liberia by President Charles Taylor. 
  ECOWAS Abuja Conference between the Liberian government, Civil Society 
and opposition.  
  President Taylor lifts state of emergency as rebel pressure declines. 
 Renewed fighting between government and rebel on multiple fronts basically for 
the control of the capital displaces thousands of people. 
 Nigeria sends into Monrovia Peace keeping Contingent. 
 Intense pressure forces President Taylor Flees Liberia ceding power to his deputy 
Moses Blah.  
 Signing of the Ghana peace Accord between the government and rebels paving 
the way for Gyude Bryant to become the head of the interim government. 
 UN peace keeping mission arrives as US forces pull out and begins to disarm 
combatants. 
 UN moves to freeze assets of former President Charles Taylor as Aid donors 
pledge a whopping half a billion dollars for reconstruction.33  
 
                                                 
33 See http//:Liberian.tripod.com/Post22.html [for more details on key events in Liberia]. 
 
See also http//:www.c-r.org/accord/chronol/html 
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Liberia is bordered by Sierra Leone on the North West, Guinea to the north and Cote 
d’Ivoire in the east.  
The country’s population is about three million three hundred thousand [2001], made 
up of indigenous ethnic groups and resettled US immigrants, and occupies a land area of 
approximately 111,369 square kilometres. 
The once prosperous economy remains so far in coma amidst devastations caused by 
the war and worsened by mismanagement and misrule. Export trade almost ceased 
throughout the conflict period limiting socio-economic activities and accumulating 
tremendous deficits. 
Table 2.10: Republic of Liberia. Trade [in billions of US dollars]. 
Year                   Exports                Imports
1975                    .394                    .332 
1980                    .589                    .535 
1985                    .436                    .284 
1990                     N|D                    N|D 
1995                     N|D                    N|D 
                                         2000                    120.3                  185.2 
                                         2001                    127.9                  196.2 
                                         2002                    147.2                  172.8 
                                        2003                      N/D                    N/D 
                                        2004                      N/D                    N/D 
Source: IMF: International Financial Statistics Year book, 2004. 
*N/D Indicates No Data. 
So far Liberia occupies itself with reconstruction efforts in the face of continued 
pressure from dissident groups scattered throughout the country and therefore 
strategically displaced to play any meaningful role within the ECOWAS framework in 
the search for sustainable development and self-reliance. 
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Table 2.18: Republic of Mali. Key Events since Independence 
1960 Gained independence from France with Madibo Keita as its first President. 
  Keita embraces Marxism and introduces a one-party socialist state.  
1968 Overthrow of Keita’s government in a military coup that brought Lt. Moussa 
Troare to power. 
1977 Former President Keita dies in prison precipitating wide spread protests and 
demonstrations. 
1979 Introduction of a new Constitution and general elections. 
  Re-election of President Moussa Troare as President. 
1985 Eruption of violent border skirmishes between Mali and Burkina Faso. 
1991 Another military coup that overthrew the government of Moussa Troare and 
instituted a transitional committee. 
  The transitional committee reinstates multi-party democracy and general 
elections. 
1992 Election of Alpha Konare as President following the multi-party elections. 
1999 Former President Moussa Troare sentenced to death for corruption but commuted 
to life imprisonment by President Konare. 
2000 Mande Sidibe appointed as Prime Minister by President Konare. 
2002 General elections that produced Amedou Toure as President amidst charges of 
fraud. 
  Resignation of Toure’s government and its replacement by a government of 
national unity. 
2003 Several Europeans kidnapped in Algeria were regained their freedom in  
2004 Prime minister Mohammed Amani resigns and succeeded by Ousmane Maiga. 
 
Mali is bordered in the east by Algeria, in the North West by Mauritania, in the west by 
Senegal, in the south west by Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso in the south and 
Niger Republic in the south east. The country has a population of about ten million, seven 
hundred thousand [July 2000], with a land area of approximately 1,240, 192 square 
kilometres. Also, the country made up of many ethnic groups including the Bambara, 
Mandinka, Senuofo, Dogon and the Fula, while over 90% of the population is muslin. 
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Though Mali possesses great potentials in natural resources, the country remains in 
poverty with poor infrastructure. Its economy is essentially based on agricultural 
production of cotton organized through village cooperatives. Its main export commodity 
is cotton but has chronic balance of payments problem. 
Table 2.11: Republic of Mali. Trade [in billions of CFA Franc]. 
Year                   Exports                  Imports
1975                    .053                        .176 
1980                    .205                        .438 
1985                    .123                        .299 
1990                    .358                        .601 
1995                    .441                        .770 
                                       2000                     388.1                       421. 
                                       2001                     531.2                       538.4 
                                       2002                    631.4                       498.3 
                                       2003                      N/D                       N/D 
                                       2004                      N/D                       N/D 
Source: IMF: International Financial Statistics Year book, 2004. 
*N/D Indicates No Data. 
 Other proven natural resources include salt, uranium, lime stone etc. but grossly lacks 
the necessary resources to exploit neither them nor the capacity to attract foreign 
investment. So far, Mali still occupies the unenviable accolade of being one the poorest 
countries in the world, and therefore could not make any meaningful impact on the 
regional integration effort of ECOWAS. 
 
   Table 2.19: Republic of Niger. Key Events since Independence 
1960 Gained independence from France with Hamani Diori as its first President. 
1973 Eruption of a devastation drought throughout the country. 
1974 Overthrow of President Hamani Diori in a military coup by General Seyni 
Kountche.  
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1986 Implementation of its first ever IMF-WORLD Bank Structural Adjustment 
Programme. 
1987 Death of Gen. Kountche and Gen. Ali Saibou became President. 
  Referendum adopting a National Charter. 
1988 Inauguration of the National Development Council to draft a new constitution 
[Conseil National de Development, CND]. 
  Formation of a new political party, the National Movement for a Development 
Society by Saibou [Mouvement National pour une Societe de Development, 
MNSD]. 
1989 Council of Ministers adopts Draft Constitution proposed by the CND. 
  Election of High Council of national Orientation by the MNSD Constituent 
Congress. 
 Presidential elections run only by President Saibou. 
1990 Poor implement of the Structural Adjustment Programme sparks off national 
strike and demonstrations. 
1991 Military officers withdraw from positions in government. 
  Convocation of a National Conference for political reforms. 
  Charter of Political Parties and introduction of multi-party democracy. 
1993 National elections by Universal Suffrage. 
  Mahamane Ousmane emerged as President under a united opposition group
 Alliance of the Forces of Change [Alliance des forces du Changement, 
AFC]. 
  Appointment of Mahamadou Issoufou as Prime Minister. 
  Election of Moumouni Djermakoye as President of the National Assembly. 
1994 Prime Minister Issoufou resigns out of government-Labor disagreements. 
  Abdoulaye Souley replaces Issoufou as Prime Minister. 
  President Ousmane dissolves the National Assembly following a Censure Vote 
on government. 
1995 MNSD bounces back to power following National legislative elections. 
1996 Overthrow of the government of Ousmane by Col. Ibrahim Mainassara. 
  Adopts a new Constitution approve by a national referendum. 
  Presidential poll won by Mainassara. 
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1997 Secessionist Tuareg Democratic Renewal Front signs Peace Accord with 
government. 
1999 Violent coup leading to the death of President Mainassara led by his bodyguards. 
  Major Dauda Wanke becomes President. -Introduces a new constitution 
separating the arms of government. 
  General elections in which Mamadou Tandja became President. 
2002 Army mutiny following arrears of wages. 
2003 President Bush of the US alleges Niger Supplies Uranium to Iraq. 
  UN  debunks the Iraq-Niger Uranium allegation. 
 Local elections won by the ruling Party.34
 
The  Republic of Niger is bordered to the north by Nigeria, to the south by Benin 
Republic, to the west by Mali and Burkina Faso and to the east by Chad. The population 
is about ten million four hundred thousand [July 2001] made up of the Hausa, Djerma-
Songhai, the Tuareg, the Kanuri, the Fula, etc and situated on a land area of 
approximately 1,267,000 square kilometres.  
The economy is heavily dependent on subsistent agriculture – livestock rearing and 
predominantly rural and vulnerable to natural disasters such as drought, and persistent 
swarms of locust. Also, Uranium mining is undertaken on a limited scale albeit poor 
international demands with devastating balance of payment deficits.  
                                                 
34 For further details of Nigerien Profile see, http:// news.bbc Co.uk 
/1/hi/world/Africa/country_profiles/1054274.stm 
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Table 2.12: Republic of Niger. [Trade [in billions of CFA Franc]. 
Year               Exports              Imports
1975                 .091                   .101 
1980                 .556                   .594 
1985                 .259                   .369 
1990                 .283                   .389 
1995                 .287                   .374 
   2000                  201.2                 235.1 
   2001                  199.7                 243.1 
  2002                  194.8                 258.7 
  2003                  203.3                 275.7 
  2004                   N/D                    N/D
                  Source: IMF: International Financial Statistics Year book, 2004. 
 
In reality, Niger depends heavily on foreign Aid from Nigeria and other donor 
countries. Nigerien internal political and economic problems could neither guarantee its 
national stability nor effective participation in regional economic integration 
programmes.  
Table 2.20: Federal Republic of Nigeria. Key Events since Independence 
1960 Gains political independence from Britain with Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe as President 
and Tafawa Balewa as Prime Minister. 
1963 Declared a Republic. 
1966 Nigeria’s first military coup detat led by Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu but Gen. 
Aguiyi Ironsi emerged the Head of the ruling military Council. 
 A counter coup led by Gen. Yakubu Gowon who became President. 
1967 Eastern Region secedes and declares the Republic of Biafra. 
 Outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War. 
 Gen. Gowon Nigeria’s Four Regions into Twelve states. 
1970 The Civil War ends with a government pronouncement of “No Victor No 
Vanquished”. 
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1972 Introduces metric system and replaces its currency, the Pound with the Naira. 
1973 Nigeria changes its mode of driving from left – to right –hand driving. 
 Nigeria hosts All-Africa Games. 
 Nigeria introduces the National Youth Service Corps Scheme – One year 
mandatory National Service for Fresh Graduates. 
1974 Gen. Gowon’s government reschedules hand over to elected democratic 
government in 1976. 
1975 Nigeria spearheads the formation of the Economic Community of West African 
States. 
 Overthrow of the government of Gen. Gowon in a coup by Brig. Murtala 
Mohammed who declared himself President. 
1976 Gen. Mohammed creates new more states and increases the number of states 
from twelve to nineteen. 
 A failed violent coup led by Col. Dimka kills Gen. Mohammed but Gen. 
Olusegun Obasanjo became the head of the ruling Supreme Military Council. 
1977 Nigeria hosts African Festival of Arts and culture [FESTAC] in Lagos. 
1979 Gen. Obasanjo hands over power to Alhaji Shehu Shagari who became president 
under his party, the National Party of Nigeria. 
1980 Nigeria hosts the African Nations Cup Tournament won by its national team- the 
Green Eagles for the first time since inception. 
1983 Another military coup led by Gen. Muhammadu Buhari overthrows the 
government of President Shehu Shagari. 
1985 Gen. Ibrahim Babangida sacks the government of Buhari in yet another military 
coup and declared himself President. 
 Nigeria wins the U-16 FIFA-KODAK World Cup. 
1987 A failed military Coup led by Maj-Gen. Mamman Vatsa in which Vatsa and 
colleagues lost their lives. 
 Gen. Babangida creates new more states and increases the number of states to 21. 
1990 Another failed Coup led by Maj. Gideon Orkar in which Orkar and number of 
officers lost their lives. 
 Nigeria organizes and spearheads the formation of the ECOWAS monitoring 
group in Liberia – ECOMOG. 
1991 Gen. Babangida creates nine more states further increasing the number of states 
to thirty. 
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1993 Gen. Babangida annulled Democratic Presidential Elections and fails to hand 
over power to an elected government as scheduled. 
 Following persistent pressures from democratic forces Gen. Babangida steps 
aside. 
 Gen. Babangida inaugurates an interim Government headed by Ernest Shonekan. 
 Gen. Sani Abacha sacks the interim Government and declares himself President. 
1995 Abacha’s Government claims it has foiled a ‘Coup’. 
 Commonwealth imposes sanctions against Nigeria. 
1996 Gen. Abacha increases the number of states to thirty-six. 
1998 Gen. Abacha collapses and dies suddenly and Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar 
assumes the Presidency. 
1999 Abubakar successfully and peacefully transfers power to Obasabjo under his 
party – Peoples’ Democratic Party. 
 Nigeria hosts the World Youth Soccer Championship. 
2000 Nigeria co-hosts African Nations Cup Tournament with Ghana. 
 Nigeria begins Liquefied Natural Gas Production. 
2001 Army unit massacres people in the middle belt region. 
 Xtian-Muslim clashes in northern city of Kano killing hundreds of people.  
 Eruption of anti-US demonstrations in Kano city. 
2003 National elections as President Obasanjo begin his second term in office under 
his ruling party [PDP]. 
2004 Abduction of the governor of the eastern region of Anambra state, Dr Chris 
Ngige by Police gangs and Political opponents. 
 Unidentified political thugs unleash mayhem on Anambra state burning down 
state government properties. 
 President Obasanjo declares a state of emergency on the middle belt state of 
Benue sacking the elected state government. 
2005 National chairman of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party [PDP] Audu Ogbeh 
resigns. 
 Inspector-general of Police, Tafa Balogun proceeds on compulsory retirement 
following alleged fraud and embezzlement.35
                                                 
35 For more information on Nigeria’s profile see> http://www.ypform.org/history_topevents
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 Nigeria is situated along the gulf of Guinea and lies between the Republic of Benin and 
Cameroon to the west and south, and to the north by Chad and Niger Republic. The 
country has an estimated population of over one hundred and twenty-three million, three 
hundred and thirty-seven [2000], and occupies a land area of approximately 923,768 
square kilometres. Nigeria comprises diverse ethnic groups the main groups of which 
include the Hausa, the Ibo and Yoruba with over two hundred and some fraction of 
others. 
The country is often bedevilled by incessant political and religious turmoil and 
frequent changes of government that has devastated any form of meaningful planning for 
sustainable development. 
Nigeria’s economy remains the most powerful economy in West Africa propelled by 
crude oil and natural gas exports. The country is most endowed in natural resources in 
West Africa with abundant minerals in commercial quantities and contributes more than 
half of ECOWAS GDP.  
                                                                                                                                                 
See also http://www.worldmonitor.into/chronoOct2001.html
 
For detailed exposition on government and politics in Nigeria, see Eluwa, G.I.C. et al, [1998]. A History of 
Nigeria for Schools and Colleges: Africana-Feb Publishers limited. Onitsha: Nigeria. 
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Table 2.13: Federal Republic of Nigeria. Trade [in Millions of US dollars]. 
Year              Exports             Imports
1975               7.845                6.041 
1980             25.968              16.660 
1985             12.548                8.877 
1990             13.670                5.627 
1995             34.179              34.488 
                                           2000             23.761               10.553 
                                           2001             19.598               11.482 
                                           2002             17.672               13.342 
                                           2003             27.416               16.885 
                                           2004              N/D                     N/D 
Source: IMF: International Financial Statistics Year book 2004. 
 
However, the country is dangerously bedevilled by serious abuses of power, gross 
mismanagement of its resources and unbridled and unimaginable corruption that has 
thrown the country into political and economic quagmire with a traumatized and 
tormented citizenry since independence. Its international trade balance of payments 
vacillates between surplus and deficit depending on the magnitude of corruption by the 
particular government in power.  
Nigeria possesses the economic and political capacity to propel the sub-regional 
economic integration in terms of her diverse resources, large population and relatively 
enterprising people. But its ability to fully utilize these advantages has been severely 
limited by the pressures of nation building in a multi-ethnic society compounded by gross 
misapplication of resources and frightening corruption. Therefore, its capacity to lead a 
successful regional economic integration scheme is severely limited. 
     Table 2.21: Republic of Senegal. Key Events since Independence 
1960 Gained independence from France under the Socialist Party [PS] with Leopold 
Senghor as its first President.  
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1962 Arrest of Prime Minister Dia following a botched Coop. 
1968 Re-election of President Senghor in the Presidential elections. 
1974 Introduction of new electoral reforms regulating registration of political parties. 
 Formation of the opposition Senegal Democratic Party [Parti Democratic 
Senegalais, PDS] by Abdoulaye Wade. 
1976 Constitutional Amendment establishing a three – Party System. 
 Ruling UPS changed its name to Socialist Party [Parti Socialiste, PS]. 
1978 Legalization of the Conservative Senegalese Republican Movement [Mouvement 
Republicain Senegalais, MRS]. 
1980 Beginning of the Casamance secessionist Movement [Mouvement des forces 
Democratique de la Camance, MFDC]. 
1988 Presidential elections won by Abdou Diof of the Socialist Party amidst charges 
of fraud and protests. 
1989 Introduction of a new labour Code. 
1990 Implementation of a Cease fire between Government and the Casamance 
separatists. 
1991 Opposition candidate Abdoulaye Wade joins the Socialist Party Government 
retaining four cabinet posts. 
1992 Wade and the rest of his party colleagues withdraw participation in PS 
government. 
1993 Re-election of President Diouf under the banner of the Socialist Party. 
 Emergence of a United Opposition Group known as Bokk Sopi Senegaal. 
 Assassination of Babacar Seye, Vice President of the Constitutional Commission.
1994 National protests and demonstrations against the government following the 
devaluation of the CFA currency. 
1995 Wade and his PDS cut links with the opposition coalition and re-joined the PS 
government. 
 
Senegal is situated at the end of the western bulge of Africa with its capital in Dakar. 
The country has a population of about Nine million nine hundred and eighty-seven 
thousand [2001], occupying a land area of approximately 196,192 square kilometres. 
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Like many of the member states, Senegal comprises diverse ethnic groups which include 
the Wolof, the Pular, the Jola, the Mandinka and other small groups. 
The economy is based on subsistence agricultural production in farming, livestock, 
forestry and services. At independence, the ruling Socialist Party pursued both market 
economy and State controlled economy. Its main export commodities are cotton, 
phosphate, fish etc and persistently suffer trade deficits. 
Table 2.14: Republic of Senegal. Trade [in billions of CFA Franc]. 
Year                 Exports                Imports
1975                  .461                     .583 
1980                  .477                   1.052 
1985                  .562                     .826 
1990                  .762                   1.220 
1995                  .969                   1.243 
                                         2000                   654.8                 951.5 
                                         2001                   735.2              1047.0 
                                         2002                    N/D                  N/D 
                                         2003                    N/D                  N/D 
                                         2004                    N/D                  N/D 
Source: IMF: International Financial Statistics Year book 2004. 
*N/D Indicates No Data. 
Senegal has enjoyed relative political peace since independence and consequently, the 
service sector of the economy remains the most productive sector accounting for over 
61% of the GDP. However, its small size and poor resources significantly limit its ability 
to make major impact in issues concerning regional economic integration in West Africa. 
  
Table 2.22: Republic of Sierra Leone. Key Events since Independence 
1960 Gained independence in 1960 with Milton Margai as its first President. 
1964 Death of Milton Margia and the emergence of his brother, Albert Margai as 
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President. 
1967 National elections marred by violence following Margai’s plan to establish a one-
party state. 
 Army renegades overthrow the government of Margia and replaced by the 
‘National Reformation Council. 
1968 National Council overthrown in another coup led by non-commissioned officers 
installing Siaka Stevens as President. 
1977 President Stevens established a one-party state. 
1985 Ageing President Stevens hands power over to Joseph Momoh. 
1990 President Momoh reintroduces multi-party democracy. 
1991 Beginnings of separatist insurgency as the Revolutionary United Front led by 
foday Sankoh attacks border towns and villages. 
1992 Unpaid soldiers’ mutiny turns out as coup and Momoh flees and Captain Strasser 
became President under the National Provisional Ruling Council. 
 Reports of horrible crimes against humanity as the crisis deepen amidst fleeing 
refugees. 
1993 Joint military operations between the Kamajor militia, Armed forces and 
ECOMOG against the RUF rebels as their atrocities continue unabated. 
1994 Rebel group the RUF took over the strategic diamond and other mines. 
1995 Government attacks forces rebels to withdraw from key diamond areas and frees 
the capital, Freetown from rebel control. 
1996 A palace coup overthrow Captain Strasser and Maada Bio became President. 
 Abidjan Peace talks between the rebels and government breaks down. 
 Ahmed Tejan Kabbah became President and signs Peace Accord with Sankoh. 
1997 Overthrow of the government of Tejan Kabbah and Kabbah flees. 
 Major Paul Koroma assumed power through the Armed Forces Ruling Council. 
 Government /RUF Coalition produce unparallel and systematic looting and 
mismanagement thus throwing the economic into shambles. 
1998 ECOMOG offensive ended AFRC/RUF Coalition and restores Kabbah to power. 
 Arrival of the UN Peace Keeping Observers, UNMSIL and Human Rights 
Observers. 
 1999 AFRC/RUF atrocities worsen as arson, rape, murder and dismemberment 
continue. 
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 ECOMOG continues its offensive against AFRC/RUF positions. 
 Negotiated Peace Agreement re-establishes AFRC/RUF and government 
coalition government. 
 Nigeria begins phased withdrawal of its troops as the UN sends 6000 capacity 
Peace Keeping force, UNAMSIL. 
2002 Security worsens delaying the Peace Process. 
 UNAMSIL deploys fully thus completing disarmament.36
  Shelter Project by World Vision for the war ravaged Kono district. 
2003 WFP assists Sierra-Leonean refugee returnees.  
 
Sierra Leone lies on the bulge of Africa with Freetown as its Capital. Its population is 
about five million two hundred thousand with a land area of approximately 71,740 square 
kilometres. The country comprises of multi-ethnic groups including the Mende, Temne, 
the Krio and other smaller groups. Its inability to forge nationhood among its diverse 
nationalities has been the bane of its socio-political and economic backwardness since 
independence, marked by crisis after crisis. 
The country is relatively impoverished with an economy that is mainly based on the 
mining of diamonds for export, with the majority of the population engaged in 
subsistence agriculture with persistent balance of payments problem. 
                                                 
36 For details of Sierra-Leone profile see, http://www.db.idpproject.org 
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Table 2.15: Republic of Sierra Leone. Trade [in millions of US dollars]. 
Year               Exports              Imports
1975                .118                   .185 
1980                .224                   .427 
1985                .130                   .151 
1990                .138                   .149 
                                            1995                .028                    135 
                                            2000                 12.9                   145.9 
                                            2001                 20.3                   183.6 
                                            2002                 48.6                   264.4 
                                            2003                 92.4                   303.7 
                                            2004                  N/D                     N/D 
Source: IMF: International Financial Statistics Year book 2004. 
 
Even though relatively endowed with mineral resources such as iron, diamonds, gold, 
bauxite, rutile etc, poor infrastructure, devastating political crisis, corruption and 
mismanagement have combined to slow down its development leaving the country’s 
economy in near total shambles. Of-course, under this condition, it can not be expected to 
make any impact on sub-regional community efforts at self sufficiency and sustainable 
development through regional economic integration. 
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 Table 2.23: Republic of Togo. Key Events since Independence 
1960 Gained independence from France with Sylvanias Olympio as its first President. 
1963 Col. Eyadema assassinates President Olympio and declared himself President. 
1973 Formation of the National labor federation of Togo [Confederation Nation ale 
des Travailleurs du Togo, CMTT]. 
1974 Promulgation of new labour Codes Prohibiting strikes and appropriate 
imprisonment. 
1983 First Structural Adjustment Programme with the IMF/World Bank. 
1984 Government privatizes major companies including Togolese Steel Company. 
1988 Inauguration of the Togolese Human Rights Commission following allegations 
of torture and arbitrary imprisonment. 
1990 Formation of the Togolese Human Rights league by Joseph Koffigoh [Ligue 
Togolaise des Droits de L’Homme, LTDH]. 
 RPT’S Convention marking its twentieth anniversary. 
 Government relaxes Press Laws allowing non-party newspapers. 
 1991 Government signs June 12th Accord with the opposition acceding to the 
Convocation of a national Conference. 
 Former President Eyadema stages another military coup and successfully returns 
to power. 
 Togolese National Conference concludes its sittings. 
 The Army invades Prime Minister Kiffigoh’s residence, took him prisoner and 
Cancels the reforms of the National Conference. 
1992 Beginnings of National Negotiations on the shape and form of a new 
Constitution. 
 Occupation of the Parliament building by the Togolese Army seizing all non-
RPT members of the Human Rights Commission. 
 Opposition Leader Gilchrist Olympio survives assassination attempt from 
Eyadema’s loyalists. 
1993 National Togolese election commission disqualifies Gilchrist Olympio resulting 
to opposition boycott of the elections. 
1994 National legislative elections won by Committee for Renewal [CAR] which 
became the major opposition. 
 Re-election of President Eyadema amidst allegations of electoral fraud and 
intimidation. 
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1995 Murder of a non-political Attorney and the subsequent arrest of the chief of 
President Eyadema’s presidential guard – Narcisse Djoua. 
 
The Togolese Republic is situated in the gulf of guinea and lies between Ghana and the 
Republic of Benin. Its population is about four million five hundred thousand [1999] with 
a land area of approximately 56,785 square kilometres. The country is inhabited by 
diverse ethnic groups which include the Mena, Ana in the South, the Kabre, the Losso 
and the Tchokossi in the north and the Basar inhabiting the central kotokoli area. 
The economy is as small as its size and based on subsistence agricultural production. 
Cotton, coffee and cocoa export form the main export commodities formerly controlled 
by the state owned monopoly-Sotoco but later joined by another company –Sicot. 
Table 2.16: Republic of Togo. Trade. [in billions of CFA Franc]. 
Year              Exports             Imports
1975               .126                   .174 
1980               .338                   .551 
1985               .190                   .288 
1990               .268                   .581 
1995               .208                   .386 
                                            2000                N/D                  N/D 
                                            2001                N/D                  N/D 
                                            2002                N/D                  N/D 
                                            2003               N/D                   N/D 
                                            2004               N/D                   N/D 
Source: IMF: International Financial Statistics Year book 2004. 
 
Togolese economy remains grossly underdeveloped compounded by its small size and 
population. Its trade balance is persistently in deficit and depends heavily on foreign Aid. 
Also, its meagre exports are severely affected by the devastating price fluctuations in the 
World commodity market. 
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More devastating is the destructive corrupt dictatorship of President Eyadema that has 
mismanaged the available resources for over two decades. Unable to galvanize the 
diverse peoples into a coherent and progressive state, Togo has so far remained a theatre 
of frequent political crisis, murder, looting thus severely limiting its ability to participate 
meaningfully in regional integration programmes. 
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Summary  
Chapter 2 traces the historical background of West Africa and member sates of 
ECOWAS providing a selected chronology of key events within member states. It also 
examined the internal socio-political and economic structure of the states in order to fully 
explain the socio-political and economic environment that is the crux of ECOWAS 
predicament, and upon which ECOWAS is expected to achieve greater economic 
integration. 
The predicament confronting almost all the member states lies in their inability to 
stabilize their political and economic environment that is crucial not only for sustainable 
national economic and political development but also for a successful regional economic 
integration programme. A cursory look at the internal socio-economic structure of 
member states shows a common trend – the common problem of nation building and 
economic development. 
It appears therefore, that most member states are enmeshed in political and economic 
turmoil from Benin Republic to Nigeria. Even the once stable states of West Africa – 
Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal that had enjoyed decades of political and economic stability, 
are gradually but steadily matching toward anarchy. 
Therefore, the present state of affair in member states’ domestic socio-political and 
economic environment does not and cannot provide the much required favourable 
condition for ECOWAS to successfully implement its regional economic integration 
programmes. 
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3 The Structure and History of ECOWAS 
The previous chapter provided an overview of West Africa and its states, and selected 
chronology of major events in the various member states of ECOWAS in order to provide 
deeper insight into the environment and circumstances surrounding ECOWAS as well as 
the challenges confronting it in its effort to attain sustainable development and self-
reliance in West Africa through regional economic integration. 
Chapter 3 is mostly descriptive looking into the history and structure of ECOWAS and 
its economic integration programme. Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 provide a selected 
chronology of major events in ECOWAS and a complete organizational chart of 
ECOWAS. The chapter goes further to examine the ECOWAS objectives and the 
theoretical rationale for ECOWAS economic integration programme and finally an 
examination of the structure and operation of ECOWAS integration initiative, in terms of 
its trade liberalization policy, liberalization of migration barriers, Agricultural and 
industrial policy as well as macro-economic policy. 
Table 3.1: Selected Chronology of Major Events in ECOWAS 
1975 Signing of the Treaty of Lagos, establishment ECOWAS by the fifteen member 
states with the objective of promoting trade, cooperation and self-reliance in 
West Africa. 
 ECOWAS conference for the Federation of West African Chamber of commerce 
in Togo. 
1976 Ratification of outstanding Protocols and Launching of the West African 
Clearing House. 
1977 Cape Verde joins ECOWAS. 
  Conference on integration and cooperation in Lagos, Nigeria. 
1978 Conference of Heads of State and Government adopts the Protocol on Custom 
Tariff and Goods from third countries. 
 1979 Second Summit of the Conference of Heads of States and Government in Dakar, 
Senegal. 
  ECOWAS Heads of State and Government signs Protocol relating to free 
movement of peoples and rights of residence and establishment of commercial 
enterprises. 
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1980 Third Summit of the Conference of Heads of States and Government. 
 Signs the Treaty of trade liberalization. 
  Ratification of the Protocol on rules of origin. 
  First provision of the 1978 protocol on the right of entry without Visa comes into 
force. 
  Adopts Programme for the development of an integrated regional road network. 
1981 Fourth Summit of the Conference of Heads of State and Government in 
Freetown, Sierra-Leone. 
  Signs Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence. 
  Commences Free Trade Area for unprocessed goods and handicraft. 
1982 Fifth Summit of the Conference of Heads of State and Government in Cotonou, 
Benin Republic. 
        Adoption of the protocol on regional agricultural development strategy- Decision 
A/DEC 4/5/82. 
         Adoption of the Protocol relating to free movement of Persons – Decision 
A/DEC.10/5/82. 
1983 Sixth Summit of the Conference of Heads of State and Government in Conakry, 
Guinea. 
         Adoption of the Protocol on single trade liberalisation scheme for industrial 
products of community origin – Decision A/DEC.1/5/83. 
 Adoption of the Protocol on the establishment of national structures to monitor 
community acts and decisions – Decision A/DEC. 2/5/83. 
1984 Seventh Summit of the Conference of Heads of State and Government in Lome, 
Togo. 
1985 Eight Summit of the Conference of Heads of State and Government in Lome, 
Togo. 
         Adoption of the Protocol on ECOWAS travel certificate – Decision A/DEC. 
2/7/85. 
1986 Ninth Summit of the Conference of Heads of States and Government in Abuja, 
Nigeria. 
1987 Tenth Session of the Conference of Heads of States and Government in Abuja, 
Nigeria. 
  Adoption and Launching of the ECOWAS Economic Recovery Programme in 
Abuja. 
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  Launching of the construction of ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria. 
1988 Eleventh Summit of the Conference of Heads of State and Government. 
  Launching of the construction of the ECOWAS fund Secretariat in Lome, Togo. 
1990 Formation of the ECOWAS Peace Monitoring Group – ECOMOG. 
  Elimination of Tariffs on 25 listed Community Products. 
  Decision to establish a Single Monetary Zone and removal of remaining barriers 
to trade in goods originating from the Community. 
1991 Signing of the LOME IV Agreement by the Conference of Heads of States and 
Government. 
1992 Changed the West African Clearing Zone to become the West African Monetary 
Agency. 
  Institutionalization of the ECOWAS Trade Fair by ECOWAS Ministers. 
  Formulation of the minimum Agenda for the implementation of Community 
Agreements regarding free movement of peoples and goods. 
1993 Revision of the ECOWAS Treaty aimed at accelerating economic integration and 
political cooperation. 
1994 Summit of the Conference of Heads of States and Government in Abuja, Nigeria. 
  Signing of the UEMOA Treaty and its ratification by the Conference of Heads of 
States and Government. 
  Adopts Protocol for the establishment of a Community Parliament. 
  Adopts Convention on Extradition of non-political offenders. 
1996 Conference of Heads of States and Government imposes common Value Added 
Tax [VAT] on consumer goods to rationalize indirect Taxation and stimulate 
intra-community trade. 
1997 Appointment of ad-hoc Committee for the implementation of trade liberalization 
measures for the establishment of a Single Monetary Zone by 2000. 
1998 Approves the establishment of a regional Bank – ECOBANK Transnational Inc. 
  Inauguration of ECOWAS Traveller’s Cheque Scheme by the Conference Heads 
of States and Government. 
1999 Mauritania withdraws from ECOWAS. 
  Converts ECOWAS Fund into an Investment and Development Bank - 
Investment Bank and a Regional Development Bank. 
  Approves Protocol for management and settlement of conflicts within the 
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Community. 
  Signs Agreement on co-financing and construction of Gas Pipe line between 
Nigeria, Ghana, Togo and the Republic of Benin. 
2000 ECOWAS Jubilee Summit –endorsed establishment of a regional Passport. 
  Inaugurates regional airline ECOAIR but yet to take off. 
2002 ECOWAS Secretariat begins implementation of NEPAD. 
2003 Special Summit of the Conference of Heads of States and Government launches 
the West African Civil Society Forum. 
2004 Special Summit of the Conference of Heads of States and Government on trade 
liberalization, customs union, trade tariffs in Accra, Ghana. 
  Launches a project on Energy Production in Lagos, Nigeria. 
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Figure 3.1: ORGANISATIONAL CHART OF ECOWAS 
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3.1 The Objectives of ECOWAS 
ECOWAS mandate was to promote cooperation and development in economic, social 
and cultural activities and indeed in all fields of human endeavour, to raise the standard 
of living of the peoples of the region, expand and maintain economic growth and stability 
as well as coordinate better relations among member states and generally contribute 
meaningfully to the development of Africa.37
In order to practically realize these aims, ECOWAS was empowered by its treaty to: 
1. Abolish all custom duties and levies of similar effect on imports and exports 
between member states; 
2. Eliminate all forms of quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade between 
member states; 
3. Formulate common tariff structure and commercial policy toward non-members; 
4. Abolish any obstacles to free movement of peoples, services and capital between 
member states; 
5. Harmonize agricultural policies and promote joint projects particularly in marketing, 
research and industrial ventures between member states; 
6. Coordinate and implement joint development schemes in transport, communication, 
energy and other infrastructures; 
7. Harmonize economic and industrial policies of member states while eliminating 
major disparities in the level of development between them; and, 
8. Institute a fund for cooperation, compensation and development. 
                                                 
37 For more details of ECOWAS aims and objectives see; ECOWAS Revised Treaty, Chap.2, Article 3, 
ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, Abuja, Nigeria. 
 94
The theoretical framework for ECOWAS economic integration programme was 
predicated on the assumption that a successful implementation of items 1&2 will mean 
attainment of a free trade area. Successful execution of item 3 implies attaining a customs 
union; a practical combination of items 1, 2, 3, & 4 will ultimately transform ECOWAS 
into a common market, while an amelioration of items 5, 6, & 7, will catapult ECOWAS 
into a complete economic union. Though, some practical steps have been taken toward 
free trade, ECOWAS seems still far from attaining a common market more than two and 
half decades after its formation. 
3.2 ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Policy 
Based on the preamble of chapter 8, Articles 35, 36, 37 & 38 of the ECOWAS Revised 
Treaty, the process of eliminating tariffs and other obstructions to trade between member 
states and the institutionalization of a common external tariff structure on non-members 
should proceed gradually and completed over a transitional period of 15years from 
197938. Within the period, the organization sought to; 
a) Remove all tariff barriers to trade. 
b) Establish a common customs union. 
c) Establish common external tariff, and  
d) Abolish all custom duties and taxes of similar effect.  
The first two years of the implementation of ECOWAS trade liberalization policy 
sought to maintain existing customs tariffs on goods within member states, and then 
gradually eliminated over a period of 8years. All quotas and other quantitative restrictions 
of similar effect are to be eliminated within 10years, while differences in external tariffs 
between member states are to be harmonized in the remaining 5years. 
                                                 
38 See Articles 35, 36, 37 & 38 of ECOWAS Revised Treaty for more details of ECOWAS trade 
liberalization scheme. 
 
See also ECOWAS Secretary General’s Annual Report [2001]. P.51-52, for more details on liberalization 
of intra-community trade. 
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ECOWAS first step was to direct effort at forming a free trade area by lifting barriers 
to mutual trade within the region on three groups of products originating from the 
community from 1981; on: 
A] Unprocessed agricultural commodities. 
B] Industrial Products, and 
C] Traditional handicrafts. 
Though implementation has commenced, the process seems problematic as there were 
no clear cut identification of the industrial products involved, and the failure of some 
member states to apply the preferential regime on other exports from the community. 
There is also the problem of compensation for losses incurred by member states in the 
course of applying the regime. 
Figure 3.2: ECOWAS Integration Process 
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Source: Own Construction. 
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Although ECOWAS took the step of classifying the member states into three 
categories of A, B, & C, [according to their economic power in descending order] in 
order to cushion the effects of revenue losses that might be incurred in the course of the 
implementation of the scheme, [especially by the less endowed states], effective 
implementation of the scheme remains problematic, since most of the member states 
depend heavily on custom duties for government revenue. 39
Table 3.2: Time Table for Tariff Reduction & Liberalization by ECOWAS 
Source: Adapted from ECOWAS Official Journal, ECOWAS Secretariat, vol. 5. June 6, 
1983. 
Country Groupings 
 [ CT ] 
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Cape Verde, The Gambia, 
Guinea Bissau, Mali, 
Burkina Faso, Niger & 
Mauritania [before her 
withdrawal]. 
 
Eight [8] yrs on the basis 
of 12% reduction each 
year. 
 
Ten [10] yrs on the basis 
of 10% reduction each 
year. 
 
 
GB: Benin, Guinea, 
Liberia, Sierra-Leone, 
Togo  
 
 
Six [6] yrs on the basis of 
16% reduction each year. 
 
 
Eight [8] yrs on the basis 
of 12.5% reduction each 
year. 
 
 
GC: Cote d’Ivoire, 
Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal. 
 
 
Four [4] yrs on the basis of 
25% reduction each year. 
 
 
Six [6] on the basis of 16% 
reduction each year 
                                                 
39 For details on obstacles to ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme, see ECW/TCIMPC/XI/6 [1982], 
Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Non-Tariff Barriers. Final Report: Cotonou: 2-6 March, p10. 
 
See also, ECW/TCIMPC/X/3 [1981], Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on trade Liberalization. Final 
Report: Cotonou: 17 – 21  August, p19. 
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   In order to further enhance the process of implementation of the scheme, ECOWAS 
adopted the convention on inter-state road transit of goods [ISRT], the development of 
automatic data processing system for customs [ASYCUDA], and statistical data and trade 
promotion and cooperation.40
Figure 3.3: Facilitation of Implementation Process. 
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Armed with its institutional framework for trade liberalization [as shown above] 
ECOWAS began from the 1990’s, to adopt greater measures to form a single monetary 
zone and efforts at eliminating remaining barriers to trade within the community. This is 
based on the assumption that monetary union would enhance investment and trade 
activities within the community and facilitate financial transactions with countries outside 
the union.  
                                                 
40 For details of ECOWAS [ISRT] See ECW/TTEC/X111/TR/V/4/Rev.1 [1982]. Convention No: A/P2/82 
regulating inter-state Road Transit between member states of ECOWAS, Cotonou: 29 May: P.20. 
 
See also, ECW/TCIMPC/V/3 Rev. Common ECOWAS Statistical Standards and Definitions. 
UNCTAD/ECDC/19.Add.1 GE – 79. 
 
On ECOWAS Regulations governing the coding of statistical and fiscal customs regimes, see 
WCW/TCIMPC/X113 [1980]. 
 
See also ECW/TCIMPC/X111/4 [1983]. ECOWAS Trade Promotion Forum: Final Report. Abidjan: 21-23 
September, p5. for more details on community trade promotion activities. 
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First, the West African Clearing House was reorganized to form the West African 
Monetary Agency [WAMA] to administer the exchange rate system [EERS] and the 
West African Monetary institute to monitor member states’ performance toward the 
regional macroeconomic convergence criteria.41 Similarly, ECOWAS instituted a Credit 
Guarantee Scheme and Traveller’s Cheque system issued by WAMA in dominations of 
the West African Unit of Account, and solely convertible into local currency at the rate of 
one special drawing right [SDR].  
Figure 3.4: Second Monetary Zone by 2000 & Revised to 2004. 
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It went further to impose a common Value Added Tax [VAT] on consumer goods in 
order to harmonize indirect taxation and stimulate greater flow of intra-community trade. 
The Second stage of ECOWAS trade liberalization policy hinged on the assumption 
that the successful implementation of the first stage [free trade area] will automatically 
lead to the attainment of a common market, through the formation of a customs union. 
ECOWAS adopted the Fast Track Approach endorsed out of the LOME Summit [1999] 
for the formation of a single regional market. To achieve a customs union, it adopted the 
                                                 
41 For more details on WAMA and WAMI, see WAMI Annual Report and Statement of Accounts [2001] 
p.8-11. 
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UEMOA Common External Tariff [CET] Structure already in force in the countries of 
the CFA Zone- comprising a scale of [0%, 5%, 10% and 20%].42  
 
Figure 3.5: Stage 11: Customs Union 
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Source: Own Construction. 
 
With this, ECOWAS standardized customs forms, procedures and processes within 
member states. However, the attainment of customs union remains slow and tortuous due 
to the failure of member states to ratify ECOWAS Protocols, gravely compounded by the 
fear of loss of revenue by member states and lack of enabling national legislations to 
enforce community decisions. 
3.3 ECOWAS Liberalization of Migration Barriers Policy 
The ECOWAS Protocol on freedom of movement and residence was articulated in 
Chapter IV, Article 27 of the original Treaty which entered into force in 1980, with an 
optional ECOWAS Travel Certificate.43
                                                 
42 On Harmonization of External Tariffs see the Annual Report of ECOWAS Executive Secretary 
[1998/1999] “Accelerating the Integration of West African Economies to Face the Challenges of the 21st 
Century”, ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, Abuja, Nigeria: Chap.111, p.105-110. 
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The Protocol stated in its preamble that “citizens of member states shall be regarded as 
community citizens and accordingly Member States undertake to abolish all obstacles to 
their freedom of movement and residence within the Community. That member states 
shall by agreement with each other exempt Community citizens from holding visitor’s 
visas and residence permits and allow them work and undertake commercial and 
industrial activities within their territories”.44  
ECOWAS set out to pursue an agenda for implementation of the Protocol on free 
movement of peoples and goods by seeking to eliminate all non-tariff barriers, 
simplification of customs and transit procedures and drastic reduction in control posts on 
international roads. It sought to harmonize its Brown Card Scheme with the UEMOA 
CIMA Code Scheme, to take care of third-party liability and the introduction of the 
ECOWAS Passport. 
To further enhance transportation and communication, ECOWAS developed a 
programme of integrated regional network roads and rail ways in 1980. Under the 
programme, two major transnational Community highways were designed and 
implemented – the trans-coastal high way linking Lagos, Nigeria with Nouackchott, 
Mauritania [4,676km], 83% completed and the trans-Sahelian highway linking Dakar, 
Senegal with N’Djamena, Chad [4,633km], and so far 87% completed.  
ECOWAS programme on telecommunications are implemented under the framework 
of INTELCOM 1 linking member states with telephone, telex and fax facilities. 
INTELCOM 11 intends to update and expand existing network as well as the envisaged 
trans-coastal gas pipeline linking Nigeria, Benin Republic, Togo and Ghana.45
                                                                                                                                                 
43 For an overview of ECOWAS migration policy, see, ECOWAS [1999], Compendium on Free 
Movement, Rights of Residence and Establishment, ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja Nigeria. 
 
44For detailed ECOWAS exposition on Freedom of Movement and Residence see, Chapter 1V, Article 27 
of the Treaty of ECOWAS or better still , Chapter V111, Article 32 of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty, 
ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja, Nigeria.  
 
45 On ECOWAS infrastructural programme and development, see WAMI Annual Report and Statement of 
Accounts [2001], WAMI Secretariat Accra, Ghana: p23-24. 
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3.4 ECOWAS Agricultural Policy 
The Community agricultural policy is articulated in Chapter 1V, Article 25 of the 
ECOWAS Revised Treaty and hinged on the promotion of joint agricultural projects in 
member states in the areas of production, research, training, processing, marketing and 
distribution.46 The main thrust of the policy is to ensure food security by ensuring 
increased production and productivity in agriculture, livestock, fisheries and forestry, as 
well as improved conditions for the regions farmers, and the protection of prices of export 
commodities in the international market. 
In order to achieve this, ECOWAS designed an enabling institutional structure to 
harmonize and integrate production structures, strategies and policies in pricing and price 
support policies in the production, trade and marketing of major agricultural products and 
inputs. 
In general terms, strategic industrial policy is often justified on the assumption of 
ensuring continuity of supply. Unlike elsewhere in which numerous internal instruments 
influence consumption, production and storage of agricultural products, ECOWAS has 
not effectively applied any specific and workable arrangement in terms of price support 
or production tied aid, to enhance producer incomes, that is desperately required to 
stimulate internal agricultural production and reduced imports. 
The extent community cooperation in agricultural policies may be possible depends on 
improvements on the nature and structure of the economies of member states, that are 
largely mono-crop economies and mainly competitive rather than complementary. 
                                                                                                                                                 
See also Annual Report of the ECOWAS Executive Secretary [2001], ECOWAS Executive Secretariat 
Abuja, Nigeria: pp 60-68. for further details of ECOWAS infrastructural programme and development 
 
46 For details of ECOWAS Agricultural Harmonization Programme, see; Arts. 34 & 35 of ECOWAS 
original Treaty or Chap.1V, Atr.25, of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty, ECOWAS Secretariat Abuja, 
Nigeria. 
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Any meaningful harmonization of policies must take into account the seeming intractable 
land tenure system in West Africa that is highly fragmented and which inhibit long term 
investment in agriculture, and indeed, subsidies, benefits to farmers and consumers, 
marketing and distribution both for food and export as well as research and education. 
Figure 3.6: ECOWAS Agricultural Policy Harmonization Process. 
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Source: Own Construction. 
 
Though, land is abundant and there is a genuine desire by member states to create 
agricultural wealth both for food and export, at present, the region’s farmers are largely 
 103
left unprotected with little capital investment in terms of equipment and machinery to 
enhance production, nor is there any concrete effort so far to redress the fragmented 
nature of the land tenure system. The sector also till date lacks any concrete intra-
community strategy for effective marketing and distribution of products for the benefit of 
consumers and producers alike. Though there are some measure of national efforts by 
member states to promote agricultural production, coordinated intra-regional effort have 
not yielded the much desired results particularly in sustained education and research. 
3.5 ECOWAS Industrial Policy 
ECOWAS industrial policy as articulated in Chapter V, Articles 26-28 of its Revised 
Treaty sought to strengthen the industrial base of the Community by modernizing priority 
sectors to ensure self-reliant development and promotion of joint development of 
industrial projects within the Community.47 The policy aims to promote industrial 
development throughout the Community, through the harmonization of investment 
legislations and policies of member states  
Decades after independence, industrial policy measures in West Africa had been 
wrongly focused mainly on the establishment of industries and the attainment of 
technology transfer through the turn-key approach. They had erroneously assumed that 
technology is willy-nilly transferred, and ended up wasting the meagre resources on the 
establishment of industries that had neither direct and strong linkages with the domestic 
economy, nor had the capacity to achieve the much envisaged gradual transfer and 
adaptation of foreign of technology.  
The result is indeed the scattering of ‘white elephant’ industrial projects throughout the 
region; from beer breweries, cigarettes factories to auto-assembly plants etc. that require 
imported raw materials, thus, consistently draining the meagre foreign exchange earnings 
of these states, and consequently reproducing dependency. 
                                                 
47 On details of ECOWAS envisaged Industrialization Policy, see Chap.5, Articles 26-28 of the Revised 
Treaty, ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja, Nigeria. 
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 The consequence is that earlier efforts at industrialization in West Africa could not 
sustain the much desired diversification of the economies of these states, as they were not 
designed to stimulate the domestic economies. 
The challenge of industrial harmonization and development in West Africa lies in the 
ability of ECOWAS to design a workable industrial development framework based on 
realizable small and medium scale labour-intensive agro-based industries with direct 
linkages with the local economies. It must be industrial concerns that have the capacity to 
offer effective challenges to the region’s men and women with the industrial expertise, 
combined with strategic policy interventions strengthening the position of those local 
industrial concerns in the face of international competition.  
Though, many of the member states of the Community in their individual national 
development efforts, have investment laws which offer competitive concessions to attract 
investment, any practical approach must define the levels and structures of intended 
inducements and concessions and as the integration process matures, must ensure a 
complete equalization of investment policies throughout the Community. 
ECOWAS views industrialization as an engine of growth and indeed as an approach to 
integration, and as a result has developed a programme of industrial development and 
harmonization which provides for a three-stage approach to industrial harmonization and 
development. 
The first stage consists of Consultations and Exchange of information on major 
projects, the second stage is hinged on harmonization of industrial incentives and 
development plans while the third stage centres on personnel exchange and training, as 
well as joint development of industrial projects. 
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 Figure 3.7: ECOWAS Industrial Harmonization Process. 
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As depicted in the figure above, the first stage is mainly preparatory, based on 
consultations and exchange of information, while stages two & three lacks any 
coordinated time-frame for achieving them or a careful delineation of the key industrial 
projects needed to jump-start region-wide industrial development and expansion, and 
therefore largely vague and indefinite. 
However, in its efforts to stimulate and promote industrial development within the 
community, ECOWAS has established a private regional investment Bank, West African 
Industrial Forum and an Industrial Master Plan outlining strategies for stimulating 
Community economic development and creating conducive environment for Foreign 
Investment. So far, one practical step toward this strategy was the envisaged 
establishment of the West African Gas Pipe line, linking Nigeria’s gas supplies with 
inland countries of Benin republic, Togo and Ghana. There are also Plans for an 
integrated regional Energy Scheme known as the West African Power Pool as well as 
efforts at promoting Renewable Energy Resources. 48
                                                 
48 For details of Community Outlook on Energy Development see, Chap. V, Article 28 of the ECOWAS 
Revised Treaty, ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja, Nigeria. 
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3.6 ECOWAS Macro-Economic Policy 
Harmonization of trade, industrial, agricultural and overall economic development 
demands some measure of coordination at the regional level of fiscal, monetary and 
exchange rate policies of member states of the community. Though, macro-economic 
policy coordination remains largely under the national control of the member states, 
ECOWAS has attempted to promote macro-economic policy convergence in the face of 
sustained economic disruptions resulting from divergent monetary policies in member 
states and persistent balance of payments problem. 
The urgency of a comprehensive and workable convergence programme of the national 
economies of member states is overwhelmingly acknowledged by ECOWAS to stimulate 
the adaptation of sound fiscal and monetary discipline required to put the region on the 
course of sustainable economic growth and development.  
In order to accelerate the development of intra-regional trade, creation of a workable 
monetary union and strengthen national economies, ECOWAS developed a programme 
of macro-economic policy convergence criteria based on consumer price stability [single 
digit inflation], Sustainability of fiscal deficit [5% of GDP], limiting of deficit financing 
by central banks [cap of 10%] and gross official exchange reserves [at least 3months of 
import cover].49
                                                 
 
49 On details of ECOWAS convergence criteria, see the annual Report [1989/1999] of the Executive 
Secretary, ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja, Nigeria. 
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Figure 3.8: ECOWAS Macro-Economic Convergence Criteria. 
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In order to facilitate the implementation of the convergence criteria, the second monetary 
zone was created made up of the Anglophone member states of the Community, with the 
ultimate aim of merging with UEMOA, the monetary union of the Francophone member 
states. So far, implementation has remained slow with virtually no practical steps taken to 
transfer financial autonomy to a regional transnational bank for greater macro-economic 
integration.  
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Summary 
Chapter 3 provides a brief selected chronology of ECOWAS since inception and 
ECOWAS organizational Chart. Further, it provides a descriptive explanation of 
ECOWAS economic integration policies of trade liberalization, liberalization of 
Migration Barriers, Agricultural Policy, Industrial and Macro-Economic Policies, thus 
providing a deeper insight into the Community’s integration programme. 
One recurrent decimal in all these policies and programmes lies in the seeming 
problem of implementation, and not the policies and programmes per se. 
First, trade liberalization demands complete elimination of tariff barriers, establishment 
of a customs union, enthronement of a common customs external tariff and elimination of 
custom duties and taxes of similar effect. Also in reality, harmonization should take care 
of the rules of origin, compensation procedure for revenue losses encountered in the 
course of the implementation of the programme, approval procedure for industrial 
products, and a conceptualization of the Value-Added Fund ex-factory price of products. 
Its success lies squarely on the ability of the member states to implement successfully 
each stage of the integration process. Obviously, this is neither the case, since neither 
prompt ratification of the Community’s Protocols is neither assured nor the 
institutionalization of required national legislations to enforce Community decisions and 
programmes. 
Second, since many of the states depend heavily on custom duties for raising revenue, 
commitment to elimination of tariff barriers remain evidently low, the continued presence 
of multiplicity of check-points on intra-regional highways is a manifestation of the degree 
of shallow commitment to free movement of peoples and goods within the community. 
Third, so far, ECOWAS agricultural policy lacks any practical approach in tackling  
the problems of the fragmented nature of the land tenure system [in terms of acquisition 
re-allocation and rehabilitation], subsidy, production and marketing etc. Also, while the 
first stage of the Community’s industrial policy is merely consultations and exchange of 
information, the second stage remains essentially vague. Apart from a few joint 
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development projects, harmonization of national investment legislations of member states 
remains disturbingly slow. 
Fourth, none of the member states has been able to fully implement the Community’s 
primary macro-economic convergence criteria, and therefore, the road to the region’s 
macro-economic integration remains basically distant. 
Finally, a detailed analysis of ECOWAS integration policies and programme and the 
factors precipitating their failure will be presented in chapter 4, while striving to answer 
the specific question in this work: Why is regional economic integration seemingly 
difficult in West Africa: What went wrong and why? 
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4 Explaining ECOWAS and its Shortcomings: A Cognitive 
Framework for Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided an overview of the history and structure of ECOWAS 
which was essentially descriptive as well as selected chronology of ECOWAS and its 
organizational chart. Chapter 4 goes a step deeper in its look into the ECOWAS 
integration programme by developing a cognitive framework for the analysis of the 
ECOWAS politics thus providing a better understanding of ECOWAS and its 
shortcomings.50
The cognitive framework provides the initial foundation for the examination of 
ECOWAS and is supplemented by explanations highlighting events and factors that 
shaped ECOWAS formation and overall performance in its economic integration 
initiative. The dilemma of ECOWAS stems from the fact that though regional economic 
cooperation provides rational “conjoint” utilities and benefits, in many cases those 
utilities are ‘incongruent’ with the cognitive framework within which member states 
cooperate or not with regional integration programmes.  
It is argued that the cognitive framework within which national actors of member states 
‘perceive, interpret and assess’ these utilities determine what is deemed a rational choice. 
The member states actor’s rationality basically hinge on a more ‘subjective’ structure of 
utilities and depends on their “perception of the policy issue, level of analysis, attitudes 
towards gain and loss, probability and risk, world view and time frame in which costs and 
benefits are likely to accrue” 51
                                                 
50 On the differences between a framework and a theory or a model see, Moravcsik [1998]: 19. 
 
51 For an overview of cognitive framework of analysis see, Brown [1994]: p38. 
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The chapter concentrates on the most important ECOWAS integration programmes of 
trade liberalization and liberalization of migration barriers that affect the everyday lives 
of the community’s peoples, using the analytical tool of the cognitive framework while 
leaving the more complex financial liberalization to future studies. Added to this is the 
fact that ECOWAS has not really done much in the harmonization of economic and fiscal 
policies of member states, to warrant in-depth analysis.  
Therefore, the chapter will centre on over two decades of community efforts to attain 
full liberalization in trade and factors of production and generally seek to examine and 
unravel the reasons behind the difficulty in attaining meaningful economic integration in 
West Africa: what went wrong and why? 
4.2 The failure of ECOWAS 
As earlier stated in the course of this work, ECOWAS was established to promote 
cooperation and sustainable development among the member states, in all fields of 
economic activity for the purpose of raising the standard of living of the region’s diverse 
peoples.52 In order to achieve these objectives, the organization embarked on a program 
of economic integration to attain accelerated and sustained economic growth within the 
region through the complete elimination of all barriers to free movement of goods, capital 
and persons. This is undertaken through a structured regional programme of trade 
liberalization and liberalization of migration barriers. Its main purpose is to ensure 
stability and economic growth throughout the region. 
In addition, the potential economic benefits from liberalization in-terms of cost 
reductions on economic agents [i.e. producers, consumers and government] are based on 
the assumption that all tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade within the region are fully 
removed. However, the welfare benefits that should accrue from liberalization are 
drastically reduced since the realization of the ECOWAS internal market programme 
remains largely incomplete. 
                                                 
52 For an overview of the general aims and objectives of ECOWAS see, Article 3 of the ECOWAS Revised 
Treaty, ECOWAS Executive Secretariat Abuja, Nigeria. 
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On ECOWAS Trade Liberalization 
The regional trade liberalization programme was hinged on the complete removal of all 
barriers to trade within the region, establishment of a customs union, establishment of a 
common external tariff and the elimination of customs duties and taxes of similar effect. 
This was planned over a transitional period of 15years from 1975.  
Its successful completion was envisaged to open up the door to greater economic gains 
for the member states of the community in-terms of increased expansion in trade due to 
free mobility of factors of production, increased capital flows and direct investment due 
to attractiveness of the large integrated market, and balanced industrialization due to 
greater specialization and economies of scale. 
So far, ECOWAS internal market programme remains largely incomplete due to the 
low commitment and lack of effective compliance on the part of member states in the 
implementation of regional decisions. Though the regional policy of trade liberalization 
offers a catalogue of rational conjoint utilities and benefits to be derived when completed, 
which otherwise member states can not achieve alone, its obvious that those utilities and 
benefits lack rationality in the minds of member states actor’s preferences as shown in 
their poor implementation. 
First Stage 
The first stage of ECOWAS trade liberalization scheme entails the establishment of a 
free trade area, the benefits of which are regionally distributed and long term in nature. 
Free trade area involves elimination of all customs duties and taxes of equivalent effect 
upon which most of the member states depend heavily for raising government revenue for 
the provision of social services to their people. 53 This process will gradually result into a 
customs union with the enthronement of a common tariff structure and other economic 
policies towards third countries with the ultimate aim of an economic union through the 
harmonization of economic, agricultural, industrial and monetary policies. 
                                                 
53 For an overview of the ECOWAS Free Trade programme see, Chap.V111, Articles 35-38 of the 
ECOWAS Revised Treaty, ECOWAS Executive Secretariat Abuja, Nigeria. 
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In West Africa, economic problems are the most consistent catalyst for social change- 
this in-turn basically shapes the preferences of member states to pursue low risk short-
term policies with immediate national gains which are largely incongruent with long term 
benefits that would accrue from liberalization of regional trade. Under this condition, 
such a policy can only survive or elicit maximum commitment on the part of member 
states if there is adequate compensation procedure for loss of revenue to member states 
particularly the poorer states.  
Therefore, a major hindrance in the implementation of Articles 12, 13 & 14 of the 
ECOWAS Revised Treaty which concerns removal of customs duties is that most of the 
member states derive the bulk of their revenue from indirect taxation. Indirect taxation 
accounts for a relatively high percentage of all budgetary income throughout West Africa 
– most of these taxes are actually import and export duties54. Thus, it is assumed that as 
member states economies undergo structural changes, the rates of indirect taxes to total 
revenue will tend to fall, but in reality this did not happen.55  
Thus, the existing tax structure poses the problem of how best to provide adequate and 
appropriate compensation for those member states drastically affected by the elimination 
or lowering of import duties through liberalization. Literally, liberalization is expected to 
provide substantial benefits to member states in the long term from the envisaged 
elimination of tariff barriers and other trade restrictions. But a close look at West Africa 
indicate most of the member states are mainly producers of primary products, which 
compete with and not complement each other. This indeed makes it quite difficult to 
achieve the principal aims of Articles 12, 13 and 14 in relation to the attainment of a 
customs union.  
                                                 
54 Due to the negative effects of elimination of tariff barriers, member states remain strongly reluctant to 
implement fully community decisions on tariff reduction and elimination, thus leaving the liberalization 
programme substantially incomplete, see Ashok, k.& Eghosa, O. in Akinyemi etal. [eds.] [1983] “Problems 
of ECOWAS” :Readings and Documents on ECOWAS, NIIA, Lagos: P.149-158. 
 
55 On the dependence of West African economies on import and export revenue, see ECOWAS Annual 
Report [2002] ECOWAS Executive Secretariat Abuja, Nigeria: chap.1 p.8.  
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In addition to the problems facing full liberalization, progress towards ECOWAS 
liberalization and market integration is further retarded by the relative small size of the 
regional market and lack of significant expansion in intra-community trade. The 
community’s half-hearted liberalization did not generate the much desired diversification 
in the national economies of member states as the non-complementarities in the structure 
of their economies persist.  
Further, reduced potential for increased intra-ECOWAS trade and the wide disparities 
in resource endowments and income levels between the member states have significantly 
sustained lopsided and marginal growth in both export and domestic production within 
the region; thus, leaving the regional market relatively dominated by only a few member 
states [i.e. Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana], which are relatively rich in natural 
resources, accounting for more than 70% of the region’s exports to the world. 
  
 Figure 4.1: Share of ECOWAS member countries’ Export 1998. 
 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Quarterly, December, 1999 [online]. 
 
Therefore, the low degree of competition if any, induced by the marginal removal of 
trade barriers did not significantly increase intra-ECOWAS output and trade, in-terms of 
exports and reduced imports, since similarities in both manufactured and agricultural 
products throughout the community precludes a broad range basis of production for 
enhancing inter-state trade. 
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Consequently, the narrow range of overlapping production that characterize West 
African economies prior to liberalization remained unchanged and severely limits 
member states to merely import-substitution types of production in consumer goods. 
Further, due to the low degree of market expansion attained by the community, 
compounded by the average size of existing firms within ECOWAS which are relatively 
below the cost-minimizing optimum, neither the potential growth effects of economies of 
scale and greater specialization accruing from liberalization nor the expected fiercer 
competition under the internal market conditions were realized.  
Also, since the internal market programme of ECOWAS was so far unable to enhance 
relatively fiercer competition, the potential for the usual behavioural changes 
accompanying liberalization in terms of reorganization of production and management to 
reduce administrative inefficiency, improved specialization, and better exploitation of 
locational advantages in production facilities as well as intensified effort at scientific 
innovation were substantially diminished. As a result, the existing level of the 
implementation of the internal market programme was not sufficient to effectively 
undermine national lobbies, so that inefficiency and inflexibility remain significantly 
sustained. 
The failure of existing liberalization measures to enhance production and expansion in 
the community’s internal market is shown in the patterns of their volume of trade within 
the region, Africa and the world, with the percentage of intra-community trade remaining 
at a relatively very low ebb, though a sizeable volume of intra-community trade remains 
unrecorded and carried out through the informal sector.56
  
                                                 
56 For an overview of the problems associated with calculating intra-ECOWAS trade, see West Africa and 
World Index, Third Quarterly [1991]: Vol. V, No. 3. p.108. 
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 Table 4.1: Africa’ Trade growth, 1992-1997, in Percentages 
 
     Year Trade within 
ECOWAS 
Trade within Africa Exports to EEC 
        1992         62.5           8.9            3.3 
        1993           8.3         11.4         -13.9 
        1994         -1.7         32.3             6.5 
        1995        19.8         11.9           13.2 
        1996        19           7.2           12.4 
        1997          9.1         11.2             2.2 
Source: Culled from African Development Indicators 1998; Economic Commission for 
Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
 
For instance, the percentage of ECOWAS regional trade with the developed countries 
for the period 1997/1998 averaged about 11% of the total community trade, where as 
intra-community trade for the same period averaged only 9%. Though member states 
economies are structurally arranged along former colonial lines as manifested in the 
existing patterns of trade and monetary systems, their preferences in trading more with 
countries outside the region are further influenced by their desire to increase their export 
capacity and raise the much needed foreign exchange. Often in West Africa, import and 
exchange controls are instituted as a matter of necessity to ensure favourable balance of 
payments. 
Also, trade and fiscal restrictions in form of import and export restrictions usually 
inhibit trade expansion either within the national economies or within the periphery of the 
community which is worsened by the disparities in their applications. Most of the 
member states of the community apply quantitative controls, licensing and the use of 
inefficient and corrupt national monopolies in the importation of reserved items in the 
effort to avoid domestic shortages.  
Added to this is the fact that even though there might be some marginal expansion in 
intra-community trade resulting from removal of tariffs from goods originating from the 
community, the degree to which this would be achieved depends on the ability of the 
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internal market expansion to ameliorate the seeming intractable problem of foreign 
exchange in member states.  
In the West African economic environment therefore, there is no real elasticity of 
supply of exports, [even in terms of primary products], which largely gravitates around 
the availability of foreign exchange. Therefore, as the problem persists, the preferences of 
member states can only change towards greater intra-regional trade only if it is capable of 
meeting their immediate short-term import needs. 
 
Second Stage 
The second stage of ECOWAS trade liberalization process entails the establishment of 
a common market through a customs union. It was envisaged that the successful 
completion of the first stage [free trade area which so far has remained largely 
incomplete] would automatically lead to the attainment of a common market. The first 
problem confronting the community in this regard was the existence of a rival union 
[UEMOA], comprising the francophone member states of the community with an already 
existing common external tariff and discriminatory trade preferences. Before now, the 
UEMOA countries consider the rest of ECOWAS countries as “third countries quite 
against the provisions of ECOWAS conventions and protocols…” 57  
                                                 
57 On the problems confronting the ECOWAS common external tariff programme, see the Annual Report 
of the Executive Secretary [1998/1999], ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, Abuja, Nigeria: p.108. 
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  However, the Bamako ECOWAS Summit of 2000 attempted to resolve this 
complication when ECOWAS adopted the UEMOA common external tariff structure 
comprising the rates of [0%, 5%, 10% & 20%]. This enabled ECOWAS to standardize 
their customs forms, procedures and processes of member states [at least on paper]. The 
problem confronting this process like others before it lies in the implementation of the 
community decisions on the attainment of a common market, which demands not only 
total tariff elimination and other remaining quantitative and administrative restrictions 
and common external tariff structure but also removal of all obstructions to free 
movement of persons, capital and services between member states.58
Intra-ECOWAS compensation agreements and procedures must be all embracing 
comprising all forms and variety since integration have both positive and negative effects, 
in order to keep weaker states within the scheme. On one hand, it could be initially highly 
disruptive to the national economies of member states in terms of higher import prices 
with negative impact on the retail prices, reduction in revenue accruing to the government 
owing to lower import receipts and indeed induced deficit balance of payment due to 
changes in new trade patterns. In practice, since the adjustment costs are obviously too 
high, member states’ commitment to regional integration programmes can only be 
assured if ECOWAS compensation mechanism is a well packaged deal. 
Most recently, efforts are still on to practically harmonize disparities in the operations 
of UEMOA and ECOWAS as most UEMOA countries demand adequate compensation 
for loss of revenue as a condition for implementing the common external tariff. The 
community so far lacks any coherent and pragmatic compensation mechanism for 
ameliorating the problem of high cost of compensation, which has significantly derailed 
the implementation of the regional common external tariff structure. The intra-ECOWAS 
compensation mechanism must be such that can effectively reduce the cost of 
                                                 
58 For an overview of ECOWAS customs union process, see Chap. 2, items D of the ECOWAS Revised 
Treaty, ECOWAS Executive Secretariat Abuja, Nigeria. 
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compensation itself and incidence of trade diversion arising from changes in the existing 
patterns of trade and loss of production efficiency.59
In practical terms, the community’s market integration procedures and instruments are 
not sufficiently equipped to generate a credible customs union in West Africa. So far 
ECOWAS regional instruments rather than stimulate national economic development, 
impose huge adjustment costs on member states, and therefore constitute real obstacles to 
national economic policies of member states. This of-course, grossly inhibit the ability of 
the private sector within the national economies to fully exploit the large opportunities of 
economies of scale within the region.  
Further, the community’s preferential tariffs are usually calculated based on high 
custom rates and are paid by the exporting member states. These procedures for 
compensation inflict substantial revenue losses on the exporting member countries which 
at the meantime member states find absolutely very difficult to offset. Also, even if 
efforts to finance compensation from the community levy [the protocol which was 
approved in the 1996 Summit provides for a 0.5% tax on the value of imports from third 
countries], is taken as an option, it faces the same obstacles as this equally demands 
member states to fully comply with their financial obligations to the community which at 
present is neither here nor there.  
Added to the problem of inadequate compensation are the complications arising from 
the regional mechanism for approval procedures for industrial products which are 
substantially “incoherent, complicated and time-consuming”.60 The community’s 
requirements for a certificate of origin and an export declaration form for goods 
originating from the community particularly on unprocessed goods, compound the 
problem and negatively impact on the expansion of intra-community trade and output. 
                                                 
59On possible ways to improve intra-community compensation mechanism, see the ECOWAS Executive 
Secretary’s Annual Report [1998/99], ECOWAS Executive Secretariat Abuja, Nigeria: p.108. 
 
60 On details of the complications arising from exiting ECOWAS approval procedures see, The Executive 
Secretary’s Annual Report [1998/1999] “Accelerating the Integration of West African Economies to Face 
the Challenges of the 21st Century” ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja, Nigeria: p.109.  
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Practically, there seems to be high incidence of losses rather than gains on the part of 
member states due to high adjustment costs from liberalization without commensurate 
compensation arising from the liberalization process so far. ECOWAS at present lacks 
any realistic compensatory mechanism for losses encountered by member states in the 
course of the implementation of the liberalization scheme and therefore, do not assure a 
fair distribution of the economic benefits from integration. Adequate compensation in this 
regard, must be in form of granting privileged treatment and transfers of resources from 
the gainers to the losers which must at the same time have beneficial effects on the 
recipient’s economy. 
However, the inability of the community’s liberalization process to enhance efficiency 
through the reallocation of regional resources neither complemented production for 
export nor increased variety of domestic consumables for the general welfare of the 
citizens. Also, there is the near absence of ‘forward and backward’ linkages in the 
community’s production processes to the extent that diffusion of growth from the export 
sectors to the rest of the economies of member states is somewhat difficult. 
For instance, liberalization have neither achieved any authentic realignment in 
industrial production processes within the region in terms of expansion in inter-industry 
specialization nor enhanced economies of scale by reducing duplication and negative 
inter-industry competition nor has it led to the attainment of enhanced agricultural 
production both for export and domestic purposes.  
The problem lies in the fact that ECOWAS till date has no effective community 
investment policy and lacks needed political muscle to take both economic and social 
decisions essential for effective coordination of investment to ensure possible reductions 
in costs of production and equitable distribution of the gains of development. At present, 
the community’s industrial policy has not gone beyond consultations and exchange of 
information as the actual harmonization of investment legislations and incentives and 
region-wide joint development of projects have not really taken off ; particularly in the 
areas of small and medium scale agro-based industries with direct linkages with the local 
economies of member states. 
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Also, strategic industrial development is usually based on the assumption of possibility 
of continuity of supply. There are yet to be any practical step towards an enhanced 
agricultural production through the reorganization of the community’s land tenure system 
in terms of land acquisition, reallocation and rehabilitation; increased subsidies in terms 
of machinery and improved varieties; enhanced production both for export and domestic 
purposes; and, effective marketing and distribution network for the benefit of both the 
consumers and the producers. 
Regional harmonization of industrial and agricultural policies is confronted with 
similar problems of implementation as member states investment policies run in 
opposition directions. While among the Franco-phone member states, investment 
legislations are integral part of the development programme, whereas in Anglo-phone 
member states, investment incentives remain measures operating independent of the 
development programme with no clearly defined degrees and structures of inducements 
and concessions in investment policies. 
The attainment of uniformity in the administrative mechanism for implementing 
incentive legislations demand some measure of rationalization with some adjustment 
costs to member states in terms of relocation of industrial projects, requisite finance to 
propel the projects and the commensurate compensation mechanism to ameliorate the 
negative effects of such reorganizations on the balance of payments of member states, 
and generally compounded by the continued reluctance of member states to transfer to the 
regional body the powers to make economic and social decisions.61
Similar constraints also diminish the capacity of the community’s internal market 
programme so far, to attract sufficient net capital inflows in form of foreign direct 
investment to support the liberalization programme. Its inability to develop a working 
integrated investment policy  increases the uncertainties surrounding the future trade 
policy of the community and the numerous conflicts in different parts of the region that 
had only exacerbated the deterioration of the region’s investment environment.  
                                                 
61 For an overview of trade problems and prospects within ECOWAS, See, Asante, S.K.B. [1982] “Seven 
Years of ECOWAS: Trade Problems and Prospects”, West Africa [May 24]: 1369-1377. 
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Further, the absence of regional integrated investment policy only results in widening 
the disparities in economic development between the member states as availability of 
natural resources and market size continue to determine decisions involving foreign direct 
investments within the community.  
Table 4.2: Aid and financial flows to ECOWAS Countries. 
Economy         Net Private Capital Flows                 Foreign Direct Investment 
                      [millions of US dollars]                           [millions of US dollars] 
                             1990                         1998                      1990               1998_______ 
Benin                     1                              34                            1                      34 
 
Burkina Faso       0                               0                              0                       0 
 
Cote d’Ivoire      57                             181                          48                     435 
 
Ghana                -5                               42                            15                      56 
 
Guinea              -1                                -9                             18                        1 
 
Mali                 -8                                 17                             -7                      17   
 
Niger                9                               -23                             -1                        1 
 
Nigeria          467                          1,028                           588                       1 
 
Senegal          42                               24                             57                      40 
 
Sierra Leone   36                                5                             32                        5 
 
Togo               0                                 0                              0                          0________ 
Source: Extract Data from Dept Analysis Undertaken as Part of Heavily indebted 
Countries [HIPC] Initiative: World Development Report 2000/2001 p.314-315.  
 
A cursory look at the direction of foreign direct investment within the region as shown 
above depicts a movement of FDI into member states with the largest natural and mineral 
resources assets with some measure of political stability with concentration in Cote 
d’Ivoire, Senegal, Ghana and Nigeria to the detriment of poor member states. Thus, only 
a regionally coordinated and harmonized investment policy with adequate compensatory 
measures can effectively bridge the ever widening disparities in investment opportunities 
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between member states by reallocating regional resources to member states with little or 
no natural resources. 
On ECOWAS Liberalization of Migration Barriers 
The ECOWAS protocol on freedom of movement, rights of residence and 
establishment of commercial enterprise was meant to ensure unhindered circulation of 
people and goods within the community. It sought to abolish entry visas and permits for 
community citizens, enthronement of an ECOWAS travel certificate, harmonization of 
immigration and emigration forms and the ECOWAS brown card scheme for vehicular 
insurance. It is noteworthy here that any protocol or decisions that do not require 
financial adjustment and losses are quickly implemented by member states. 
However, the protocol on freedom of movement like others soon began to face similar 
problems in its implementation. Apart from the revenues to be lost by member states 
through the abolition of national passports, immigration charges, social and cultural 
frictions soon emerged following the movement of labour and other entrepreneurs.  
Commitment to the protocol on the part of member states dwindled soon after they 
realized that rather than mitigate their unemployment problems, it did actually exacerbate 
it and therefore largely incongruent and grossly lacked rationality with member states 
immediate national aspirations. Often, in periods of economic down turn substantial 
labour influx into the member states generated resentment and hatred and sometimes 
violent crisis as competition for jobs ensued and practically result to high political risks 
for the national governments of member states.62
                                                 
62 Good examples of the negative effects of removing barriers to migration on the national economies of 
member states and the high political risks involved are the labor tensions between migrant laborers from 
Burkina Faso and Ivorien nationals. 
 
Also includes, the tensions between Nigeria and illegal aliens that led to their deportations in 1983. Of-
course, in every case, the tensions were followed by tightening border controls against the provision of the 
protocol on free movement 
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Soon most national governments began to face the problem of how to give priority to 
their nationals without disrupting economic activities. Many states too reacted to the 
challenges in the form of new commercial enterprises laws reserving selected sectors of 
the economy to their citizens and in some cases outright expulsion contrary to the 
provisions of the community protocol.63
Most threatening to the protocol is its propensity to generate violent tensions between 
the host states and the immigrant populations arising from economic competition, which 
some times result to the overthrow of national governments of member states. 
Sometimes, the immigrant populations are conscripted to swell the rebel camps [such as 
in Liberia, Sierra Leone and now Cote d’Ivoire].64
Therefore, the long-term regional benefits that might accrue from the free circulation of 
peoples and entrepreneurships within the community at present seem to have been 
heavily outweighed by very high short-term economic and political risks involved in their 
implementation in member states.  
Further, the high adjustment cost to member states in terms of revenue losses in 
customs duties, immigration charges etc. and economic and political risks once again 
could not guarantee effective compliance and psychological commitment on the part of 
member states that are essentially averse to risks and losses and which constantly seek to 
maximize short-term national economic and political gains contrary to the long-term 
regionally distributed benefits that would accrue from unobstructed migration within the 
community. 
The member states’ attitude towards gain/loss as well as the time frame in which 
regionally distributed benefits are to accrue in relation to the protocol is reflected in the 
numerous check points still existing along the community’s highways contrary to the 
provisions of the protocol.  
                                                 
63 For an overview of the obstacles confronting the protocol on free movement of peoples and goods and 
freedom to establish commercial enterprises in member states, see Kumar, A. & Osagie, E. [1983]. 
 
64 For greater details on the problems of ECOWAS, see; Akinyemi, A.B. et al. [1983] “Readings and 
Documents on ECOWAS” NIIA: Macmillan Nigeria Publishers Ltd. Ilupeju, Lagos: pp496-498.  
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 Table 4.3: Checkpoints along Intra-ECOWAS Highways.  
 
 
    High Ways 
 
    Distance 
 
Checkpoints 
 
Checkpoints  
Posts per 
100km 
Lagos – Abidjan 
 
   992Km            69            7 
Cotonou – Niamey 
 
  1036Km            34            3 
Lome – Ouagadougou 
 
   989Km            34            4 
Accra – Ouagadougou 
 
   972Km            15            2 
Abidjan – Ouagadougou 
 
1122Km            37            3 
Niamey – Ouagadougou 
 
  529Km            20            4 
Source: Adapted from the Executive Secretary’s Annual Report [1998/1999] ECOWAS 
Executive Secretariat, Abuja, Nigeria: p. 35. 
 
As shown in the table above, as at 1998/99, there are approximately 7 checkpoints per 
100km on the highway between Lagos and Abidjan, 3 per 100km between Cotonou and 
Niamey; 2 per 100km between Accra and Ouagadougou; 3 per 100km between Abidjan 
and Ouagadougou; and 6 per 100km between Niamey and Ouagadougou. 
Like others before it, the implementation of the protocol on free movement of peoples 
and goods suffer serious abuses by officials and agents of member states’ governments. 
The author’s field observations and interviews [2002 and 2003], revealed the most 
disturbing abuse of the protocol. The most notorious of them all is the Conji Border Post 
between Togo and Benin Republic where immigration and customs officers on both sides 
of the border could be described as anything but civil in their spurious extortion of traders 
and other travellers against the spirit of the protocol thus confirming age long allegations 
of their government’s complicity.  
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This represents the gruesome experiences of thousands of traders and other travellers 
along the community highways with long queues of vehicles and goods from one end of 
the highway to the other. Even along the Lagos-Accra highway, a short distance of about 
30kilometres between Badagry in Nigeria and the Nigeria – Benin Republic Border post 
[Seme post] there were well over 21 checkpoints all engaged in the illicit business of 
extortion. 65
In addition to the widespread abuses of the protocol on migration, there are also the 
dilapidated structural inadequacies hindering both intra-community trade expansion and 
output in terms of lack of basic infrastructures throughout the community. The existing 
disproportionate arrangements of roads and railway links, air and sea transport and poor 
communication and power, all combined to heavily weigh down the intra-ECOWAS 
efforts at regional economic integration. 
Though visible efforts are on by ECOWAS to achieve an integrated transport and 
communication infrastructure within the community in terms of intra-community 
highways construction, improvements in the telecommunications system under the 
framework of the INTELCOM 1 AND 11, and sustainable power in form of the 
envisaged West African power pool that are still on the drawing stage, greater activities 
must shift to more practical integration rather than rhetoric. 
On Macro-Economic Convergence 
Regional efforts at attaining macro-economic convergence of member states’ 
economies through the framework of ECOWAS have so far yielded little or no dividends. 
It is rightly assumed that the success of the ECOWAS internal market programme would 
guarantee a balanced distribution of wealth and significantly narrow the widening 
disparities between member states, by facilitating the intra-ECOWAS movement of 
goods and factors of production. 66
                                                 
65 Author’s interviews and observations along the highways and border posts running from Lagos, Nigeria 
through Benin Republic, Togo and Accra, Ghana February –March [2002 &2003]. 
 
66 For an overview of the ECOWAS Macro-economic Objectives, see Article 51, of the ECOWAS Revised 
Treaty, ECOWAS Executive Secretariat Abuja, Nigeria. 
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However, the full benefits of the community’s internal market programme on the 
region’s macro-economic stability [assuming full completion] could not be realized 
without the harmonization of economic and financial policies of member states to ensure 
both internal and external balance.67  
Further, the community’s goal in its macro-economic agenda is to “achieve 
convergence in fiscal balance, inflation rates, limiting of central banks budge deficit and 
maintenance of sufficient levels of gross official foreign exchange reserves”.68
The ECOWAS primary convergence criteria of limiting national budget deficit of 
member states to GDP to 4%, inflation rates of 5%, central bank financing of budget 
deficit to 10% and foreign exchange reserves covering not less than six months of 
imports demand painful austerity measures from national governments and therefore, 
equally confronted also with high adjustment costs on the part of member states without 
the enabling resources to compliment them. 
Though, convergence of national economies of member states would in the long-run 
provide immense benefits to member states in terms of stability and growth, its rationality 
is significantly diminished within the thought processes of member states national 
political elites seeking to maximize individual political gains.  
Further, the existing economic conditions of West African economies compounded by 
the fragile nature of the member states mono-cultural economies based on the export of 
one or more agricultural products and the attendant disruptions accompanied by the 
persistent fluctuations in the prices of their products in the international market, can not 
sustain the adjustment costs required to fully cushion the negative effects of the 
implementation of the community’s primary convergence criteria. It is extremely difficult 
to maintain an inflation rate of 5% in a fragile and distressed economy or place a 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
67 On the details of ECOWAS Macro-economic Convergence Criteria, see the Executive Secretary’s 
Annual Report [1998/1999], ECOWAS Executive Secretariat Abuja, Nigeria: pp. 110-119. 
 
68 See also the West African Monetary Institute [2001], Annual Report and Statement of Accounts: p. 5. 
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successful limitation on government borrowing from central banks to finance budget 
deficits. 
In addition, the heavy structural imbalances inherent in the economies of member 
states arising from non-diversification in their national economies and unsteady prices of 
their products in the international commodity market cannot guarantee steady flow of 
foreign exchange reserves to always carry the burden of imports upon which their 
economies basically depend, as reflected in their persistent balance of payments problem 
over the years.69
Thus, strict compliance on the part of member states in the implementation of these 
convergence criteria without the critical resources to accomplish them would under 
existing economic conditions precipitate a chain of economic and even political events 
that can uproot the very foundations of these states and their national governments.  
 In most cases, long-term ECOWAS economic integration programmes and 
instruments largely run in opposition directions with the immediate national aspirations 
of member states, and therefore, lack rationality in the preferences of member states 
governments. At present, neither the relatively endowed member states nor the very poor 
ones have fully complied with the community’s primary convergence criteria. 
ECOWAS economic integration programmes are usually long-term in nature, the gains 
of which are regionally distributed and constitutes some measure of high risk adventures 
contrary to the overwhelming immediate national aspirations of member states which 
seek to pursue low-risk policies with short-term pay-offs that could result to immediate 
national welfare. In reality, their present economic and social conditions that demand 
immediate solutions do not give much room for high risk economic adventures with long-
term benefits propagated by regional economic integration programmes. 
                                                 
69 For an overview of ECOWAS member states foreign trade imbalances, see chap.3, or for greater details 
on individual ECOWAS Member States, see IMF [1999] International financial Statistics Yearbook. 
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So far the overall effect of ECOWAS policies appear contradictory and basically 
depend on the capacity of member states to effectively adapt to those policies. Thus 
regional policies generally tend to undermine economic adjustments at the national level 
and have not fully utilized available domestic and foreign resources to develop and 
expand the economies of less endowed member states with the risk of widening the 
already existing disparities between member states and unending necessity for non-
existent compensation, hence the failure of most community economic integration 
programmes.  
It is important to note, that economic integration as in ECOWAS cannot take place in a 
vacuum, and really requires that the regional body must command some measure of 
political authority in terms of adequate decision-making and enforcement powers on its 
member states. As long as the decision-making powers completely reside with the 
national governments of member states, commitment to implementation of regional 
programmes will remain at the mercy of national governments of member states as and 
when it suit them. 
Another major setback in the ECOWAS efforts at economic and social stability within 
the region appear to hinge on its decision-making processes per se. Often, the elaborate 
ceremonies surrounding the conference of heads of states and government end up without 
any practical decisions/solutions on boiling issues particularly on the pace and process of 
regional integration. The provision that all member states must agree before any major 
decisions are arrived at, constitute unnecessary delays in the implementation of regional 
programmes, despite the fact that such decisions must again go through ratification by 
each member state. 
Even economic constraints hindering member states capacity to take quick decisions 
and actions involving the implementation of regional economic integration programmes 
are further exacerbated by the seeming intractable political crisis and conflicts around the 
region. Since most member states lack any foresight in building enhanced unit integration 
within their national polity, often many national governments fall back on ethnic loyalties 
to remain in power, thus promoting sectional conflicts that sometimes develop into full-
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scale armed conflicts. The consequence is the frequent economic and social-political 
disruptions arising from such political tensions and sometimes bitter wars, as in Liberia, 
Sierra-Leone, Burkina Faso and most recently Cote d’Ivoire or Nigeria. 
Summary 
ECOWAS was formed to coordinate region-wide development in all fields of human 
endeavour as a practical reaction to their underdevelopment and poverty. This it hoped to 
achieve through regional economic integration. Regional economic integration in West 
Africa literally would have ensured some measure of economic and social stability 
throughout the region in the long-run. The purpose had been and still is to promote 
economic and social stability and sustainable development within the region through the 
framework of ECOWAS.  
Thus, it is obvious that ECOWAS was influenced to embark on regional economic 
integration by the large array of economic gains which traditional integration theorists 
have propounded could accrue from integration. Through regional economic integration, 
they hoped to expand their internal market through the enhancement of intra-regional 
trade, coordination and harmonization of regional industrial and agricultural production 
as well as harmonization of their economic and financial policies to achieve both internal 
and external balance. 
 However, it is quite probable that member states of ECOWAS either did not 
understand the full implications of economic integration or that they underestimated the 
enormous sacrifices in terms of painful adjustments required to achieve meaningful 
regional economic integration. These necessary adjustments comprise elimination of 
tariff barriers to trade in terms of import and export duties upon which the economies of 
most member states basically depend. It also demands adjustments in industrial policy in 
terms of harmonization of investment legislations, agricultural policy involving near total 
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restructuring of the agricultural system and regionally controlled harmonization of 
economic and financial policies.70
The greatest dilemma of member states lies in the necessity to divulge some decision-
making powers to the regional body for meaningful economic integration to be achieved. 
Unfortunately, the member states remain stunned and strongly resistant to the idea of 
loosing some aspects of their sovereignty to the regional body. Thus, the result is that 
ECOWAS has so far remained an organization [a kind of a lame duck] with a large array 
of protocols and decisions without the requisite political power to enforce them. 
Further, there are quite profound contradictions between ECOWAS regional economic 
integration policies and the national policies of member states. Whereas the benefits 
accruing from numerous regional integration policies are long-term in nature, involving 
low/high risk adjustments, and are regionally distributed, the harsh economic and 
political conditions of these states demand urgent remedies and their policy preferences 
gravitate around policies that offer short-term payoffs, with relatively low risk or total 
risk aversion for the maximization of immediate national welfare. Therefore, this basic 
contradiction accounts for the lacklustre implementation of the community’s protocols 
and decisions and consequently the failure of those regional economic programmes 
within the frame work of ECOWAS. 
Thus, implementation of both the ECOWAS envisaged free trade area and the customs 
union approach to integration impose high risk adjustment costs on member states in 
terms of revenue losses arising from the reduction or total elimination of tariffs without 
an enabling compensatory mechanism, the burden of which seriously weakened their 
moral support and commitment to the implementation of those programmes and 
subsequently their failure. 
                                                 
70 On the crisis of managing development and economic integration in West Africa, see also, Asante, 
S.K.B. [19859] “Development and Regional Integration since 1980” in Adedeji, A and Shaw, T.M. [eds.] 
“Economic Crises in Africa” Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc. 
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Finally, the Community’s liberalization of migration policy, Industrial and agricultural 
policies, economic and financial harmonization, all demand heavy sacrifices from 
member states in the form of structural adjustments for their implementation without 
corresponding compensatory mechanism to compliment them. This state of affair 
apparently led to the frustration of member states and gradually diminished their 
enthusiasm and interest in ECOWAS economic integration programmes. 
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5 Regional Integration Theory and ECOWAS 
5.1 Introduction 
The current chapter examines regional integration theories in order to ascertain if they 
are useful in explaining ECOWAS and its shortcomings. It focuses primarily on the 
realist and liberal traditions in their original and transformed versions and is limited to the 
most influential ideas and concepts from the economic and political fields, and 
determining the utility of their basic assumptions in explaining ECOWAS and the 
problems confronting it, in its effort to attain self-reliance and sustainable development 
through regional integration. Further, the chapter attempts to answer the question: Is 
regional integration for the developed countries only? 
Regional economic integration is essentially characterized by the formation of regional 
cooperation groups of countries with a liberalized intra-community trade and increased 
mobility of factors of production. Earlier political science theories developed out of the 
functionalist and neo-functionalist frameworks, and basically focus on the characteristics 
and processes of regional economic organization itself. Often, they concentrated attention 
on such variables and processes as ‘membership size, symmetry of member’s power 
capabilities, quality of regional leadership, decision-making style and the distributive 
outcomes of regional policy’. Others explained supra-national organization as a process 
in which national actors “are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political 
activities toward a new centre […] [Haas 1968:16]”.  
The neo-functionalists emerged out of the basic assertions of the functionalist blueprint 
and insisted that international organizations offer states full benefits as integration 
progresses applying such concepts as “functional spill over”, “up-dating of common 
interest” and “sub-national and supra-national group dynamics”. The 
intergovernmentalists among them view integration as an orderly arrangement of inter-
state bargains resulting from the convergence of policy preferences among states, which 
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in turn maximizes states wealth and power.71 Earlier works concentrated on functional 
arguments about the importance of a supranational governance structure with well 
groomed bureaucrats, insisting that the process in one area would automatically spill over 
to related areas. 
Traditional economic theories centred on market-driven integration process and 
therefore, concentrated on the relationships among goods and factors of production 
within a region without a proper consideration of the importance of institutional and 
political exigencies of integration. The two main economic theoretical strands concern 
the customs unions and the optimal currency areas.  
The customs union considers the implications of integration on general welfare of the 
integrating group in terms of trade creation, trade diversion and terms of trade while the 
optimal currency area theory insists, that the use of a common currency enhances 
mobility of capital, labour and consumers and reduces regional disparities in taxes and 
increases the supply of public goods with the potential for fiscal spill over across national 
borders. 
Finally, for analytical convenience and clarity of purpose, the examination of these 
theories of integration and determination of their relevance or order wise in explaining 
ECOWAS and its short comings is undertaken by grouping them into two categories 
based on their theoretical orientations: a] Political Science Theories, and b] Economic 
Theories to integration. 
                                                 
71 For an overview of intergovernmentalist theoretical approaches to integration, see [Hoffmann, 1966, 
1982, Taylor 1981, Moravcsik 1991, 1993, 1995, Garrett 1992, Milward 1992]. 
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5.2. Political Science Theories 
5.1.1 Realism 
The grand theories of the realist school that emerged out of American political thought 
[i.e. Hans Morganthau etc.], view the state as the single most important actor in the 
international system with predetermined national interests, which often quantifies costs 
and benefits involved in different policy alternatives to achieve desired goals. It assumes 
that these tasks are undertaken often without enough resources, information and time and 
conceptualized state behaviour as a “consequence of bounded rationality [Keohane, 
1989:62, Simon, 1955, 1957 and 1958]”. 
The realists view the international system as lacking in any centralized authority to 
make and enforce laws governing inter-state relationships, and that in international 
politics states compete with one another without established rules and norms except those 
which “the changing necessities of the game and the shallow conveniences of the players 
impose [Hoffmann, 1965: p. vii]”. Under this condition, states rely on the “means they 
can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves [Waltz, 1979:p.11]”. 
In addition, the realists argue that the basic anarchical structure of the international 
system determines inter-sate relations where states seek self-preservation and application 
of force in the pursuit of their national interests, which largely accounts for the “general 
discord arising from fundamental conflict of interests [Waltz, 1959: Tucker, 1977]”. 
The basic assumptions of the realist school suffered a ‘backlash’ in the 1960’s as it 
faced serious criticisms even from its avowed apostles for not offering useful insight into 
states’ decision to cooperate within regional economic organizations, particularly in areas 
originally viewed as “low Politics”, such as “monetary management, health, humanitarian 
efforts and the environment [Stein, 1990:5, 25; Keohane, 1984: 7]”. 72
                                                 
72 See [Stein, 1990, Keohane, 1984] for more details of the inability of the realist suppositions in dealing 
with the intricacies involved regional cooperation schemes. 
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A seeming crack in the realist ranks and the growing need to construct a supra-national 
governance structure with seasoned bureaucrats led to the emergence of liberals among 
them, who view state actions as determined by rational costs and benefits analysis, and 
insisted that general welfare increases as states interact, by contending that international 
cooperative schemes grow as competing states’ interests converge. 
In general terms, the realist blue print seem to have significantly predicted the failure 
of ECOWAS in their basic assumptions in that states are more likely to pursue policies 
with maximum national benefits at minimum cost. What is rational remained the way 
utilities are framed within the thought processes of a particular political elite/actor 
seeking to maximize individual state gains based on the quantification of the costs and 
benefits associated with the particular policy and the time frame for accomplishing them. 
The realist suppositions underwent several reformations between the 1940’s and the 
1960’s, thus, functionalism, neo-functionalism, interdependence theory and the regime 
theory, all attempted to garner for itself distinct analytical features in their examination of 
the international system. 
5.1.2 Functionalism 
The functionalist blue print based its assumptions on the believe that in a world of 
economic interdependence, apolitical problems such as social, technical and humanitarian 
could be prioritized and solved. It insists that in a “world of economic interdependence, 
common economic interests create the need for international institutions and rules 
[Mitrany 1975]”.73 Its assumptions emphasized a practical approach to problem solving 
insisting that this could be achieved by prioritizing areas of common interests while 
                                                 
73 For an overview of the early works against realist theoretical assumptions in international relations, and 
attempts to overcome the trepidations of war through functional cooperation: see [Mitrany 1966, Deutsch 
1968]. 
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concluding that cooperation in economic and social fields may eventually spill over into 
the political fields.74
Functionalism pessimists strongly illuminate the set backs involved in a regional 
integration programme due to the reluctance of member states in a regional organization 
to transfer sovereignty to a higher level particularly in areas of strong national interests 
[Hoffmann 1964]. For them, this condition would only reproduce supra-national body 
with state-like functions and solely dominated by the most powerful states. 
 They point also to the inadequacy of the logic of spill over, since there is no guarantee 
of stopping neither war through functional cooperation nor the seeming difficulty in 
entirely separating social, technical or economic problems from the political. The theory 
also laid too much emphasis on technocratic logic to the detriment of the importance of 
politics, while some dismissed it for its “poor record of prediction [Haas 1975, 
Thompson, 1980: 201]”, and “lack of scientific rigor [Thompson, 1980]”. 
Whole sale application of the thesis of functionalism in the examination of ECOWAS 
and its short comings may not be entirely useful as so far, cooperation in the social, 
technical and economic fields have not automatically yielded increased dividends in other 
areas within the community. Further, one major set back bogging ECOWAS remains the 
reluctance of member states to transfer decision-making powers to the regional body 
which still lay squarely with the national governments of member states.  
Due to the inability of the community to enact and enforce laws, its legislations and 
protocols are often left at the mercy of the national governments of member states to 
decide whether to enforce or not. Therefore, the success of functionalism within the 
frame work of ECOWAS is severely limited to the extent that the basic ingredients for 
the success of its basic assumptions are quite non existent in the case of ECOWAS – 
there is no guarantee that people and governments would always move in rational 
directions. 
                                                 
74 See also Rosamond [2000:20ff], for a summary of the theoretical underpinnings of Functionalism and 
transactionalism. 
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In reality, functionalist thesis provides an insight into the operations of international 
organizations, by successfully tracing the origins of international cooperation to 
functional interdependence. Its sectoral approach to cooperation and recognition of non-
governmental and trans-national actors in the international system however remain quite 
useful only if actors consistently harmonize their interests by compromising their 
differences and reaping mutual benefits, without down grading nation-states as important 
actors.75
5.1.3 Neo-Functionalism 
Neo-Functionalists seek to refine the functionalist assumptions as clearly demonstrated 
in Ernst Haas work “the Uniting of Europe”, and hinged on three main processes – the 
actors, the motives and the process and context. In order to avoid the pit falls of 
functionalism, the theory upgraded the importance of nation-states by insisting that states 
are the primary actors in an integration process, within which are interest groups and 
political parties. 
In addition, above the nation-states are the supra-national regional institutions which 
spin the webs binding integration, foster the growth of interest groups and promote closer 
cooperation between them and fellow technocrats in member states, thus, promoting 
alliances across national boundaries and adding to the integrative momentum.  
The second process is based on the belief that goodwill, pursuit of common interests or 
common good would ultimately lead to greater integration. “… The process of 
community formation is dominated by nationally constituted groups with specific 
interests and aims willing and able to adjust their aspirations by turning to supra-national 
means when this course appears profitable [Haas 1958].” 76
                                                 
75 For an summary of the reformation of the functionalist theoretical assumptions and the “concordance 
system”, see Donald Puchala, [1999]. “Institutionalism, Intergovernmentalism and European Integration: A 
Review Article”, Journal of Common Market Studies 37[2]:317-31. 
 
76 For an summary of the Neo-functionalist theoretical assumptions, see, Haas, E.B. [1958]. “The Uniting 
of Europe”. Stand ford: Stand ford University Press. 
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The theoretical assumptions of the neo-functionalists insist the idea of spill over 
assumes that “member states’ economies are reasonably interdependent before the 
emergence of the integration programme [Mustier 1989]”. They viewed integration as an 
outcome of joint action by all parties as problems in one area could only be solve through 
recourse to action in other sectors. This is to be achieved by upgrading of common 
interests under the guidance of a regional supra-national body. 
Finally, the Neo-functionalist contend that the context in which integration takes place 
is economic, social and technical and to a lesser extend political but assumes that joint 
activities in the non political areas would gradually permeate the political. Linberg [1963] 
illuminates on conditions necessary for the success of the Neo-functionalist hypothesis77: 
  “Central institutions and policies would have to be present and assigned the capacity 
to initiate social and economic processes thereby taking their remit beyond the normal 
mandate of an international organization. Tasks assigned to the institutions should be 
expansive …member states need to perceive some congruence between their interests and 
the project associated with the new institutions, and common policies [chap.1].”  
   The Neo-Functionalist assumption was part of an ongoing debate on integration in 
Europe at the time but seem to have overshot its projections of possibility of spill over 
from one area to other areas in an integration process. The theory had “exaggerated both 
the expansive effect of increments within the economic sphere and the gradual 
politicization of spill over [Nye 1971]]”. 
Further, its usefulness in understanding ECOWAS and its short comings is limited 
because in the first place, the core preconditions for the successful adaptation of the Neo-
functionalist blue print are quite non existent. The fact of economic interdependence and 
strong and focused political parties and technocrats are yet to materialize in West Africa. 
Without contradictions to say the least, this work agrees that effective institutions can 
enhance the integrative momentum in West Africa, but to the extent that the structural 
                                                 
 
77 For an overview of the preconditions for the proper functioning of the neo-functionalist hypothesis, see, 
Linberg, Leon [1963] “The political Dynamics of European Economic Integration” Stand ford, Calif: Stand 
ford University Press, p.10. 
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imbalances inherent in the economies of member states are rigorously addressed, to 
achieve meaningful interdependence within the integrating group. 
The limited applicability of the Neo-functionalist hypothesis and the problems 
associated with its adaptation are fully recognized and succinctly articulated by Haas: 
  “Other regions with strongly varying environmental factors are unlikely to imitate 
successfully the European example; because of thinner spread of core preconditions 
[1961: 389].” 
   It seems quite obvious that the tasks assigned ECOWAS institutions are not expansive 
enough and that the organization’s institutions lack the capacity and enabling political 
power to initiate social and economic processes beyond its normal mandate to warrant 
effective application and/or adaptation of the neo-functionalist framework to the 
ECOWAS integration programme. 
5.1.4 Intergovernmentalism 
This theory conceptualized integration as “a series of bargains between the heads of 
government of the leading states in a region [Moravcsik 1991: 19-56].” Its basic 
assumption lies underneath the belief that integration takes place within domestic politics 
and entirely a logical consequence of intergovernmental negotiations while down grading 
the importance of supra-national institutions in the process of integration. 
It assumed that converging interests within an integration process are essentially the 
interests of large states characterized by “multiple channels of access” where harmony is 
maintained within the union by the big states buying off the small ones. However, the 
theory contends that weak states would need international institutions as they are 
confronted with more expansive and complex issues.78
                                                 
78 For a detailed overview of the basic contentions of the intergoverntalist tradition, see, [Grieco 1988: 486, 
489, 498-490; Keohane and Nye 1977: 35-36, 232, 234, 240-242]. 
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The intergovernmentalist basic assumptions placed too much emphasis on heads of 
states as major players in the integration process without due regard to the importance of 
several behind the scene events that take place before inter-state bargains. Its backlash 
lies squarely in its lack of explanatory power and core preconditions from which 
hypothesis could be generated. Further, the theory’s “two-level game analogy seems too 
simplistic [Smith and Ray 1993]” while at the same time it could not be “tested 
empirically and should be seen as an approach rather than a theory [Wincott 1995].” 
The theories successful application and/or adaptation in the examination of ECOWAS 
and its short comings are doubtful. First, the leadership elite in many of the member 
states of ECOWAS lack necessary bargaining skills while the region is frost with 
frequent changes of government to allow for sustainable bargaining between 
governments and ensure vital stability in policies and commitment required to achieve 
meaningful integration. 
Finally its transformation and sharpening into “liberal intergovernmentalism 
[Moravcsik 1991]” based a on two-pronged approach to integration does not go a long 
way in accounting for ECOWAS. Its assumptions that the constraints and opportunities 
imposed by economic interdependence shape national preferences or that outcomes of 
inter-state bargains are results of relative bargaining power of governments etc. does not 
hold much water in the arguments on ECOWAS.  
First, the structure of the economies of the member states of the community are more 
or less not interdependent but highly competitive since they produce basically similar 
narrow range of products and therefore, trade more with countries outside the region. 
Second, the relative poor bargaining power of ECOWAS member states in both the 
domestic and international arena fully debunks the efficacy of that assumption – neither 
was ECOWAS a result of efforts to avoid high transaction costs nor the desire to control 
domestic agendas.79
                                                 
79 For expanded summary of intergovernmentalist basic framework, see, [Grieco Joseph: 1997] On 
Variance in modern regional institutionalization – power related variables. 
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5.1.5 Transactionalism 
Theoretical permutations of transactionalism are based on the assumption that 
integration is a function of the level of communication between states. It offers a much 
broader definition of integration then functionalism in economic sense to include “social 
perceptions, values, sentiments and articulation of these values and sense of community 
in formal and structured forms [Duffy and Werner 1980: p.506]. It holds the view that 
cooperation could indeed be enhanced and empirically quantified in term of the 
frequency of transactions between states. 
Transactionalism is best explained in the works of [Deutsch 1966] on nationalism – 
which effectively depicted transactionalism as an effective mechanism for social 
mobilization of communities that initiate historical processes of national development. It 
contends that solid network of transactions between states would lead to more interaction 
and greater importance to one another, and enhanced feelings of mutual benefits and trust 
from increased transactions would motivate “further interactions [Deutsch 1964:54].” 
The theory insists that the potential for integration is guaranteed in regions with mutual 
high international transaction, which would be actualized if states are responsive to one 
another, where responsiveness is defined as “the probability of getting an adequate 
response within an acceptable limit of time [Deutsch 1964: 69].80  
Others argue that member countries of an integrating area would be better integrated if 
they are sufficiently heterogeneous, thus promoting and coordinating friendship across 
national boundaries81
Though the theory broadened the ‘narrow domain’ of inter-state interactions to include 
people-state relations, its process is frost with the difficulty of ‘measurement and 
                                                 
80 For in depth explanations of transactionalism and its theoretical assumptions, see, [Deutsch 
1964]“Communication theory and Political Integration” pp.46-74, in Jacobs and James V. Toscani eds. 
“The Integration of Political Communities” Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott.  
  
81 For details of factors promoting or inhibiting cooperation across national boundaries, see [Newcomb, 
1953: 393-404, Lazersfeld, in Berger abd Page, 1954: pp.18-66].  
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operationalization – resulting from inadequate data required for measuring those 
‘phenomena and test hypotheses’. 
Further the assumptions of the theory are further deflated for not being explicit on the 
mechanism for the operation of its key processes nor how informal interactions can lead 
to formal development of institutions. Even, the problems associated with its application 
are further compounded by the difficulty in measuring cognitive change in terms of 
interaction, attitudes and behaviour by social scientists. 
Its effective adaptation to the circumstances of ECOWAS may pose serious problem as 
greater percentage of transactions within the community are basically informal and 
unrecorded, but how these high informal transactions within the region have promoted 
greater reciprocal relevance or the feeling of trust between member states is difficult to 
quantify. 
5.1.6 Institutionalism 
The foundations for the Institutionalist theoretical framework was laid by March and 
Olsen [1984, 1989], which hinged on the basic assumption that institutions are important 
because of their impact on political outcomes – they provide the contexts where actors 
conduct useful bargains and serve as information pool with relative transparency. 
Generally, institutions intervene between preferences of actors and policy outcomes.82
However, Institutionalist theoretical agenda is diverse with three major variants and so 
are their accounts of the importance of institutions, actor’s preferences and indeed how 
and when they are formed. They differ in terms of the extent institutional structure 
influences the actor – Historical and rational choice variants [Armstrong and Bulmer 
1998; Bulmer 1994], while some others further distinguish between historical and 
sociological institutionalism [Hall and Taylor 1996]. All the variants generally agree that 
‘institutions matter’ and are not passive tools but significantly shape political out comes. 
                                                 
82 For detailed overview of institutionalist theoretical agenda, see, [Aspinwell and Schneider 1998; Peterson 
1995; Pierson 1996: Pollack 1996, 1997]. 
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Rational choice institutionalism assumes that actors will only engage in rational pursuit 
of their self-interest, and views preference formation as undertaken quite outside the 
institutional venue. In this context, institutions shape or moderate the “strategies that 
political actors adopt in the pursuit of their interests [Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 7].” They 
insist that states create institutions in order to benefit from the important services offered 
by them particularly in the reduction of ‘transaction costs’.83
Rationalist institutionalism tends to focus on formal rules and sums up institutions as 
offering Indispensable venue for states to gain wider knowledge of each other and 
therefore serve as “decisive constraint upon self-interest [Thelen and Steinmo 1992:7].” 
However, some apostles of the institutional framework point to the utter neglect of the 
informal rules and the need to include them in the agendas [Hug 2001, Schmidt 2001]. 
Rational choice institutionalism derived its basic assumption more from political 
economy and views institutions either as ‘games on rules or ‘games within rules’, 
[Calvert 1997, Tsebelis 1994, 1999, Tsebelis and Garret 2000]. 
 Historical institutionalism conceptualizes institutions as ‘intervening variables’ which 
dictate the context in which political action takes place. They assume that institutions 
greatly mould the goals and preferences of actors and thereby “structure political 
situations and leave their own imprints on political outcomes [Thelen and Steinmo 
1992:9].” Pierson [1996] insists that social processes can only be understood by 
acknowledging the utility of historical processes, that are characterized by asymmetrical 
distribution of information – this shapes policies quite beyond the original intentions of 
institution builders. 84  
The variant insists that uncertainty surrounding policy formation widens with the 
limited time available to policy makers and changes in domestic politics [i.e. replacement 
                                                 
83 See [Keohane 1992 chap.2; Gandholz 1996: 406] for an in depth account of the benefits offered to states 
by institutions particularly in reducing transaction costs.  
84 On the limited knowledge of policy makers involving treaty negotiations and their ability to speculate on 
consequences, see Tsebelis and Kreppel [1998]. 
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by a new government]. Historical institutionalism essentially gravitates around the 
motives behind an actor’s decision and the general impact of institutions.  
Sociological institutionalism epitomized by Hall and Taylor [1996] hinges on the 
cognitive aspects of institutions providing the cognitive parameters, categories and 
models without which the behaviour of others can not be interpreted. It conceptualizes 
variations in cultural norms and identities as shaping actors perceptions in and out of 
institutions [see Aspinwall and Schneider 2000, Jorgensen 1997, Wiener 1998]. 
The sociological variant uses constructivist arguments in form of policy networks and 
actor based strategies to capture the intricacies of decision-making on sector by sector 
basis, with greater emphasis on informal rules such as conventions and customs 
embedded in institutions.  
5.1.7 Regime Theory 
Regime theoretical framework owes its foundation to the early ground works of 
[Axerold, 1984; Keohane, 1984; Krasner [ed.], 1983], which insisted that states’ interests 
and capabilities as well as the increasing global interdependence can promote 
cooperation. It sees realism as being consumed on the way out of the war trap without 
due attention to the capacity of international organizations to foster cooperation.85
   The theory assumes international institutions moderate and ‘socialize states and 
promote understanding between them, thus providing arena for monitoring states’ 
behaviour and reducing uncertainties and transaction costs. International institutions 
succeed if they are able to “establish principles and facilitate the convergence of 
expectations and interests [Stein, 1992: 207-208].” The framework emphasizes the 
“importance of cognitive factors in international politics [Ruggie, 1975].” 
                                                 
85 For an overview of the regime theoretical framework, see, Axerold’s work on “Evolution of 
Cooperation” [1984], Keohane’s “After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy” [1984] and Krasner’s “International Regimes, [ed.] [1983]. 
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Regime theoretical concept was defined as “a set of implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors expectations converge 
in a given area of international relations [Krasner, 1983:2].”86  
Regime theory is viewed as an amalgam of the realist and liberal traditions. Those 
closer to the realist concepts assume that the conflicting nature of the international system 
diminish free flow of cooperation and that a hegemon is needed to restore sanity within 
the system emphasizing the importance of sanctions. They insist that sanctions and 
monitoring are important to sustain cooperation among self-interested states. 
However, Regime theorists with more liberal orientation de-emphasize the application 
of sanctions and monitoring in international cooperation, assuming that “increasing 
interdependence and common interests, enhancement of available information and norms 
are sufficient to foster cooperation [Grieco, 1988:497]”.  
This work embraces the liberal Regime concept of effective institutions as an practical 
attack on the roots of the discrepancy between the framework of pay-offs provided by 
regional economic integration initiatives and framework of utilities within which member 
states of ECOWAS choose to cooperate or not with regional integration programmes. 
However, there is still little hope as to the readiness of member states to transfer some 
measure of sovereignty to the regional body. In addition, it remains quite doubtful if there 
is any member state of ECOWAS with sufficient resources to play the role of a 
‘Benevolent Hegemon” without necessarily jeopardizing their immediate national 
interests and needs, thus, the concept in all its dimensions do not go a far in explaining 
the state of regional integration in West Africa. The experience of Nigeria in Liberia 
within the framework of ECOMOG is a case in point.  
Also, Regime theoretical framework is seen as a failed effort to “reconfigure the 
international system lacking in the more important analysis of the forms of power that lie 
in the background [Strange, 1983]. The concept is also flawed for assuming that 
                                                 
86 See also Krasner, [1983:2] for detailed explanation of International Regimes as intervening Variables 
between the structure of the international system and the behavior of actors. 
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international organizations are ‘embedded within regimes’, where as their work is to 
“monitor, manage and modify regimes [Breckinridge, 1997]”. 
5.2 Economic Theories of Integration 
Liberal economic theoretical framework is hinged on the assumption that ‘productive 
efficiency’ is enhanced if states undertake economic production in areas where they have 
relative advantage to others, thus rationalizing costs and prices. The two main strands of 
economic integration theories are the Customs Union and the Optimal Currency Area. In 
general economic theories view existence of tariffs and quotas as inimical to free flow of 
goods within a region. 
5.2.1 Customs Union Theory 
The Customs Union examines markets and goods within a region and the effect of 
discrimination within the integrating area. Customs Union is defined as the process of 
“elimination of intra-trade barriers and the equalization of tariffs on imports from non-
member countries [Viner, 1950]”.87 Viner conceptualizes the condition under which trade 
is created within an integrating area; that this occurs when the output of inefficient 
producers are replaced after the elimination of tariffs by cheaper imports of more efficient 
producers within the region to the benefit of both producers and consumers. 
   On the other hand, trade diversion effect occurs when imposition of common external 
tariff puts suppliers from countries outside the integrating area in a competitive 
disadvantage by encouraging imports from less efficient suppliers with the union. Thus, 
this condition leads to trade diversion which reduces the economic welfare and benefits 
accruable to members of the union. 
In general terms, conventional economic theories are hinged on the gains derivable 
from changes in the existing trade patterns within a region based on the condition that; 
                                                 
87 For a general overview of the Customs Union and see the ground works of Viner Jacob, [1950] “The 
Customs Union Issues” New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
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Employment is full under a given input of resources. 
Domestic prices of products must be a practical reflection of opportunity cost under a 
free market allocation of resources. 
These two basic conditions will ensure the attainment of integration through the 
gradual elimination of quantitative restrictions between member states of an integrating 
area. Thus, Balassa [1961] categorized the assumed process of removing discrimination 
into five stages; 
Table 5.1:  Schematic Representation of the Process of Removing Discrimination. 
                       No Tariffs      Common       Free Flow     Harmon. of          Harmon. of       
                         Or Quotas      External        of Factors     Eco &Policies     Policies &                                  
                                               Tariffs                                                            Pol. Institutions 
Free Trade Area     X              -----                   -----               -----                          ----- 
Customs Union      X               X                     -----                -----                          ----- 
Common Market    X              X                      X                    -----                          ----- 
Economic Union    X              X                      X                     X                             ----- 
Total Economic     X               X                      X                     X                               X 
Integration 
Source: Gambari, I. A.. [1991] “Political and Comparative Dimensions of Regional 
Integration”: The case of ECOWAS, Humanities Press Intern.Inc., New Jersey & 
London. 
 
The wholesale application of the customs union basic framework in understanding the 
case of ECOWAS and its short comings is difficult, as there is no assured success in 
moving from one stage of the integration process to the other. Moreover, its success is 
essentially hinged on the conditions that the proportion of intra-community trade is high; 
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that member states economies are complementary and that member states GNP comprise 
low percentage of foreign trade.88  
So far ECOWAS intra-community trade remains largely insignificant due to the non-
complementarity of the economies of member states. The economies are largely 
competitive rather than complementary as they produce similar products with high 
percentage of their trade out side the union. Therefore, the envisaged economic gains 
from the adaptation of the customs union would not fully materialize in the case of 
ECOWAS as the basic conditions for the success of the framework are largely non-
existent within the region.  
Even expectations of economic gains from integration will only come if full 
liberalization and harmonization of the diverse economic policies of member states is 
attained. The full economic gains of its trade creation effect would be minimal in 
ECOWAS, as there are virtually no efficient industries to supply cheaper goods within 
the region. On the contrary, trade diversion effect is most prevalent as member states’ 
economies are largely dependent on the export of one or two agricultural commodities to 
other regions in exchange for the much needed industrial goods that are non existent 
within the region. 
In addition, the customs union concentrated so much on markets, goods and factors of 
production with out due regard to the importance of underlying political intricacies and 
supra-national institutions in the process of integration. Also, deepening of integration 
and joint coordination of fiscal and monetary policies could enhance economic gains 
from integration and balance trade, but membership alone does not guarantee better 
economic performance. 
                                                 
88 For an overview of possible sources of economic gains from customs unions see, Tinbergen [1957: 404-
414] cited in Gambari, I.A. [1991] “Political & Comparative Dimensions of Regional Integration: The case 
of ECOWAS, Humanities Press Intern. Inc., New Jersey & London. 
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5.2.2 Optimal Currency Area Theory 
Optimal currency area is defined as “an area in which exchange rates are immutably 
fixed or in which a common currency exists [Mattli, 1999]”. The theory basically 
examines the conditions under which the formation of a currency is economically viable 
and hinged on “money, markets for goods and markets for factors of production”. It seeks 
to achieve both internal and external balance in the least costly way without 
compromising monetary and fiscal policies.  
However, the proponents of the optimal currency area are divided as to the best avenue 
to achieve both internal and external balance [i.e. Flexible or fixed exchange rates]. The 
first group favours the adoption of “flexible exchange rates to maintain both internal and 
external balance [Friedmann, 1953:157-202]”.  
This strand of the optimal currency area theory argues that adopting fixed exchange 
rates would inevitably exacerbate unemployment and inflation, insisting that imbalances 
would be eliminated by “induced changes in trade and real wages [Kawai, 1992:78]”.  
The second group insists that payment equilibrium would be achieved if real exchange 
rates are fixed thus reducing its volatility. However, both strands converge at the point 
that the success of a currency area depends on the availability of “high mobility of factors 
of production within the region… [Mundell, 1963]”.89
In general terms, optimal currency theory framework whether in the form of fixed 
exchanges rates or in flexible exchange rates would not guarantee the much desired 
economic benefits of ensuring both internal and external balance in form of full 
employment and low inflation, as the member states’ economies remained too weak, 
highly fragile and structurally truncated with little or no influence on the international 
economic system.  
   Added to this is the fact that at present ECOWAS exhibits very low mobility of factors 
of production to ensure needed flexibility in the process of real adjustments to economic 
disturbances within the region. Worse still, the community has neither attained partial nor 
                                                 
89 On the conditions for the effectiveness of a currency union, see also McKinnon [1963:717-725]. 
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full liberalization and harmonization of member states economic and fiscal policies, as 
significant disparities persist. 
Summary 
The analysis of some regional integration theories was undertaken based on their 
different orientations. One common observed phenomenon in all these theories is the near 
total absence of the basic conditions required for their successful application and/or 
adaptation to the socio-political environment and economic circumstances of ECOWAS. 
First, the theories with political science orientations – realism, functionalism, neo-
functionalism, transactionalism, intergovernmentalism and institutionalism, in their 
different analytical strands, require certain conditions which are necessary for their 
effective application and/or adaptation. 
The functionalist logic for instance, tends to separate economic and social from the 
political where as in West Africa, political and social changes are often precipitated and 
determined by economic changes. Therefore, socio-political issues and economic issues 
are functionally related and none can function effectively in isolation to the other. Also, 
its attempt to subvert sovereignty through functional cooperation is unlikely to succeed in 
West Africa, where member states are usually unwilling to surrender any form of 
sovereignty to the regional body; except perhaps, in areas such as the more advanced 
economies [i.e. the EU], where member states jointly agree “to do so within the 
integration process”. 
The neo-functionalist logic of “indirect penetration of the political by way of the 
economic” remains largely difficult to attain within the framework of ECOWAS. Even 
attaining common grounds in political issues within ECOWAS is equally very difficult, 
due to wide differences in socio-political and economic orientations of member states, as 
well as wide differences in their levels of economic development. 
For the transactionalist theory which sees integration as taking place under conditions 
of “high international transaction”, success in its application also remains elusive because 
in West Africa, transactions are higher with countries out side the region than between 
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member states due to similarities in the structure of their economies and the low level of 
interdependence between them. 
The intergovernmentalist basic assumption that integration out comes are consequences 
of intergovernmental bargains, depends largely on the relative bargaining power of 
governments. But considering the fact that ECOWAS region is bedevilled by incessant 
changes of government that severely discourage bargaining among governments and 
ensure vital stability in policies required for meaningful integration, its value in 
understanding ECOWAS and its shortcomings becomes grossly limited. 
Similarly, the adaptation of the institutionalist logic on importance of effective 
institutions to propel the integration process faces the same dilemma in accounting for 
ECOWAS, as ECOWAS is yet to acquire the capacity to enact and enforce binding laws. 
Apart from the framework’s self-inflicted difficulty of fragmentation, ECOWAS is 
neither effectively positioned to serve as “decisive constraint upon self interest” of 
member states nor has it the capacity to practically reduce “transaction costs” for member 
states. 
Even its sociological strand of using institutions to influence and interpret the 
behaviour of member states, remains problematic in accounting for ECOWAS where the 
behaviour of member states are highly unpredictable depending on the issues at stake and 
the time-horizon for attaining them. 
   On their part, the two main theories with economic orientation – customs union and 
optimal currency area- appear to have made an appreciable impact on the ECOWAS 
integration process, but still pose the problem of effective implementation and/or 
adaptation. 
In reality therefore, regional integration is a complex phenomenon. Its complexity 
arises from the diversities in the political and economic environment of different regions. 
And so, its operational dynamics can not subscribe to mere theoretical formulations. 
Besides, most theoretical frameworks which appear to have originated from regional 
integration processes in more developed economies, become complicated by the seeming 
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intractable problems associated with their implementation in less developed economies.90 
At present, it appears quite obvious that cooperation rather than integration is best 
suitable to less developed economies of ECOWAS than total economic integration.  
                                                 
90 For overview of the difficulties of Regional Economic Integration in Less Developed Countries, see; 
[Lincoln, 1961:235-236] 
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6 Conclusion and Outlook 
6.1 Conclusion 
Decades before political independence, West African economies were to a great extent 
tied to the international economic system. They were structurally designed to supply 
agricultural raw materials to the industrialized economies of Europe and later America. 
 In addition, throughout the colonial period there were no conscious efforts to ensure a 
balanced and diversified development of the economies. Rather, the economies were 
mainly dependent on a few commodity exports with inherent persistent price fluctuations 
in the international commodity market, which created serious balance of payments 
problems for the region’s economies. 
After independence, the newly independent states of West Africa were soon to be 
confronted with the harsh realities of a structurally truncated and functionally 
disarticulated economies with no ‘forward’ and ‘backward’ linkages with the local 
economy. 
So, contrary to the conditions obtainable in other regions, the conditions of economic 
contradictions, economic decline and in some cases decay became the order of the day in 
West Africa, and resulted to social changes that were characterized by underdevelopment, 
poverty and violent conflicts. This is quite contrary to the conditions obtainable in the 
industrialized countries which had attained meaningful levels of economic and political 
stability before engaging in regional economic integration and had significantly 
eliminated possibility of recourse to physical force.91 Due to the fact that most advanced 
economies are highly interdependent, collaboration and coordination is “considered vital 
for the protection of their national interests [Rothgeb, H.M. Jr., in Neack, Laura et al. 
1995]”. 
                                                 
91 For more explanations and comparisons on the conditions obtainable in the industrialized world and the 
less developed countries, see Macridis, [ed.] [1989: 379]. 
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Further, the severe and harsh conditions in the social, economic and political scenes of 
the West African States imposed grave repercussions on the growth and stability of the 
states themselves, the region and the wider sometimes the wider world.92 This is clearly 
evident in the incessant violent conflicts, occasional unwarranted wars and frequent 
uncalled for changes of government in most states of the region such as: Liberia, Sierra-
Leone, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria, and most recently Cote d’Ivoire to mention but a few. 
However, as these states became increasingly confronted with the persistent need to 
contain pressures from surging urbanization, increasing population, disease, poverty 
invasion and possible disintegration, they jointly began to search for immediate and 
practical solutions to their needs, which gave rise to the idea of regional economic 
integration under the framework of ECOWAS. 
With the robust and promising package of its regional economic integration 
programmes, ECOWAS had been at the forefront of the region’s efforts towards 
sustainable development and stability in West Africa.  
However, its apparent lack of the requisite resources to accomplish such programmes, 
in addition to the fact that in its original treaty, its founding father’s codified a strong and 
wide-ranging role in both domestic and foreign economic relations for its institutions, 
without  providing the enabling empowerment for the organization to carry out its 
agenda. 
Simultaneously, the kind of decision-making mechanism that developed in ECOWAS 
did not include the ability to enact laws and enforce them and therefore lacks the 
necessary tools to reconcile the ideals of the long-term prospects of its regional economic 
integration programmes with the realities of the urgent national needs of member states. 
Consequently, its capacity to achieve meaningful economic integration in West Africa 
was severely limited. 
                                                 
92 For detailed explanations on the impact of the grave socio-economic and political conditions of the third 
World Countries and the international system, see, Wolf-Phillips, [1979:106], Macridis, R.C. [eds.], [1989: 
379f]. 
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This work therefore, sought to describe and explain ECOWAS failure in its economic 
integration programmes as a logical consequence of the seemingly incongruity and 
obvious incompatibility between the long-term challenges of regional economic 
integration programmes and the urgent national challenges faced by member states. 
Although, ECOWAS economic integration programmes of trade liberalization, 
harmonization of industrial and agricultural policies, as well as economic and financial 
policies had great potentials for offering region-wide long-term benefits, which otherwise 
member states could not achieve alone, the burden of the real adjustments in-terms of 
costs, risks and time-frame for accomplishing them, was too heavy for member states to 
shoulder, given their poor economic conditions that desperately seek urgent national 
attention and near absence of political maturity. 
Similarly, such regional economic integration programmes as harmonization of 
industrial and agricultural policies and economic and financial policies of member states 
equally require not only high adjustment costs/risks and huge resources [that are non-
existent] to achieve them, but also demands elaborate mechanism for sharing the 
gains/losses from harmonization.93  
The need for greater coordination and harmonization appear to be even more urgent in 
the industrial and agricultural sectors because member states which are largely dependent 
on subsistence agriculture view their future socio-economic development and 
modernization of agriculture as closely interwoven with the capacity for quick and 
sustainable industrialization.94 Therefore, the chances of any member state 
accommodating any integration arrangement that leaves it a loser are quite slim. 
Thus, like the industrial sector intra-community agricultural harmonization is quite 
sensitive as member states’ economies are basically dependent on agriculture. Therefore, 
a carefully structured and implemented harmonization programme that will ensure 
                                                 
93 For an over view of the gains, problems and prospects of ECOWAS Integration Programmes; see, 
[Markham, T.K. in Akinyemi et al. 1983: 591-596, Ezenwa, U. 1977]. 
 
94 Rothgeb, J.M. Jr. [1995: 38-41] had offered concise explanations on why collaboration and coordination 
seem to be easier in developed economies in terms of the strong interdependence nature of their economies. 
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viability and narrow the ever widening gap in productivity between member states is a 
“precondition for contemplating and implementing such a scheme [Markham, T.K. 
1983:601]”. 
Further, harmonization of economic and financial policies of ECOWAS member states 
entails measures to achieve macro-economic convergence. At present, apart from the 
complications arising from the existence of a rival union [UEMOA], the inelastic nature 
of West African economies which impose severe strains on member states ability to 
maintain both internal and external balance, demand urgent convergence of national 
economies. This process is compounded by the continued reluctance on the part of 
member states to transfer the powers to regulate financial policies to the regional body. 
In addition, since most of the ECOWAS member states are basically ‘weak constructs’, 
they lack strong socio-economic and political structures to absorb the shocks of 
adjustment in the process of integration per se. Thus, confronted with the dual problems 
of ‘nation-building’ and ‘state building’, member states policy preferences are wholly 
geared toward rationalizing development to more direct and immediate national gains, 
and the promotion of national unity.95
This is further compounded by the seeming recurring question of legitimacy on the part 
of the governments of member states. Unlike the developed countries which derive their 
legitimacy through such structures as democratic governance, balanced economic system 
and near absence of social instability, the West African states are yet to become nations. 
Consequently, the state “frequently will look to foreign policy to meet this legitimation 
function [since] foreign policy enables the state to portray itself as the embodiment of 
nationalist pride”96
                                                 
95 For an over view of the problems of stability and growth faced by developing countries, see, Thomas, C. 
[1987]. “In Search of Security”, The third World in International Relations, Great Britain: Wheat Sheat 
Books, p.2.  
 
96 See Moon, Bruce. E [1995] “The state in foreign and domestic policy”, in Neack, Laura et al., “foreign 
policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, pp.38-41. 
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As the discrepancies between long-term regional integration challenges and the urgent 
national exigencies of member states continue unabated, member states clearly 
demonstrated their lack of interest to simply delegate the powers of making binding 
decisions, monitoring and sanctions to the regional body.97
On theoretical grounds, this work sought to establish that though traditional integration 
theories had quite some significant contributions in the understanding of ECOWAS, 
particularly the realist assumptions that states would likely pursue their narrow interests 
in-term of rational costs and benefits, which seem to have successfully predicted 
ECOWAS failure, their anomalies in broader understanding of the roots of that failure 
were highlighted. This is apparent when viewed in terms of the basic internal conditions 
and circumstances in relation to the wide discrepancies between the long-term regional 
economic integration programmes and the huge requisite resources required to 
accomplish them vis-à-vis the urgent national needs of member states were addressed 
drawing from the theoretical armoury of the cognitive framework paradigm in the study 
and understanding of ECOWAS and its integration programme. 
Thus, the analysis in chapter 4 illustrated the inability of neither the functionalist nor 
the neo-functionalist paradigm to find solutions to the continued rivalry between 
ECOWAS long-term regional programmes and the immediate national preferences of 
member states by their sustained reluctance to submit to more supra-nationalism within 
the framework of ECOWAS. 
Even the pendulum too could not swing in favour of intergovernmentalism as 
reasonable bargains and prompt ratifications of community decisions and protocols 
remain difficult and time-consuming, in the face of high adjustment costs and very low 
degree of economic interdependence between member states. 
Further, the salience of transactionalism is limited too by the enormous official and 
unofficial obstacles which underscores ECOWAS intra-community network of 
communication so far. Also, the two variants of regime theories face somewhat similar 
                                                 
97 See also, the lamentations of the ECOWAS Executive Secretary’s Annual Report [1998/1999], 
ECOWAS Executive Secretariat Abuja, Nigeria. 
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dilemma, as ECOWAS lacks the powers for monitoring and sanctions, let alone enhance 
effective information and establish norms during ECOWAS negotiations. 
Furthermore, apart from the rational choice institutionalist prediction that states would 
‘undertake rational pursuit of self interest’, the other two variants – Historical and 
sociological institutionalisms offer no tangible solutions to ECOWAS problems as the 
organization could neither effectively constrain member states nor sufficiently influence 
their behaviour. 
However, the sociological variant throws more light on the stability or otherwise of 
cognitive ‘patterns and Frames’, thus accounting for interpersonal interactions, and 
generally useful in ‘anticipating the possibility of change in actor’s preferences. 
Finally, the work attempted to combine the salient aspects of these approaches and the 
cognitive framework tools to engage in the project research to find explanations to the 
issue of why regional economic integration is difficult in West Africa and whether the 
developed economies are better suited for regional economic integration in view of the 
inter-dependent nature of their economies and level of development. 
6.2 Outlook 
The journey to economic cooperation and integration in West Africa has been a long 
and tortuous one seriously retarded and frustrated by fiscal difficulties which tended to 
discourage cooperation and integration. Though at present, there seems to be quite some 
practical reasons generating scepticisms about the possibility and success of regional 
economic integration in West Africa, it is not entirely unexpected that at first, conditions 
may be worsened in the short-term arising from the heavy burden of adjustments required 
in the implementation process before becoming better in the long-run. 
Thus, it is obvious that since ECOWAS liberalization process required member states 
to engage in progressive elimination of tariffs and/or eventual total elimination of duties 
from the definitive entry into force of the protocol, that weak member states which 
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constitute about two-thirds of ECOWAS membership had really begun to feel the pinch 
of revenue losses, aggravated by their over dependence on direct and indirect taxation. 
Further, if fiscal difficulties are taken as constituting the most potent obstacle in the 
implementation of the community’s regional economic liberalization programme, the best 
formula for generating and allocating funds from the common pool for cooperation, 
compensation and development must be fashioned out by ECOWAS through a generally 
agreed terms if its must remain relevant in the future. 
The problem arising from the absence of a practical all embracing ECOWAS common 
monetary system must be tackled with all the seriousness and urgency it demands. 
Greater intra-community effort is needed to unify the UEMOA and ECOWAS 
convergence mechanism and establish a common convertible currency for enhancing 
inter-regional and intra-community transactions. An agreement on a unified West African 
Central Bank and a strong West African Clearing House would most ideal. 
Further, the continued presence of a multiplicity of different but, related cooperation 
schemes within the region, is at best distracting and constitute a duplication of efforts and 
resources which must undergo drastic reductions in their numbers, nature and functions. 
ECOWAS can not achieve any meaningful regional economic integration, if the 
organization’s responsibilities, capacities and competence are not renegotiated. It must be 
assigned the powers to enact requisite laws, monitor and enforce them on regional 
priorities. 
Also, member states individual development plans depict a clear view of the direction 
of their desired development. Thus, harmonizing them is not simply reconciling them, but 
require regionally structured and directed policies with enabling powers and requisite 
resources to implement them. 
Consequently, industrial and agricultural harmonization should be regionally 
undertaken and directed taking into account the pitfalls of over concentration and 
locational disadvantages. For instance, one major factor that precipitated the collapse of 
the now moribund East African Community lies on the over concentration of cooperation 
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investment and infrastructure in Kenya to the detriment and utter frustrations of other 
member states. 
Therefore, its collapse was a kind of logical result of the failure of several attempts to 
address the wide disparities in the cooperation benefits between the member states. Thus, 
neither the Raisman Commission [1960], the Kampala/Mbale Agreement nor the Demas 
Commission could effectively assuage the frustrations of other member states or address 
the whopping imbalances created by the heavily lopsided distribution of the costs and 
benefits of cooperation between member states. 
ECOWAS must as a matter of urgency strive to create an objective and dynamic 
mechanism for equitable distribution of the costs and benefits of cooperation. Often, large 
revenue losses on the part of member states arising from the implementation of the 
liberalization process had been a bitter source of tensions and bitterness between member 
states. Equally, its highly probable that fair distribution of the costs and benefits of intra-
community cooperation will make member states feel better within the union than outside 
of it. 
Above all, since the main purpose of regional economic integration is to ensure vital 
economic stability and growth within the integrating area, ECOWAS economies must 
strive to attain sustainable economic growth by diligently maintaining their several 
domestic and regional reform programmes, in form of domestic adjustments towards 
economic diversification and stability. 
Further, ECOWAS decision-making mechanism hinged on the principle of unanimity 
needs to be overhauled with greater emphasis on flexibility and consensus-building based 
on mutual consultations, as in the case of the ASEAN Community, with a better 
understanding of the problems, aspirations and limitations of each other. 
Enhanced consensus-building has greater potential for eliciting better commitment and 
cooperation on the part of member states in the ratifications and implementation of 
regional economic integration programmes 
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Since social and economic stability is a major prerequisite for enhanced economic 
growth, sustainable peace and stability would pave the way for uninterrupted socio-
economic development throughout the region. ECOWAS must redouble its effort at 
enthroning good representative governance and re-energize its conflict management 
mechanism to reduce the high incidence of recourse to physical force in settling disputes 
in terms of bitter civil wars, violent conflicts and protests as well as frequent changes of 
government through military coups, which only exacerbate the already grave economic 
conditions of community. 
Though, it has been argued by some that region-wide threats from military insecurity 
could precipitate greater cooperation between nations within an integrating area, the 
constant conflicts in West Africa with the possibility of spill-over across national 
boundaries have so far elicited only marginal cooperation between member states as were 
the cases in Liberia, Sierra-Leone etc.98  
Finally, apart from the obvious disparities in ideological socio-economic and political 
systems, ECOWAS must strive to transcend these limitations, and constantly seek to 
promote sustainable intercultural and interpersonal relationships between member states 
with greater emphasis on those things that bind them together, while de-emphasizing 
disputable and contentious issues. 
Also, in the face of continued dominance of the political and economic activities in the 
region by a few member states [i.e. Cote d’ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria, ECOWAS should 
redouble its efforts in the promotion of greater cooperation and joint resources utilization 
between weaker member states to ensure equal benefits with the other states, as in the 
case of the Benelux countries with the enlargement of the EEC.99
ECOWAS must seek greater cooperation with the industrialized economies and donor 
countries with the aim of expanding possibilities for enhanced development assistance 
                                                 
98 For an over view of contributions of military insecurity, in the enhancement of greater cooperation 
between member states of an integrating area: see, Whealer, K.C. [1946: 37]. 
 
99On the effects of the enlargement of the EEC on the Benelux Countries and the acceleration of their 
integration, see, Padleford [1959: 380-393; Arnold, 1963-1964].  
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either in the form of increased foreign direct investments in community projects or in co-
financing the cost of adjustments both within the national domains of member states and 
in the region wide  integration programme. 
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APPENDIX. 
*The method. 
Step I: The first step taken by the researcher was to dig deep into the historical archives 
of West Africa. This involved a critical study and examination of relevant historical 
records and resource materials before and after independence of the West African states. 
In this process too, care was taken to investigate and determine the initial political and 
economic conditions that directly or indirectly created the need for the formation of an all 
embracing regional economic union in West Africa – ECOWAS. 
Step II: The researcher delineated ECOWAS regional economic integration programmes 
of trade liberalisation and liberalisation of migration barriers from the rest of the regional 
programmes; thus, leaving the yet to be implemented but important regional programme 
of financial liberalisation to future studies. 
The work basically concentrated on investigating the interrelated factors that jointly 
constitute the necessary and sufficient condition for the failure or order wise of the two 
aforementioned regional economic integration programmes because: 
A] They are the areas where some real and visible efforts have been made by ECOWAS 
in relation to regional economic integration, and; 
B] The two key regional policies have direct and immediate effects on the every day lives 
of the peoples of the region. 
Step III: The investigation of the operationalization of these two policies in member 
states was undertaken within the constraints of enabling resources and limited relevant 
materials required to undertake an extensive investigation.  In the light of these 
limitations, the researcher categorized ECOWAS member states into two groups of [A 
&B], based on the strength of their economies; thus, selecting only two member states 
from each group: 
A = [Nigeria and Ghana] for the “big” economies, and;  
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B = [Benin Republic and Togo] for the “small” economies. 
Step IV: The researcher set out to collect and examine relevant ECOWAS official 
documents and recorded materials in relation to the implementation of the two regional 
policies of trade liberalisation and liberalisation of migration barriers. This was against 
the background of insufficient data and poor record-keeping on the part of the 
organisation. Useful deductions were recorded while critically examining available 
recorded facts about the interplay of factors that constitute real problems and/or facilitate 
progress in the implementation of the programmes. 
Step V: In the light of a clear identification of the data gap, a field research was 
undertaken between 2002 and 2003. The process concentrated on investigating the 
obstacles in the implementation of the delineated regional programmes based on the two 
categories of member countries. The process involved; 
I] Open and informal qualitative interviews. 
II] Conversations and impressions documented in form of field notes - on the practical 
workings of the two regional protocols within the two categories of member states. 
 The views of customs and immigration controllers and documentary officials, Directors 
and programme officers of ECOWAS secretariat, other border posts officials, customs 
agents, traders and other persons crossing the borders were informally sought and 
obtained. 
The researcher’s observations and impressions on the regional decision-making style, 
organizational issues such as poor monitoring mechanisms, member states attitudinal 
behaviour in relation to cooperation with regional decisions and other political and 
strategic issues militating against the integration process were duly accounted for. 
Step VI: This involved a comprehensive examination and critical analysis of the two sets 
of data generated from both ECOWAS official documents and materials, and the field 
research. Care was taken to ascertain the degree of discrepancy between that which was 
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observed and records of the informal interviews from the field notes, and that which 
constitute the bulk of ECOWAS documentation. 
While bearing in mind the pitfalls of this method, the researcher carefully used 
deductive reasoning to select salient aspects of both groups of data to provide a detailed 
qualitative explanation of the interrelated factors that were necessary and jointly 
sufficient to precipitate the failure or order wise of ECOWAS regional economic 
integration policies. 
Finally, though this process was essentially qualitative, some basic statistical tables and 
figures were used to support the data without necessarily delving into systematic 
statistical explanations and ‘pontifications’.
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